

**COMMUNICATION-CONTENT SECURITY:
HYBRID MESSIANIC AGGRESSIONS**

Ukraine: 2014–2017

Training manual for communication-content
(informational) resistance specialists

Kyiv 2019

Recommended for publication by the Scientific Council of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
(protocol № 11 of 21.03.2019)

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ЛІ93 **Communication-content security: Hybrid messianic aggressions. Ukraine: 2014–2017: Training manual for communication-content (informational) resistance specialists.** Compiled by Liubovets H., Korol V.– K : Sole proprietorship Lopatina O.O.2019. – 166 pages
ISBN 978-617-7533-44-2

Communication-content aggressions have become very commonplace nowadays. That is why informational security is currently one of the main priorities in the framework of comprehensive protection of states and international organizations. However, an individual, a person, their consciousness and worldview require the strongest protection.

The topic of communication-content security, as a component of information security was studied by researchers and professors of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and other military and civilian higher educational establishments of Ukraine, representatives of civilian and military mass media, ATO veterans, as well as foreign and domestic experts on communication-content security.

The topical structure of the publication and principle of training development of publications was designed by H. Liubovets and V. Korol, the leading researchers of the Communication-Content Security and Regional Military Analysis Department of the Research and Development Center of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv based on the proprietary methodology of context analysis of information resonances (CAIR)..

The manual is designed for the information security specialists, public officials, students and citizens that are looking for answers regarding the issues of the contemporary communication-content conflict between Ukraine and the aggressor – Putin's regime of the Russian Federation.

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FOREWORD

The issues of informational security are a very trendy topic in the modern world. The civilizational future of the planet depends on how the infrastructural digital world is built, on how effective our defense mechanisms are against the communication-content challenges and the threats of hybrid messianic aggressions and global hybrid terrorism and on how well we can protect not only our data and networks, but also the human consciousness and worldview.

The range of topics covered by the training manual “Communication-content security: hybrid messianic aggressions” is extremely relevant, as it reflects the global need for the efficient information security algorithms. New threats and challenges build upon the communication-content flows, integration of cyber, political and information fields both require us to rethink the traditional approaches to managing communication structures and institutions and to review our understanding of the contemporary architectonics of content environments dynamics on different levels and the type of information circulating within them.

This manual covers a range of topics, linked together by a spectrum of information security issues. In particular, the manual introduces the issue of communication-content aggressions in the context of functions of the Ukrainian information space, it raises the issue of national identity transformation during decommunization, as well as the need for decolonization. The manual also describes a system for countering the global hybrid aggressor and highlights the need to restructure the state security sector in accordance with the NATO requirements. Considerable attention is paid to the hybrid aggression phenomenon and the mediatization of different segments of society, including the service segment. Manual contains a lot of empirical and statistical data that the readers can later use in the professional and personal life.

A set of practical questions added after each lecture will also come in handy for the audience, as they facilitate comprehensive learning. The questions motivate the reader to do research on the topic that has just been introduced and provide for a prolonged reflection on the issues that have been raised, thus providing additional opportunities for the analysis of the topic under consideration.

Readers are offered to conduct terminological analysis of the essential concepts, study certain historical facts, work with the biographies of key personalities in our history, and also to translate theoretical research results into empirical realities, echoing their own communication experience.

All of the material included in the manual is clearly structured. The topics

are presented in a way that is easy to understand. Alternation of theoretical and empirical segments also facilitates efficient learning.

Authors of the textbook, Hryhorii Liubovets and Valerii Korol, found an interesting way of composing a training manual – their own texts combined with materials provided by colleagues gave scientific and creative insight into many aspects of past and present and an impetus to try to answer the questions of the future.

Topical structure of the publication and the principal of the training development of publications are based on the proprietary methodology of context analysis of information resonances (CAIR).

The manual is designed for the information security specialists, public officials, service personnel and professional communicators. The information provided in this book might also be of interest for those citizens, who cannot ignore the intense communication-content confrontation between the modern Ukraine and the Moscovian neo-empire. This research might also interest people specializing in contemporary communication processes and cultural creative industries in the social civilizational dimensions of the global 4.0 world.

The manual may also be used by professors, teaching students majoring in journalism, political science, social informatics, etc.

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**CONTENT FLOW-ORIENTED MODELS
AS TACTICAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE
COMMUNICATION-CONTENT SECURITY**

Assistance, redemption, salvation, liberation – this is the incomplete list of Moscovia’s historical memes, that over an extended period of time have been shoved into “the limited resources of the human brain” of the Russian subjects, with the aim of it later becoming the motivating force of “the Russian patriotism” – a selection of monarchically chauvinistic, aggressive or messianic affirmations that were used by Kremlin to annex territories and to enslave peoples.

Are elites just a relic of the past or are they the digital prospect for the global digital empire of the planet of the chosen ones? Digital game-based practices: are they the extension of opportunities for freedom, dignity and partnership or a convenient system of social imprisonment?

The world of today is facing new threats to the global security. Permanent military conflicts, local wars, revolutions escalating into civil confrontations that have regularly occurred in different parts of the world (predominantly of the African continent), have raised concerns in the international community, but only in the form of focal areas of regional disturbance. In early 2000s the overall security situation could be characterized as stable.

In order to resolve political-territorial and other interstate disputes the international community has designed certain rules (international law) and institutions, most notably the UN. Until recently these measures were considered sufficient to resolve (either compulsory or on a contractual basis) both global and local conflicts.

However civilizational pacification of the international community, which was obviously based on the peaceful perspective of the democratic development of the global society determined by the principles of technological improvement of humanity and synergetic nature of economy and information as the historical prerequisites for transitioning to the noosphere (according to V. Vernadsky) and which accepted morality as its core value, was belligerently destroyed by the neo-barbarism of the Putin's regime.

What is the essence of the messiahship of the Russian (Soviet) empire? How has it transformed over time?

History has witnessed countless examples of dictators or state alliances repeatedly trying to conquer the world. In the previous century alone, according to different estimates, humanity lost from 50¹ to 75 million people that fell victim to unconscionable psychotically authoritarian imperial ambitions of A. Hitler and J. Stalin. It seemed like the lesson learned from the most notorious massacre in human history should have become a warning ensuring that it would never happen again.

The illusion of the peaceful development of the planet was destroyed by Putin's regime, ridden by eternal imperial messianic obsessions. Having conducted "the ceremonial review" of its forces on the Russian territory (two wars in the Chechen Republic) and having seen the reactions of the West, Kremlin was able to pinpoint the time in history when the international community was helplessly distant and that is when it carried out the attack against Georgia. Aggression against Ukraine was just a matter of time.

¹ Anastasiia Zanuda. World War II for Ukraine: new understanding. E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2015/05/150506_ukraine_ww2_az

It is worth noting that after the “first Chechen war”, when the international community began perceiving Moscovia as an aggressor owing to the professionalism of Chechen media experts, the respective conclusions were drawn in Moscow rather quickly. Ideological and informational state mechanism of the Russian Federation, previously rather cumbersome and monumental, was now transformed into a dynamic model of immediate reactions and potent media propaganda projects (both inside the country and on an international level).

These projects gained certain characteristics associated with the com-

What is the essence of the ideological and mental nanoreplicators? Where and when are they employed?

munication-content flow combined with significant organizational and coordinational capabilities of Kremlin at the international level. Particular emphasis was placed on the traditional exploitation of sophisticated ideologemes (which under the influence of the contemporary process solutions in the informational media domain have emerged as the idiosyncratic ideological and mental nanoreplicators). It should be stated here that large-scale, but often covert, information aggression operations against Ukraine had been a constantly occurring phenomenon. Kremlin has always been aware of the fact that Moscow (as an empire) isn't viable without Kyiv (Ukraine).

Furthermore, it is crucial for us to understand the historical and mental background that served as a backdrop for all of these manifestations of aggression against Ukraine (and actually against Europe as well). A while back D. Dontsov perfectly summarized the situation by saying: “..Ideologies of Russian communism and tsarism are just different embodiments of the same essence, different forms of the same more global phenomenon, which, in fact, is nothing but the Russian messiahship waging war against the West”¹.

As for the current situation the scientists from the National Institute for Strategic Studies state that: “...the strive to saturate Russia's historical image with spiritual, messianic content is an important element of the reconstruction of imperial identity”² and also, that “...proclaiming the necessity “of protecting and liberating Europe” is an important component of the ideology of Russian messiahship”³.

1 D. Dontsov. The basis of our policy. E-resource. Can be accessed at: <http://www.myslenedrevo.com.ua/uk/Publ/Dontsov/BasesOurPolicy.html>

2 Global hybrid war: Ukrainian frontline: monograph /edited by V.P. Horbulin. K.: NISD, 2017. – 496 p. P. 137

3 Global hybrid war: Ukrainian frontline: monograph /edited by V.P. Horbulin. K.: NISD, 2017. –

Assistance, redemption, salvation, liberation – this is the incomplete list of Moscovia’s historical memes, that over an extended period of time have been shoved into “the limited resources of the human brain”¹ of the Russian subjects, with the aim of it later becoming the motivating force of “the Russian patriotism” – a selection of monarchically chauvinistic, aggressive or messianic affirmations that were used by Kremlin to annex territories and to enslave peoples.

Only by realizing the seriousness of the threat, imposed on us via historical, linguistic, mental, sociolinguistic, media and other means of targeted influence on the mind of an average Ukrainian citizen and Ukrainian society as a whole are we able to counter the informational and propagandistic hybrid messiahship of Moscovia.

To better understand the diversity of possibilities of such counteraction through the lens of a communication-content security system deployed on a state level please refer to the tentative list of topics for potential scientific researches and functional research areas provide in the annex.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. State of the global security in the beginning of the 21st century. Key characteristics.

2. Role that the internal wars of the Russian Federation waged in 1990’s (1st and 2nd Chechen wars) played in the development of the Kremlin’s armed aggression policy (perspective) against closest neighbors.

3. Characteristics of the Russian (Soviet) empire as a potential aggressor in the works of the prominent figures of the 19th and 20th centuries (K. Marx, F. Engels, W. Churchill, R. Reagan and others).

4. Explain the essence of the definition of “Russian messiahship” provided by D. Dontsov and the contemporary challenges of the hybrid messiahship. Historical context. Multitude of examples. Types of threats.

5. What is the essence of the messiahship of the Russian (Soviet) empire? How has it transformed over time?

6. In which condition of the information domain can the content flow-oriented models be perceived as tactical instruments of the communication-content security? Characteristics. Indications. Suggestions.

496 p. P. 140

1 James Gleick. What defines a meme? E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/scho_take_mem

7. *What is the essence of “the noosphere” according to V. Vernadsky? Key provisions. Essential composition. Areas of application in modern societal processes.*

8. *Transformation of the information and military policies of the Russian Federation after the First Chechen war. Informational and technological support of the Second Chechen war. Areas. Approaches. Process solutions.*

9. *What is the essence of the ideological and mental nanoreplicators? Where and when are they employed?*

10. *Why is the thesis stating that Ukraine is the basis for historical and contemporary statehood of the Russian Federation so fundamental to Kremlin’s political regimes? Arguments. Methodologic models. Geopolitical conditions. Geostrategic perspectives.*

11. *Which functional areas of the communication-content security were you able to learn about from this article? How do you feel: surprised, shocked, amazed? What can you add?*

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**CONTEMPORARY INFORMATION SPACE
OF UKRAINE AND THE ADEQUACY
OF THE INFORMATION SECURITY**

Combining all aspects of the multi-format and multi-level aggressions of putinism against our country, such as armed, linguistic, confessional, sacral, sociolinguistic, cultural, historical, ideological, mythological, diplomatic, economical and communication-content related aspect (the list goes on) we come to the conclusion that Ukrainian territory, in particular Crimea and the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, is a field testing site for the global hybrid terrorism.

If we were to accept Ukraine being defined as a field testing site for the global hybrid terrorism and were able to prove that to the international community, we could offer a new configuration of the international collective security to the global society

Information fields of Ukraine can be characterized by a multitude of formats and dynamic flows, but they are almost completely not integrated into the regional communication-content environments of various scopes by the means of partner situational coordination services. This is why Ukrainian information space is often unbalanced in its segmental elements.

Contemporary regional and interregional communication-content environments and the structure of Ukrainian information fields have held the dominant position under their own momentum since the days of the Soviet Union, thus the key players of the EU are often influenced by the dominant forces of non-Ukrainian origin, that quite professionally mimic the brand imposed upon the civilized world “That is what Ukrainians think”. Leading media corporations with a foreign target audience support permanent resistance to any actions of the Ukrainian government by the means of their information journalistic practice, regardless of the political orientation of the media outlet itself and the motivation behind those actions. The bet is placed either on the popularity of media’s democratic push-back against the government (traditional competitiveness of the fourth estate) or on the contemporary communication-content effects of the global hybrid-messianic aggressions.

How would you explain the phrase “communication-content sovereignty of Ukraine”?

Information-related topics are inertially cultivated at the dominant levels of the Ukrainian society based on the visual TV-image. This is particularly evident in the ATO zone. The image relies on the psychophysical reflexes of a human being, which usually are fear, caused by deaths, tragedies and catastrophes on one hand, and excessive positivity of the advertising formats on the other (as the other extreme).

Gaps between these extremes are filled but the information industries of the third parties (Putin’s Russian Federation, global cinema corporations, etc.). This traditionally underlines the functional reality, which is a hallmark of the partial communication-content sovereignty of Ukraine, as a young state. Positive information theses, describing the life in Ukraine, that exist within the regional communication-content environments do not have access to any adequate communication-content systems and support tools for the sole reason that the strict hierarchical model of perceiving the life on this territory as unpromising, aimless and catastrophic has been monopolistically imposed upon the society. These and other negative models

Communication-content security: are employed with the only purpose to make positivity (of an advertising non-discrete nature) unpopular in Ukraine, in particular in the horizontal sections of certain Ukrainian territories. Such a situation is used to support the simplified, often inconsistent with the current threats and challenges, hierarchical information media system of the Ukrainian information field, which is very economically advantageous for the super lucrative monopolistic centers of the advertising industry. It also works in the favor of individual central government actors who strive to neutralize the proactive manifestations of the public life in the regions. This approach leads to the Ukrainian state structure taking on the characteristics of the “Mexican model”, in which jobs and life in general are concentrated around metropolises, and all other territories are not even decently civilized.

Globalization processes launched in the framework of the technological era of cyber networks (infrastructures), which ensured the unobstructed movement of various data and content information arrays, no longer necessitate high professionalism in the production of the communication-content flows. Moreover, strong dynamics have dramatically altered the nature of the content production, forcing the quality and substantiation to compete with the legalization scope and the response format. This occurs because the competition for attention has shifted from political or other elites to groups of citizens, whose role in economic and budgetary processes, as well as governmental statuses and states’ perspectives continues to increase. And as a result of global hybrid terrorist catastrophes in Ukraine or the permanent processes in Syria the role of the citizen groups extended continent-wide.

The model of a transparent, open and democratic society, which is cultivated by the developed countries, such as the USA and the EU member-states, enabled them to establish a monopoly on global governance in our information-oriented society by using not facts or newsworthy occurrences, but rather a strong technologically creative accent distribution in the visualized multi-format information media flows, which overlap with the globalized key messages (the linguistic diversity of the world is not an issue in this case).

Communication-content aggressions of the hybrid messianic world akin to those of the Russian Federation actively employ the potential of the new information phenomenon – the public diplomatic terrorism. This phenomenon occurs when the attention is riveted on both the direct threats and the

comminatory accusations by the key political actors on the international level. The essence of the information in these claims will be subsequently repudiated on multiple levels, but the third parties (or the population of certain countries) will have already drawn their conclusions regarding Ukraine at the behest of the strategists of the hybrid messianic aggressions (D. Shusharin) or from the standpoint of the ideological framework of the monopolistic universal human instruments, such as, for example, Christianity as “the Russian world”, “Slavic unity” or “Eurasian orthodox identity”, etc.

There is only one way for the state of Ukraine to come out on top in the modern highly sophisticated information processes that is by using a system of diagnostic creative industries with state-of-the-art approaches and methodologies for countering and neutralizing information influence. At the same time, it is necessary to engage the intellectual potentials of the multi-functional coordination models of the state institutions, the existence of which depends on the outcome of the information rivalry

with a very well-known name (not just the information security, but its communication-content component in particular). The term “information security”, as a collective name

*What is the essence
of the communication-content
phenomenon known as “public
diplomatic terrorism”?*

for cyber and communication-content components, unfortunately hasn’t gained the status of an evaluation criterion in the minds of most executive cadre of the defense sector, but instead still remains simply a name of a closed hierarchical organization dealing with corporate information transfers, which the world of today simply calls “the cyber security of a state sector or a market segment”. In this case the parity of the communication-content component seems far-fetched, since the new type of partnership hasn’t become a dominant feature in Ukrainian managerial practices yet.

Information security has a positive evaluation capacity only when there is an effective coordination between a few parallel areas of the information environment in place, such as: the communication-content flow-oriented industry, cyber network resources with the highest level of functionality and ranked access and protection, and systems of communication-content engagement, used as a tool to extend the partnership capabilities between all components of the security sector based on the ATO lessons learned, etc.

Out of the couple of models that would support the efficient information security of the state, the best one is the one that envisages the concentration of resources, personnel and tools in the primary law enforcement institution of the security sector of the state, which has an amplified level of compliance standards enforced through both the legislative-statutory liability and the encouraging and promising opportunity to work with the maximum number of civilian and civilian-military audiences that do not conflict with any confessional, professional, age or gender-related interests.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *What do you think “an information field” is? In your opinion, what is the difference between information fields and communication-content environments?*

2. *What is the functional role of the information fields in the contemporary segmentation of the Ukrainian informational domain? Your associations?*

3. *How can the mass media of democratic societies use the technologies of global hybrid terrorism against democracy? Examples. Suggestions to neutralize such actions.*

4. *How would you explain the phrase “communication-content sovereignty of Ukraine”? Opinion. Arguments. Prospects for change.*

3. *In your opinion, are the TV formats of the flow content presentation dominant in terms of providing information and influencing public opinion? If the answer is yes, then where — in the world, in Ukraine, in Crimea, on the line of deterrence in the ATO (JFO) zone, elsewhere? Arguments. Examples.*

4. *What is a non-advertising content positivity? Your explanations, structured sequence of arguments. Examples. Cases from personal experience.*

5. *What is the essence of the communication-content phenomenon known as “public diplomatic terrorism”? Illustrate using the examples of public processes and occurrences.*

6. *Which public factors have facilitated the massification of public or social attention? What is the difference between the sociopolitical and public attention? Indicators. Hierarchy of influence. Dominant factors that influence the state of the attention.*

7. *What are the structural components of information security? Which one of these components is dominant in your opinion? Reasons. Consequences. Prospects for development in quantum networks.*

Ihor Levchenko
military expert

FROM DECOMMUNIZING THE SPACE TO DECOLONIZING THE CONSCIOUSNESS

Admittedly, up until this day (before Maidans in 2004 and 2014) Ukrainian society remains post-colonial and post-genocidal, as its mental transformation is taking a lot of time and a lot of effort.

...We have to be prepared for the fact that the decolonization will be met with even greater resistance than decommunization. The situation that occurred when the Lva Tolstogo street in Kyiv was supposed to be renamed after a famous activist of the Ukrainian national movement Yevhen Chekalenko can be given as an example. This civic initiative was met with an immense resistance from the “culturally Russian” plebs. And almost every inch of the maps of our cities and towns is covered with examples similar to the “Tolstogo” case. It’s not that they are bad by default: they are neither nor bad, they are simply foreign.

Amidst the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine it is no secret to anyone that the main battlefield in the fight for our Motherland is not only where the “thin red line” of the active armed conflict in Donbas is, but rather it is stretched over the entire territory of the country. Moreover, this battle extends into other – virtual – domains as well: from information space to consciousness of the society, certain societal groups and even separate individuals.

In these domains the war is waged not by the means of tanks and cannons, but rather mentalities, values and, in a wider sense, worldviews. Here information is the weapon and the collective and individual consciousness are the target. Therefore, in order to win we have to clearly understand who we are and where we come from, why we were attacked and what is that that our enemy wants, what we want and we strive for.

Admittedly, up until this day Ukrainian society remains post-colonial and post-genocidal, as its mental transformation is taking a lot of time and a lot of effort. Ironically, even though the Russian aggression has been made possible by such a state of Ukrainian society among other things, it has also created the conditions that facilitated the acceleration of the transformation processes within said society. Under such circumstances the objective of the state is to create institutional and legal conditions enabling a rapid societal transformation. The scientific and expert community, as well as public figures have to assist the state in the fulfilment of this objective. Since, as it turned out, our political elites are inherently deeply post-colonial and post-genocidal and not exactly fit for self-transformation.

The author believes that as of today the decommunization process is the most successfully implemented state transformation. It is worth noting that in 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence, it was already clear for most people that the decommunization of societal and individual consciousness was not feasible without the decommunization of public space. Therefore, it is impossible to build an actually successful and independent Ukraine without the former as well. Even then, the Ukrainian State with the revived independence of the Ukrainian nation craved its own identification of the Ukrainian space, there was an obvious need to take the haze of the post-colonial sovietness off of the nation. Today, after fighting for our independence against the Russian aggressor for three years, this realization is clearer than ever.

Owing to the Revolution of Dignity, it is now clear for everyone that decommunization is inevitable. The Russian aggression that followed only reaf-

firmed such a stance. A very rational thought started to take form in the societal consciousness, an idea that it is not only impossible to build a successful Ukrainian State living on the hypothetical “Lenin” street and seeing yet another Kremlin’s idol every day but it is also very likely that sooner or later there will be a Russian tank driving through this hypothetical “Lenin” street and you will cry about missed opportunities in a basement to the sounds of the explosion of Russian “Grad” shells on the very same hypothetical “Lenin” street.

Today, evaluating the decommunization laws adopted in spring of 2015, we can conclude that the procedure itself is outlined reasonably well. Unlike most Ukrainian laws, they contained very few ambiguities and loopholes which could be used to circumvent or ignore their provisions. The law made it completely impossible to imitate or fail to implement it establishing well-defined limits. However, the provisions of the law envisaged taking into account public opinion and engaging non-governmental initiatives. For example, the new name of Kirovograd – Kropyvnytskyi – was not created behind the closed doors of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, it was one of the options suggested by local activists. By the way, INM leaned more toward the other suggestion from the public – Inhulsk.

According to INM, around 51,5 thousand toponomic items in cities, towns and villages have lost their totalitarian names as a result of decommunization. 2389 monuments and memorial signs have been dismantled, 1320 of which have been Lenin monuments. Verkhovna Rada, in turn, has renamed 25 regions and 987 settlements (including 32 cities). In this process the Parliament of Ukraine has predominantly relied on the suggestion of local communities regarding the new names for cities and villages. The decommunization process is still ongoing, as the Kremlin-Bolshevist regime has left an abundance of marks all over our territory.

This year the decommunization laws have acted as a reliable breakwater, breaking the waves of “pobiedobesiye” (annual V-Day related rampage organized to please the Kremlin), the flare-ups of which usually characterize the first decade of May. For example, today the demonstration of Soviet totalitarianism symbols is punishable by up to 5 years of imprisonment with confiscation.

As predicted, the decommunization was met with quiet sabotage by certain local comprador elites and the notorious fifth column. Nothing was off the limits, neither inaction nor fear mongering, nor intimidation based on non-existent problems. However, the most dangerous aspect of the decommunization is not the sabotage, but rather the avoidance and opposi-

Communication-content security: tion to the ukrainization of the territories manifested in making up various generic plant, emotion and weather related names. Analyzing the actions of local comprador elites, it becomes evident that their efforts are aimed at preserving the sovietized expansion, which is essentially an integral part of Russian imperial expansion.

These expansions are at the core of the modern ideology of Russian aggression. Russian neo-imperialism is being held

Are there modern elites in Ukraine? Does this phenomenon have the potential and perspective?

in place by these hypothetical and seemingly innocent faceless “Kate’s” and “Elizabeth’s”, liberators, like Zhukov and Vatutin and the cultural and value-based story of Schors.

For example, the local government of Kharkiv has deliberately ignored the suggestions of local activists regarding the perpetuation of the memory of the 1917-1920 liberation movements participants, the centenary of which we are commemorating this year. As a result, the city with probably the most eventful history in the East of our country was deliberately deprived of a new, purely Ukrainian toponomic image. The same thing happened in Odessa, but there, the city authorities, having resorted to sabotage from the start, were forced to react to the changes that had already been approved at the level of the regional state administration.

Therefore, the decommunization process has brought to the light the issue of decolonization of both the Ukrainian State territories and the consciousness of the Ukrainian people. It is worth noting, that the need for decolonization is not that obvious, as the postcolonial ideas are deeply and covertly rooted in the consciousness of the Ukrainian society and their boundaries are often unclear. Launching the decolonization process, it is important to clearly recognize its biggest adversary, the notorious “Russian world”. At the same time, we must also be aware of the fact that “the Russian world” does not only involve the apocalypse that is taking place in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea, it is not only manifested in the blatant fascism in the speeches of such odious figures, as Zhirinovsky or Dugin. On the side opposite to “Givi and Motorola” there is an entire world of Pushkin, Lermontov and even Makarevich. These two sides are united and inseparable in their entirety. The neo-imperial intellectuals, like the notorious Girkin, have become the quintessence of this unity in the contemporary Russian aggression against Ukraine, as they have

come to our land to kill us bearing weapons and reciting Yesenin. This is something we have to be aware of.

Nevertheless, we have to be prepared for the fact that the decolonization will be met with even greater resistance than decommunization. The situation that occurred when the Lva Tolstogo street in Kyiv was supposed to be renamed after a famous activist of the Ukrainian national movement Yevhen Chekalenko can be given as an example. This civic initiative was met with an immense resistance from the “culturally Russian” plebs. And almost every inch of the maps of our cities and towns is covered with examples similar to the “Tolstogo” case. It’s not that they are bad by default: they are neither nor bad, they are simply foreign. And there are way too many of them. This “great Russian world” leaves no room for the Ukrainian universe, which for us has to objectively come first. Moreover, we have to always keep in mind that this “world” is the world of our enemy. By tolerating it we are tolerating our enemy and consequently becoming weaker.

We are yet to discover our own Ukrainian universe, as it still resides under the thick layers of Russian imperialism. This principle is applicable to more than just the toponomic space around us. We are not aware of the depth of our musical tradition, we try to ignore national Renaissance and Baroque schools of thought, we have not yet fully discovered and sounded out the cultural legacy of the “Executed Renaissance”, let alone the more ancient layers of the national neo-folklore culture.

We simply do not know our history and often use foreign historical concepts. For some reason, the great rulers of the ancient Ukraine-Rus still have to push through the thousand-kilometer wide wildwood of our imagination with the tenacity of a schizophrenic to reign in the godforsaken and, probably, existent only in Karamazin’s mind cities of Suzdal and Riazan. We bashfully stay quiet about the existence of the Rus Kingdom and invalidate the role and the progress of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Grand Principality of Rus, the Duchy of Samogitia and other lands, which in their form and essence were OUR states.

In our imagination the Ukrainian Cossacks are still embodied by the rascal Cossack in crimson sharovary, dancing hopak and drinking horilka, but not by a noble knight representing the real Rus people of the time. Their Eastern and Western contemporaries called them the “Rus Sarmatians” and the “fiery host”. And their biggest value was INDEPENDENCE.

It was a specific social and legal category which closely corresponds to the currently overused definition of “rights and obligations”, but with a more powerful moral and spiritual foundation. Independence was the motivation behind waging wars and it also was the driving force for the works of such great Ukrainian minds of the XVII-XVIII centuries, as Antin Radyvylvovskyi and Hryhorii Skovoroda.

That is where the lack of knowledge of our own military tradition comes from, as well as the misunderstandings that occur between the law enforcement officials and social advocates, such as: historians, heraldists, designers and technologists, who are all trying to give our warring army a genuinely Ukrainian and a contemporary European appearance.

The regional aspect of decolonization requires a specific approach as well. While the Eastern regions of Ukraine have always been more “Sovietized”, the Southern regions, on the other hand, have always leaned more toward the “imperialized” side. In order for the “Russian world” to not stand a chance here, an average dweller of Odessa has to know and be proud of the fact that the first written record of the Katsiubiiv – the port castle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Rus dates back to 1415. It is worth noting that the noble family of princes Ostrogski – the uncrowned rulers of the Rus-Ukraine in XIV-XVII, played a huge role in building a mighty castle there. In the same manner the dwellers of contemporary Ochakiv should know about Dashiv and the dwellers of Kherson – about Bilkovychi. They should also be aware of the fact that Mariupol was founded by the Greeks exiled from Crimea by the Russian crown in place where the ancient Cossack fortress of Domaha that shielded the entire river mouth of Kalmius once stood. Another thing that should be common knowledge is that the European maps of the XVII century had a Cossack city of Vynogradna Krucha in spot where the contemporary city of Mykolaiv stands.

There is also an urgent need for the Ukrainian South to scientifically rethink the Hellenic period of its history. This is because its ancient history has little to do with “Potemkin villages” or even with the noble battles of Zaporozhian Cossacks or Crimean Tatars, who undoubtedly have the right for an exclusive national and cultural autonomy on their own historic lands. First and foremost, this has a lot do with the millenary existence of the Hellenic world here – the foundation of the contemporary European civilization. The world that our ancestors remained in constant contact with, being an integral part of it. This is something we have to proudly pro-

Hybrid messianic aggressions claim in front of the entire planet, as the dignified heirs of that world, since all contemporary European nations are a blend of a Hellenic base and an average fifteen-hundred-year-long national history, glorified and reflected on down to the last Celtic button.

Which Russian cultural symbols contribute to the mental expansion of the “Russian world” and why?

In general, at a regional level there is an urgent need to create our own local Ukrainian spaces and local collective memories that could be organically inscribed into the nationwide Ukrainian context. At the same time, they have to be based on the local material (which is sufficient enough) and keep up to date with the local events and figures in the framework of the Ukrainian world, the most significant of which may even require a certain “canonization” in the public consciousness. Every citizen in every corner of our country has to feel like a part of something great and splendidous. And if, for example, the government of Kharkiv does not want to reveal its Ukrainian face, then the state has to do it for them.

Particular attention has to be paid to the capital of our state – Kyiv. We can confidently say that Kyiv is that particular consolidating and even partially sacral place that unites the East and the West, the North and the South of our country. Therefore, the government of the city has to understand that Kyiv is not just a large city – it is the capital of the state, its face and the example for others. And as for the government of the state, they have to not leave everything to the mercy of the local government under the guise of self-government.

All of this means that Kyiv needs a prominent statehood-based face. It should demonstrate the greatness and antiquity of the “Ukrainian world” but at the same time – the modernity and the focus on the future. Kyiv is the city of the contemporary technologies and high speeds that provides a multitude of opportunities and comfortable living conditions. But it is also the location of the nation-wide memorials, national pantheons, sacral sites of commemoration, spiritual and historic shrines of the Ukrainian nations and the origins of its statehood. Kyiv needs its own Acropolis at the Starokyiv hill and its own Louvre – in Pechersk region. Fortunately, we already have our own Mount Athos, the question is whether it is really ours.

It means that Kyiv does not only need convenient transport junctions and the “subway to Troyeschyna”, but also museumification and memori-

Communication-content security: alization. And maybe it also needs a new, exclusively Ukrainian monumentalism. This is because, as it turned out, the Ukrainian society ended up not being ready to immortalize the heroes of the Revolution of Dignity in the postmodernist stylistics. Probably it would be appropriate to create our own contemporary Ukrainian Neo-Empire style? And then maybe we can even finish constructing our own Hősök tere (the Heroes' Square in Budapest)...

The best illustration of the current state of things is a small journalistic investigation by Iryna Kostenko and Maryna Ostapenko. Over the course of the year these two journalists have visited the scheduled tours held at such sacral for all Ukrainian shrines, as the Saint Sophia's Cathedral and Pechersk lavra. The results were impressive. The contents of the tours correspond to the list of Soviet-Russian clichés and concepts, not to mention the Russian language spoken by the tour guides. Without going into details (their articles can be found on the Radio Liberty website) it should be noted that these sacral sites are completely deprived of a Ukrainian context, they exist beyond it. The tours did not even have the words "Ukraine", "Ukrainian", "Ukrainians" or "national" in them and that was something the authors pointed out.

And this is just the edge of the thickened post-colonial blanket, which our northern neighbor is using to sedate Ukraine. And from that point on everything goes according to Shevchenko... This is where the aforementioned museum studies, tours, secrecy and the lack of information about our past and present come into play. Ukrainian children still learn pioneer marches and Russian folk songs at music schools. In schools and kindergartens, they sing about "krylatyie kacheli", "uchat v scholie" and "begut neukliuzhe" (which are all references to Soviet children's songs). Not to mention the fact that the upbringing within the military lyceums system, for example, until recently was for the most part based on three pillars: "the great victory", "the glory of Russian weapon" and "the loyal cadets of the emperor".

Therefore, without the interference of the state the Ukrainian society will have a difficult time. The decolonization task is a lot more extensive and painstaking, it requires a lot of efforts and the coordination between different state institutions. The Institute of National Memory can take over the role of the initiator and coordinator of the decolonization processes, since it already has the positive decommunization experience. The management of the Institute must, however, realize that the role of their institution goes a lot deeper into our history than its Eastern European counter-

parts limited by the totalitarian past. Both the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education should also play an important role here and, maybe, the existence of such a mysterious state institution as Ministry of Information Policy will also eventually make sense.

This is due to the fact that the success of the implementation of the “Ukrainian world» greatly depends on how attractive and interesting, fundamental and profound, great and dignified its image is. In the modern world this includes the video, audio, graphic and monumental aspects, which are key in shaping public opinion. Therefore, information, information and once again information, such as content and the optimal forms of its presentation, are crucial. The author thinks, that the state institutions listed above do not only have extensive administrative and professional capabilities for the implementation of the respective policy, but also certain financial resources in the form of the national cultural fund and grant funds allocated for implementing the projects in the information field. Not to mention the fact that those institutions also have an absolute advantage when it comes to the administrative and managerial systems in the educational and pedagogic activities of the state, the state media system, etc. Based on the decommunization experience we know that the corresponding legislation initiatives are absolutely necessary, as a mean of “soft” Ukrainization.

It is important to additionally highlight the need to bring to the logical conclusion the processes of creating a new face for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, permeating the military motivation system and the patriotic upbringing system with Ukrainian notions, implementing a reasonable statehood-oriented value system within the military lyceums system, etc.

And, of course, no one should ever doubt the fact that the Ukrainian language is necessary for creating a Ukrainian universe. This topic should not be up for discussions. That is why the author thinks it would be unreasonable to stop there.

Therefore, we may conclude that decolonization is crucial for the already decommunized Ukraine, as the Russian aggressor may not find that many differences between the hypothetical Lenin and Pushkin streets.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. What do you think is the starting point of Ukrainian history? Substantiate your opinion.

2. *Why are messianic hybrid aggressions bigger than military ones in terms of scale and impact intensity? Do you agree with this opinion? Argumentation. Source references. Current situation.*

3. *Do you agree with the idea that the Ukrainian society is post-colonial and post-genocidal? Your opinion. What are the differences between these two expansion vectors of the Ukrainian nation? Which manifestations of these phenomena have you witnessed in your life?*

4. *Are there modern elites in Ukraine? Does this phenomenon have the potential and perspective? Your opinion. Argumentation. Precautions and suggestions for understanding the awareness of this problem in your age group.*

5. *How do you define the concept of the “decommunization process”? Your associations. What do you think about that and why? Provide reasoning for your opinion. Experience of participating or reasons for not participating in this process.*

6. *In your opinion, why do decommunization sabotage cases still occur on a local level?*

7. *What is a good way to terminologically present the events that took place on the central squares of Ukraine in 2013-2014 in the history textbooks? Why does the notion of “revolution” dominate the public discourse? Characterize the expression “Maidan of Dignity”. How would you define the notion of “maidan” through the prism of history and mentality of the Ukrainian nation? Arguments supporting your opinion. Recommendations for a better understanding of the process.*

8. *Who is Lenin and what is the hypothetical “Lenin street”? Your associations and arguments supporting your opinion.*

9. *Which Russian cultural symbols contribute to the mental expansion of the “Russian world” and why? Examples that prove the malignity of the semantic similarity between the notions of “world” and “peace” through the creation of the “hybrid peace” state on the occupied territories of Ukraine by the Putin’s aggressors as a global threat.*

10. *Who is Yevhen Chykalenko in the Ukrainian history? Name the prominent historical figure of your region, that were a part of neither communism nor colonialism. Why are these precautions important? What is a preferable way to combat it?*

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**LANGUAGE POLICY
AND COMMUNICATION-CONTENT SECURITY
UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBAL
HYBRID TERRORISM. UKRAINIAN FIELD
TESTING SITE**

Analyzing the manifestations of the hybrid messianic aggressions of putinism in Ukraine, we started to understand the scale, specifics and perspectives of the new public-private way to counter the enemy, which is known as “communication-content security”.

...We have come to realize the importance, or it is even better to say, the status of content, as a particular area of communication dynamics in contemporary realities. Content is no longer a solely linguistic notion, due to the fact that Putin’s technologists perceive it as a target for aggression.

An opening ceremony of the multimedia historical park “Russia is my history” took place at the end of October 2017 in the city of Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan (the Russian Federation) on the territory of the permanent exhibition center “Kazan fair”. It was a very high-level event, since the guest list included the President of Tatarstan Rustam Minihanov, Vice Prime Minister of the Republic Vasily Shaihrzitev, mayor of Kazan Ilсур Metshyn, dignitary clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslim Spiritual Authority, etc. Another testimony to the statusness of this event was the greetings telegram from the senior staff of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, which beside everything else, contained the following statement: “It is symbolic that... the park “Russia is my history” is being opened in Kazan, as the city has played a significant role in the development of the united Russian nation, in the establishment of the united and consolidated nation of Russia”.¹ United Russian nation with the center in Kazan is a state-geopolitical trend that has been spreading amongst the governmental elites (leadership) of the Russian Federation for quite a while with the aim of affirming a new modernity format – societal mega environment of corporate stylistics and functions, which used to be called nation formations. This is the advanced response-dimension of the culturally-expansionistic absorption of other peoples and nations, given that there are representatives of 204 ethnicities and ethno-national groups currently living in the Russian Federation² and there were 21 republics, 1 autonomous region and 4 autonomous districts founded based on the ethnic factor.³

The dominance of language mono-identity is perceived by the contemporary leadership of the new Russian empire, as one of the most important factors for maintaining the statehood within the current geographic borders and as an option for preventing radical disobedience campaigns by the population of the Russian Federation subjects against both their local and federal government in the future.

It is obvious that all of the governmental and even corporate commercial organizations and services of the Russian Federation are following the

1 President of Tatarstan headed the opening ceremony of the new multimedia exhibition “Russia is my history” in Kazan. E-resource. Can be accessed at: <http://kazan.bezformata.ru/listnews/vistavku-rossiya-moya-istoriya/62079886/>

2 Information on the final results of the All-Russian census of 2010. E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm

3 Socio-demographic portrait of Russia: According to the results of the All-Russian census of 2010/ Federal Service of State Statistics. – Moscow: information research center “Russian Statistics”, 2012. – 183 p. P.102-104. E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/portret-russia.pdf

same principle, as they implement the policy of destroying the languages of the indigenous ethnicities of the federation and forcefully replacing them with Russian language. For instance, in October of this year the federal prosecutor's office deemed illegal the curriculums for the educational establishments of the Republic of Tatarstan which contained Tatar language as a compulsory subject and sent an order to the head of the government of Tatarstan demanding to repeal current recommendations, thus practically banning Tatar language from being taught in schools.

Tatarstan is not the only place, where measures like these are taken. All of them are justified by the “abidance by the federal laws on ensuring the right of citizens to voluntarily study their native language from the list of languages of the ethnicities of the Russian Federation and the state languages of republics, which are a part of the Russian Federation”, as this was the order Vladimir Putin gave to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.¹

In your opinion, does the united Russian nation exist?

Therefore, we are witnessing the implementation of yet another stage of the policy of destroying the national identity of the indigenous people of the Russian Empire through forcing them to renounce learning and using their native language as a geo-unification factor for population and communities. This method is used to undermine the individual identification based on mental spiritual codes of living.

Historically, this pressure was also put on Ukraine. Without taking too long of a historical journey, let us just look at one example, when in 1970's the formula about Russian language practically being the second native language for the peoples of the USSR adopted by the party in the 60's and proclaimed by the then leader of the Soviet Union Mykyta Khrushchev was transformed into the practical idea of Russian language “rightly” being second native for the Ukrainians. The leader of the Ukrainian communist party Volodymyr Scherbytskyi advocated in favor of this approach, implementing the cruel policy of raising “conscious, active constructors of communism”.² That is why it is no coincidence that the language issue was selected by the Putin's regime to launch a large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

1 Prosecutors asked parents to come to school because of Tatar language. E-resource. Can be accessed at: <https://realnoevremya.ru/society/education/78249-prokuratura-rt-zapustila-kontrolnuyu-po-tatarskomu>

2 Ukrainian Language in the Twentieth Century: A History of Linguicide, edited by Larysa Masenko. Kyiv: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2005. – 399 p. P. 24.

Analyzing the range of issues that have been traditionally attributed to information confrontation, in this case between the Putin's Russia and Ukraine, over the course of the last four years in the premises of the Research and Development Center of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, we can conclude that the contemporary information space is filled with entirely new publicity handling categories that arose from the hyper-scaled dynamics of event-related processes and are their new quality. In our opinion these categories are: "hybrid messianic aggressions", "communication-content security", "communication-content aggressions", "communication-content simulation", "communication-content flows", "communication-content design", "informational challenge", "information risk", "information threat", "communication-content multiplier", "global hybrid terrorism", etc.¹ Such an approach to determining the essence of the emerging processes that are taking place in the information space give us an opportunity to pin-point the contextual essence of all actions committed by the Putin's regime not only against Ukraine, but also against the international community, as a whole and to create an advanced communication-content system of countering the aggressor by using fundamentally different means and measures, in particular in terms of efficiency and perspective, to neutralize (first and foremost methodologically) the actions of the adversary.

Based on the above, we perceive Kremlin's language identity policy – one of the foundations of the "Russian world", as a potent complex of non-military, but still very efficient weapon of global hybrid terrorist, the apologist of which is Putin's regime. Combining all aspects of the multi-format and multi-level aggressions of putinism against our country, such as: armed, language, denominationally-sacral, sociolinguistic, communication-content, cultural, historic, ideologically-mythological, diplomatic, economic – the list goes on, we draw a conclusion that the territory of Ukraine, in particularly Crimea and the occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, is the testing range for the global hybrid terrorism.² Today the global community is moving ever closer to realizing that this is exactly what the situation in Ukraine is. If we took the fact that Ukraine is

1 Hryhorii Liubovets, Valerii Korol. National Security and Its Information Component. Content as an instrument of hybrid messianic aggressions. Collection of works "Language and Society", issue 7, 2016, p. 95-107. E-resource. Can be accessed at: <http://sociolinguistics.lnu.edu.ua/ua/issues/07/10.pdf>

2 Hryhorii Liubovets, Valerii Korol, Content Flow-Oriented Models as Tactical Instruments of the Communication-Content Security. Materials of the International Forum on Crisis of Communications. – Kyiv.: Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 2017 - 306 p. P.11-21. E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://mil.univ.kiev.ua/files/230_575144259.pdf

Hybrid messianic aggressions

a testing range for the global hybrid terrorism as a premise and proved it to the international community, then we would be able to offer the world a new configuration of the international collective security.

However, currently we, as a state, are working with the usual or rather traditional understanding of all processes (independently or at the suggestion of strategic partners)

How do you interpret the expression “latent communication-content aggression”? How can we counter this phenomenon?

that are taking place in the state, which prevents us from rising above the notions of historical and mental analogies.

The stylistic background of perceiving politics as an art of state and social governance always required to prioritize the institutional instruments of the state, meaning to ensure the dominance of coercion frameworks over the social milieu. This principle was employed in all aspects of life, even the ones that did not have any technological determination, culture and language.

Global contemporary world is getting very irritated by the idea that politics equals violence and requires entirely different technologically-creative approaches to the issues that have become pressing due to the capabilities of the technocratic cyberspace in the 4.0 world. We are faced with the natural and technological process of the mechanical (traditional) skills that satisfied our needs in the past being forced out of our lives and replaced with personal (individual) motivation of a human being to achieve something creatively, mentally, spiritually and culturally significant.

Contemporary public dynamics of the global world indicate that language is no longer only an instrument or a mean of daily human activity. Language is creating an extraordinary potential for various capabilities on one hand, and various threats on the other. We believe that the speed of globalization leads to a massive concentration of terminological arrays and language culture, as a whole, in the process of the indicative understating of life’s reality. This situation leads to the emergence of a new quality and, respectively, an increase in the number of possibilities for the deliberate use of language potentials via emphasis on the communication-content influences. According to our research this perspective is well-understood and actively exploited by the aggressor.

After spending the last four years studying the range of issues of the defense and security sector of the country, we started to realize the importance

Communication-content security: of the current state, or it might be better to say statusness of the content, as a specific field of communication dynamics. Content is no longer just a linguistic notion, because Putin's technologists see it as a target for aggression. These aggressions can be direct and the events that took place at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin's terrorist forces are an example of that. At that time the information space was filled with memes like "Kyiv junta", "fascists", "ukrops", "castigators", "vatniks", "LPR", "DPR", "KHPR"... And the television landscape of the Russian Federation and a significant part of the Eastern region of Ukraine was overwhelmed with the themes and images imposed by Putin's technologists, such as: "Ukrainian castigators continue to intentionally destroy the infrastructure of the Luhansk People's Republic", "Ukrainian castigators increase the intensity of the artillery shelling of the residential quarters in the cities of DPR", "Government of DPR: as long as the castigators continue waging combat, ceasefire is impossible", "Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster: UAF continued to shell Donetsk".¹ Beside the direct ones there are also latent communication-content aggressions. They are not only creative, but also sophisticated in their stylistics, content and energetics. Such amalgamation creates the effect of the delayed explosion under the condition of external innocence and even compliance with the internal Ukrainian information topics. An example of this is an excerpt from the speech Putin gave on July 27, 2013 in Kyiv at the conference titled "Orthodox Slavic values are the base of Ukraine's civilizational choice", that was arranged to celebrate another anniversary of the Christianization of Kyiv Rus: "...At the Dnipro's laver, at Kyiv laver the choice for the entire Holy Rus was made. Here the choice was made for all of us. Our common ancestors, that lived on these territories made this choice for our entire nation. I say "for our entire nation" meaning that of course we understand the contemporary reality, there is a Ukrainian nation, a Belarus nation, and other nations, and this heritage is something we respect, but all this in undoubtedly based on our common spiritual values that make us one

On what managerial security level do we have to acknowledge the existence of the "Ukrainian testing field for the global hybrid terrorism" in order to reach a new quality of an efficient collective security on the global scale?

¹ Homegrown Goebbelses. E-resource. Can be accessed at: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/ethics/manipulation/gebelsi_mistsevogo_rozlivu/

Hybrid messianic aggressions —————
nation...»¹ The motto “**Unified country (in Russian language) – unified state (in Ukrainian language)**”, which was definitely introduced into the Ukrainian information space by Putin’s technologists has very similar semantics.

We classify these and hundreds of other informational and psychological acts targeting Ukrainian State and society, carried out by Putin’s centers of global hybrid terrorism as communication-content aggressions.

Analyzing the manifestations of the hybrid messianic aggressions of putinism in Ukraine we have gained an understanding of the scale, specifics and perspectives of the new form of governmental and private opposition to the enemy, which has been dubbed “communication-content security”. In our opinion, the communication-content security is the most accurate characteristic of the dimension of the civilizational challenge produced by the global hybrid terrorism apologists. It is based on the word, linguistic-mental service, communication-content design of momentarily actions on the scale that the globalized world creates every minute and at the same time on the ability of this order to neutralize the entire onslaught.

Currently we define communication-content security as the establishment of legal conditions on national and international levels, professional and technological motivations and infrastructural solutions for the adequate simultaneous development of communication-content processes which would accelerate the crystallization of modern communication dimensions in various-size communities and ensure the ability to employ the contemporary and future palette of information formats of the flow content. Advanced comprehensive development of the communication-content security of Ukraine can protect from the contemporary streamed public negatives (challenges, risks, threats) and streamed geostrategic public aggressions by third parties or global international players.

What, in our opinion, is the most acceptable situation for the establishment of an active system of countering the aggressor in the information space?

One of the main factors necessary for the establishment of such system, not only in Ukraine, but also on the scale of the international opposition to the global hybrid aggressor is the understanding, interpretations and finally implementation of a new unique discourse into the international law – the discourse of communication-content security.

¹ Putin launched a war against Ukraine because of language aggression. E-resource. Can be accessed at: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26845325.html>

Our practical research team made many different discoveries which, on one hand are very complicated if you look at them from the viewpoint of the traditional understanding of the information space processes that occurred in the past, but on the other hand they hold a serious technical and partnership potential not only for the documentation of the communication-content challenges, risks and threats, but also for getting answers that lie in the depths of the stylistics of the dynamic linguistic services based on the capacities of the Ukrainian language. The research is carried out at the commission of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and will be practically implemented in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. In your opinion, does the united Russian nation exist? Your characteristics of the societal mega environment of the Russian Federation.

2. The events that took place in Tatarstan in 2017 and had a lot to do with the destruction of the native language status and the dominance of Russian language, as an attribute of mono-identification of citizens in the “Russian world” paradigm – does it indicate the transformation of Putin’s regime into totalitarianism (neo-barbarism) or is it just a situational nomenclative game of local managerial elites? Give your opinion using comparisons with language situations in other federal elements of the Russian Federation. Situation with Ukrainian and Tatar languages in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

3. Is language mono-identity in a federation of peoples and ethnicities a nonsense or a trend? Future of similar processes: provide arguments “for” and “against”.

4. The societal-corporate stylistics of the social infrastructure of Putin’s Russia – is it a testimony to rapid socio-political changes or an indication of the quality and stable perspectives of the Kremlin’s political regime directed by collective putinism? Your opinion with reasoning and associations. Examples that illustrate your opinion.

*5. What is the essence of the language-based process of societal environments geo-unification and why are mental and spiritual inhabitan-
cy codes a civilizational capitalization of the peaceful coexistence by the global world? What is the essence of the development vectors of the glo-*

balization trend? Substantiate your response based on the examples from personal life and professional experience.

6. Which contemporary categories, characterizing the dynamic hyper-extensive publicity under the conditions of the event-triggered processes (as opposed to the traditional stylistics of declaring a completed phenomenon post factum) can you name? In your opinion, what is the number of existing categories and can it increase? Decipher the content of each category and illustrate it using the examples of the dynamic publicity.

7. What do you know about the methodological novelty of the communication content opposition to contemporary hybrid messianic aggression of Putin's Russia? Name existing methodological approaches, decipher their essence, use examples to illustrate effectiveness and perspectives, taking into account the hyper dynamics and excessiveness of the content flows.

8. How do you interpret the expression "latent communication-content aggression"? Give examples of this type of aggression. How can we counter this phenomenon?

9. Language identity and language conceptual sphere — under which conditions can these factors be used as a weapon against humanity? Suggest a scenario that negates this issue. Substantiate your opinion in the paradigm of globalization and anti-globalism.

10. On what managerial security level do we have to acknowledge the existence of the "Ukrainian testing field for the global hybrid terrorism" in order to reach a new quality of an efficient collective security on the global scale? Indicate difficulties in the understanding of this issue. Why is it obvious? Substantiate your opinion using examples and axiomatic associative models from managerial practices.

11. What are the features of communication-content aggressions and what scale should the communication-content security reach in order to successfully tackle challenges, risks and threats produced by the global hybrid aggression centers? Characterize them using verbal-intellectual examples and practical manifestations in the stylistics of the public memes and axiomatic threats of various scale and targeting principles.

Viacheslav Suchenko

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Honorary worker of the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine

**LEGAL SERVICES OF THE DEFENCE
AND SECURITY SECTOR OF UKRAINE
IN THE CONTEXT OF COUNTERING GLOBAL
HYBRID TERRORISM**

...In order to ensure appropriate legal functioning of the bodies that guarantee the security of the state it is necessary to establish a unified special security and defense legal service that would fulfill legal preventive, legal exploratory, legal consultative and law enforcement functions.

Global challenges, risks and threats posed by global hybrid terrorism objectively and expectedly call for a radical transformation of the state security sector in accordance with NATO standards and the values of the Maidan of Dignity. In-depth consideration and understanding of the essence of this new globally dangerous phenomenon, aimed at destroying the peaceful way of life, prove that the key aspect of combating this phenomenon lies in developing and implementing an effective all-encompassing system of communication-content security of the contemporary society in the framework of state transformation processes. This super task raises urgent questions in regards to building a qualitatively different legal foundation for this system that could ensure its efficient functioning.

Global hybrid terrorism is carried out via the multi-format multidimensional aggressions that are in constant motion and rapidly change the semblance. The legal underpinnings, norms and methods of the innovatively dynamic system-phenomenon – communication-content security of the state – must subsequently ensure timely and adequate analysis (recording), prognosis (announcement) and prevention of these multi-format messianic aggressions of various scales, as well as operationally hierarchized reactions and instantaneous creative and technological responses to their manifestations. As a result, moving forward they must also ensure a well-coordinated cooperation of all elements of the defense and security complex of Ukraine and eventually partner-nations of Ukraine in the geostrategic security of the civilizational scope.

In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to establish a consolidated legal complex (body) in the security sector that would fulfill a multitude of functions of the defense and security service.

Unfortunately, as of today we still can't keep up with contemporary challenges and under the conditions of Putin's aggressions, which have been occurring for over three years now, we have only managed to restore the bodies of military prosecution. However, these military prosecution bodies are semi-legally (without the direct transfer of authorities to any other body) deprived of the essential functions related to overseeing compliance with and enforcement of the law in military formations. At the same time there is a special law enforcement body that functions within the security sector – Military Law and Order Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is also deprived of the criminal intelligence functions and whose area of responsibility is limited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Other law enforcement bodies of the security sector, such as the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and other military bodies, established in accordance with Ukrainian legislation, do not have any subordinated structures\ bodies that fulfill the functions similar to those of the Military Law and Order Service.

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (which currently is a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), having the key role in ensuring the security of critical infrastructure and environment safety, falls within the area of responsibility of territorial prosecutors. At the same time, various territorial state control bodies that fall within the areas of responsibility of different ministries, monitor the compliance with and enforcement of the law in the abovementioned executive bodies. Moreover, it is worth noting that the bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Military Prosecution are authorized to conduct pre-trial investigations of military crimes and crimes against the foundations of the National Security of Ukraine according to the respective investigative jurisdictions.

Military courts have not been restored at all. Even though, the multi-faceted and multi-functional aggressions of global hybrid terrorism definitely call for the establishment of contemporary military-judicial bodies as an element of the security sector of the state. Openness must become the crucial characteristic of these new judicial bodies as opposed to the corporate nature of their predecessors. We need a new modernized military court system the functional capabilities of which would include operational multi-format justice-based responses to the cases when hybrid aggressions disregard the rule of law in the military sector. Military courts will ensure the effective functioning of the new defense and security service.

Therefore, we are faced with a dispersion of efforts, absence of a coordination body for countering offences, certain chaos in the way these countermeasures are organized within the security sector of the state, which all are completely in line with Putin's stylistics of hybrid aggressions manifested not only on the military frontlines, but also in the governmental offices dealing with strategic planning. This is why each body of the defense and security complex functions separately, often overlapping and interfering with each other activities. This gloomy picture is amplified by the fact that numerous legal structures and units of the abovementioned bodies protect the rights of servicemen, the employees of these bodies and their

families, including ATO veterans in their own fashion. The activities of human rights subdivisions of executive bodies and local governments in this field do not add any optimism either, as each of them has their own understanding of existing issues and ways to deal with them. Taken together with the widespread network of enemy's human intelligence assets within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, every law enforcement body and other bodies of executive and local government such discord creates a very dangerous and even threatening situation.

Special bodies have already been established to counter the dangerous phenomenon of corruption, such as the National

Is it rational to establish a unified multi-functional legal complex (body) in the defense and security sector?

Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office within the framework of Ukrainian prosecution, as well as the National Agency on Corruption Prevention. However, in order to ensure appropriate legal functioning of the bodies that guarantee the security of the state it is necessary to establish a unified special security and defense legal service that would fulfill legal preventive, legal exploratory, legal consultative and law enforcement functions.

It is envisaged that the effective security of the state in the areas currently defined by the National Security Strategy of Ukraine must be provided based on methodological and technological principles of communication-content security, as the primary source of various security-related measures. Therefore, the new legal defense and security service, as the legal basis/component of the communication-content security, should ensure not only the daily evaluation of the situation and the rapid efficient response to the occurring challenges, risks and threats, a long-term forecast and prevention of enemy's intentions and capabilities.

The hybrid nature of Putin's aggressions is manifested in the combination of the elements, phenomena and processes that seems absolutely inconceivable from the common sense point of view. Such an unnatural combination leads to a number of various psychological self-reflections that lie in mental distress and are the prerequisite for the development of permanent anxiety. This is exactly how the highest terroristic aim of these aggressions is achieved.

Lack of modern architecture of legislation aimed at countering such aggressions contributes to the fulfillment of their purpose and significantly

Communication-content security: prolongs the helpless state of the societies and state institutions under attack. As a result, these societies start to establish the legal response mechanisms to such hybrid-messianic aggressions only after getting over the initial shock. In the meantime, the adversary continues to produce, plan and implement new, more dangerous aggressions piling them up on top of each other like Lego blocks.

It is significant that the lack of effective governmental support and legal protection of people directly dealing with state security provides fertile ground for modelling and implementing any provocations of any terrorist threat levels within this critical for the state security environment.

A network of situation analysis centers should become the backbone of the new legal body, as the information they provide will be used for analyses and forecasts, as well as prompt responses and in the preventive measure development. There-

Why do we need a defense and security law enforcement service?

fore, the aforementioned information should be functionally divided for further processing and to be used by the respective detachments.

It is necessary to combine diagnostic, consultative and law enforcement functions within the same body because of an objective need to promptly neutralize hybrid aggressions when such occur. This is due to the fact that hybrid aggression by virtue of its nature mostly affects the legal relationship, which in the case of prompt response can be regulated at the level of legal diagnosis and counseling. If these functions are not fulfilled in the area under aggression or if there is no resistance at all, the public danger of the problem increases and can turn into actual criminal manifestations. Moreover, this defense and security service has to have a comprehensively developed and a well-functioning mechanism of immediate legal response to aggression, which will ensure its prompt neutralization.

Significant differences between the new special body and the existing law enforcement bodies lie in the wide universal coordinational communicative capabilities and a new value-based orientation. Unlike the hierarchical, bureaucratically regimented, closed to the public old-school law enforcement bodies, the new legal defense and security service has to be characterized by transparency, openness, partnership and trust. New circumstances can be achieved only through the systematic publicity as a function, but not through a personalized institutional bravado.

The employees of a body like that have to be proud of serving the civil society and unlike their predecessors should not feel like they belong to an elite closed law enforcement club that is over and beyond the limits of society.

In order to ensure the proper implementation of the concept the aforementioned issues have to be addressed by the means of thorough scientific research and formalization in the concept of the communication-content security of the state.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *Provide your understanding of the “global hybrid terrorism” phenomenon, decode its essence. How justified, in your opinion, is the characteristic of the current global threats?*

2. *Do you think there is a need to create a doctrine conception of the communication-content security of the state? Provide arguments for and against the idea.*

3. *Is it rational to establish a unified multi-functional legal complex (body) in the defense and security sector?*

4. *Why are Maidan of Dignity values and NATO standards promising not only for Ukraine, but also for the entire global democracy? What did Francis Fukuyama say about this and what is his opinion about it today? Your personal associations with these phenomena and situational sketches of these events. Provide reasons proving your opinion, attitude and knowledge of the cooperation philosophy within NATO.*

5. *Approaches to the examination of the phenomenon/system of “communication-content security”. Interpret each standpoint. Illustrate by providing examples of your job description requirements.*

6. *Highlight the functionality that limits the capabilities of the Military Law and Order Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and offer a list of additional functions that would help to transform MLOS into a Military Law and Order Service suitable for the multi-functional security sector. Rationalize your opinion and the scope of the implementation by providing arguments for and against.*

7. *What are the functional manifestations of the hybrid essence of military prosecution and how is it connected to military courts? What will change if the multi-functional level of the security sector starts to function*

Communication-content security: properly in relation to current global challenges, risks and threats. Rationalize your opinion and suggest a solution model for this issue.

8. What functions should the coordination center for countering offenses in the defense and security segment of the national security have? Why does the dispersion of means and efforts within this category of institutions only assist the global aggressor, producing new forms of defense and security related crimes and offenses? Rationalize your opinion. Provide cases that prove the relevance of your reflections.

9. Why do we need a defense and security law enforcement service? How complicated of an infrastructure does it require considering the ongoing transformation of the defense and security sector of national security under the conditions of global hybrid terrorism?

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**SPECIFICS OF THE LINGUISTIC IMPACT
IN THE ERA OF THE GLOBAL HYBRID
TERRORISM**

The uniqueness of the current situation lies in the fact that today we can first create the information field with the predefined configurational characteristics on certain territories and then conduct a hybrid attack based on it

... Impact through symbolic-verbal encoding of information is more intense and more effective than through visual images...

First of all, it is necessary to emphasize that any conflict takes form of hybrid confrontation in the world almost completely covered by network communications. In a certain way, this happens due to the greater effectiveness of the impact and the lower cost of its implementation, as well as due to the fact that the hybrid attack results in significantly less infrastructure and human resources losses, which the aggressor subsequently plans to employ. The destruction of the structures of information fields or content in the minds of certain communities may be later filled up by relevant technologies used in the interests of the aggressor.

Nowadays, the intrusion of the global network technologies into the administrative, industrial, cultural and communication areas in the most developed countries of the world is a comprehensive process, in the same time the systems of global positioning and improvement of the quality of communication allow to organize the intrusion of the network and its technologies to any desired place worldwide, including Antarctica and inaccessible areas of Africa. Thus, the specific impact technology, based on the network technology, information field and content field, can be spread to any community and to any place in the world via relevant information field. The uniqueness of the current situation lies in the fact that nowadays one can firstly create an information field with defined configuration at the required territory, and then make a hybrid-type attack on the basis of certain information field.

If before there was a phenomenon of information field intrusion and its transformation in accordance with the needs of the aggressor, then now there would be the example of modern hybrid terrorism, when it is possible to observe a completely new technology used in different parts of the world: creation of informational fields of the aggressor on the substrate of the insufficiently organized fields of the victim-territory and using victim's resources and tools.

In order to understand the mechanisms of this phenomenon, it is necessary to identify the basic tools to its implementation.

Within the community of scientists and specialists in the field of mass communication in various areas, one can often hear the conviction that the most powerful part of the impact is carried out through the visual channel. This belief is based on numerous and repeatedly confirmed studies of the importance and predominant nature of the visual channel functioning of individual's perception. It is widely known that the analysis of visual

information is predominant regardless of the individual characteristics of the homo sapiens' perception. People belonging to kinesthetic and audio types mostly encode information in their usual channel (audio or kinesthetic channel), but the initial processing of information after its receipt by analyzers occurs at the level of building a worldview in the substantia reticularis of the brain when the signal is still processed by the second signal system.

However, the role of pictographic, pictorial information, visual image, as opposed to verbal, is overestimated. The peculiarity of images of the pictographic type is that they are uniquely formed and perceived by the percipient № 69 as a processed material. Accordingly, for a certain part of the audience, this image can be positive and have active connotations, for the other group it can mean nothing, and someone will oppose and disgust. As compared to

*World religions are
global confrontation or the
path to reconciliation?*

the visual image, the image formed by verbal information is created by each percipient independently through the second signal system, on the basis of experience and «dictionary of images» of their own consciousness. In case of using the correct choice of impact means, the image will be influential and at the same time completely ecological for percipient's consciousness. The above-mentioned principle was explained by Russian writer Yuriy Nikitin, who noticed «that in the video or in the picture the images are already created and they do not always correspond to my personal ideas, but when I read a book, I draw the images in my mind independently, proceeding words, and they necessarily affect me as created adjusted personalized product».

Accordingly, the impact through symbolic-verbal encoding of information is more intense and more effective than through visual images.

A brilliant historical example of a special operation on the content transformation of an individual information field at the certain territory is a creation of Islam, where the worldview is transmitted exclusively as a text (Koran), and the images of existing physical objects of any kind are completely prohibited by tradition.

Another example of transformation can be the assimilation of the western regions of Ukraine at different times by the Austro-Hungarian Empire through language, school, literature, and legal documents issued solely in the dominant language. However, if traditionally there is an idea in histo-

Communication-content security: riography that all the features of such an impact are limited to the norms of linguistic behavior and the restriction of the native language and culture use, then nowadays the examples of the modern hybrid aggression allow us to refine and contradict such representations. For example, in the wake of Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine, the restriction of Ukrainian language use had not been carried out de-facto, at the same time the linguistic behavior of the vast majority of the population did not undergo a significant transformation (the population was mostly Russian-speaking). The main reconstruction of the territory content was carried out within the framework of displacement of imagery and topics, arguments and events of Ukrainian origin in the information field.

The processes of hybrid terrorism hadn't been almost studied as a phenomenon, they are only given as observable facts. However, there is no doubt that this phenomenon is not a natural result of the development of information and content environment of the communications network. Hybrid terrorism arose through the deliberate employment of specific technologies. That means that we are not engaged, in the role of researchers, in the discovery of the consistent patterns of the development of ordinary, natural, although new, un-known process, but we reconstruct a conscious external impact on this process from the side of certain reasonable power.

The observations of hybrid aggression in information fields gathered throughout many years allow us to highlight some important areas of linguistic technologies employment by aggressor, which are based on the knowledge gained by a group of scientists involved in the study of linguistic and symbolic human behavior.

One of the most powerful ways of the content field transformation is the change through popular literature and long-term ideological influence. For example, 3-4 years prior to the events of the Revolution of dignity and the beginning of the open phase of the hybrid-messianic Russian aggression big run prints were expanded at the territory of Ukraine (more than 15,000 copies), comprising 300 different books written in scientific heroic fiction, heroic fantasy, alternative history, detective and other popular genres. The main content of above-mentioned books was «humiliation of Ukraine», the development and formation of a powerful Russian Empire, the restoration of the traditions of the Russian Imperial Army and the Fleet, their modern development (including space), the reversion of humanity to the «glorious era» of the late XIX century, beginning and middle of XX century and the

restoration of world justice to the «great Russia,» which lost its grandeur because of the intrigues of the «western allies.» The number of books published in Russia, which did not reach the Ukrainian market, is countless.

This type of impact includes several important factors which should be taken into account. The studies of a number of modern literature theorists show that the most powerful influence on the consciousness of large human communities for quite a long time was provided through books, which are big substantial texts. For example, Dante Alighieri's «Divine Comedy» was widely-known in its native Florence, often the most interesting fragments of a book were known by heart. The knowledge and quotation of «Divine Comedy» all over Italy is confirmed by certain fragments present in folk art, sayings and songs from various Italian regions, which nowadays Italians sincerely consider as folktales.

A similar situation is with Cervantes' «Don Quixote» and Lope de Vega's theatrical pieces in Spain. Chinese traditional literature, in particular mighty historical epic novels such as «Romance of the Three Kingdom», «Journey to the West» and others not only absorbed folk art, but also formed it from the moment of their composition and to this day. It has been proved that the most powerful influence on the consciousness of people and its transformation in terms of coverage, depth and time of impact is provided through large texts. Therefore, if one can carry out tactical special operation or cause an uprising while using small messages in social networks, then one can create a new nation or change its development using «Kobzar» or the Koran.

Another important factor is that the transformation of the national content field and semantic fields were carried out mainly by Ukrainian authors. One third of the writers who created the necessary content for the aggressor were Ukrainian citizens, well-known Ukrainian writers using Russian language. The third decisive factor is that the authors of the highest level of mastering modern technologies for creating effective text have been involved in creating the appropriate content.

Text editing technology which enhances its practical function has reached an extremely high level of development. The UML meta-model, the Milton-Erickson hypnotic patterns model, and the direct intrusion to the reaction level of the limbic body and the reptileoid formation of the cerebral cortex are the achievements of neuro-linguistic programming. In fact, most of these technologies are public and are studied by future writers,

Communication-content security: screenwriters, marketers and others in a majority of developed countries of the West and the Far East. They are public source and are distributed without any abbreviations in the form of numerous textbooks, «Be your own psychologist» book series and other cognitive literature. However, the employment of such technologies requires significant training, special knowledge and long-term application of techniques in order to develop a conscious competence. These technologies are based on the manipulation of vocabulary, imagery, architectonic characteristics of the text, as well as on the creation of a visual representation of the text as eurhythmics of its perception by percipient.

In terms of hybrid terrorism, the technologies of linguistic impact work at many levels simultaneously, and most specialists are not fixed so far as a part of one common structured influence. Thus, the mass adoption of Islam by young people, especially women at the age of 16-22 years, is carried out at the level of social network communication in messengers with subse-

How can we prove or refute the fact that the symbolic-verbal coding of information is more intense than coding through visual images?

quent personal communication with the tradition bearers. The study of conversation and communication scripts gives a clear and unambiguous picture of the use of the Milton-Erickson pat-

terns and the technique of «circumambulating consciousness» and activating the unconscious reactions of the limbic body, which are widely used in sexual attraction and interpersonal communication techniques.

Effective symbols and ideological constructions are also created, which allow one to create the certain type of perception of reality that corresponds to aggressor's interests. A striking example is the spread of Soviet literature, the promulgation of images of the Second World War, the persistent use of vocabulary of this time, and the rethinking of its images on the technological background of the new epochs by applying science fiction and anime. Very important factor of the efficiency of the content field transformation is the versatility and simultaneity of the impact. These are large artistic texts, author's journalism, social networks, small regional news journalism, and the imposition of linguistic patterns of communication at the level of genre art conversation (certain slang, quotations, etc.).

Resulting from the described state of affairs, a situation arises when in today's information field there is the possibility of forming any groups

capable of independently constructing content of any level of quality and directing the impact with its high efficiency at the consciousness. Accordingly, in the absence of purposeful filling the information field with its own content with a high degree of influence, there is an information vacuum, in which there are almost uncontrolled instruments for the formation of consciousness of large groups both in separate territories and in the form of distributed networks of interconnected people. This is the substrate used by the hybrid aggressor to realize its own interests.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *Your understanding of hybridity in the modern world. Reasoning, examples.*

2. *The capabilities of the global network (Internet) in changing social mood, political and personal preferences, life priorities. Argue your opinion with facts and examples.*

3. *World religions are global confrontation or the path to reconciliation? Your thoughts. Options for the development of the religious situation in the world, in particular in Ukraine.*

4. *Give the wording of your understanding of the «information field». What associations do you have? Do you feel like part of the information field?*

5. *Do a verbal or a visual image have greater effectiveness in forming a person's opinion on a specific topic? Why? What features prevail in each of these images? How and under what conditions can you apply each of these images to your professional activities?*

6. *What characteristics of the informational space state of any country are connected with the phenomenon of the globalization of a particular conflict, in other words with the public significance of the direct and indirect nature of cause-and-effect? Suggest examples that would confirm this opinion or refute it. Indicate the sources of the judgments you have generated and the duration of the thought positioning as an argument while proving the opinion.*

7. *What is the uniqueness of the information space segments for managerial and security impacts, and what are the factors that measure segments in technological, creative, organizational and global dimensions? How can the events be intensified or hidden in information space, thus creating additional potentials for hostile domination? Reason the opinion of any connotation.*

8. *Why practices of global hybrid information terrorism are more efficient than manifestations of real international terrorism in terms of payed attention and expansion of fear and incertitude. Give the examples of manifestations characterized by hybrid-messianic aggression or other elements of the «Russian world», etc.*

9. *How can we prove or refute the fact that the symbolic-verbal coding of information is more intense than coding through visual images? What is the controversy of this judgment? Give the example of this difference on your own experience, as well as in relation to different vectors of creative industries. How does this methodological guideline work in the communication-content security paradigm?*

10. *How do conceptual artistic works influence the development of a nation or nationhood? Why don't they die in modern conditions of the predominance of short-format symbolic-verbal expression? Can short formats of traditional streaming technologies of communication-content design and contemporary art of creative industries replace large-scale works of the past? Reason your opinion using examples of artistic understanding of the present and future in the scope of national and global development.*

11. *Do you know the technologies of effective text creation? What peculiarities does the technology have and what technological techniques are used? Reason your opinion using examples of modern national security and defense development.*

12. *Give arguments for and against the necessity of purposeful filling of all information space segments (information fields) with content as a civilization security function of a new quality (conscious action and expanding opportunities for an adequate result and compliance with modern trends). Why has this become an urgent need in the era of global hybrid terrorism practices?*

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INTERNATIONAL PRESS POOLS USED IN CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST PRACTICES

Half-truth is the biggest lie. This is exactly what the Russian propaganda is using to conceal the involvement of Russian forces in the terrorist operation in Donbas.

A terrorist attack, especially a successful one, that does not have an extensive informational component is devalued by at least 50%. This is exactly why the contemporary terrorist organizations carefully work through not only the technical, organizational and financial aspects of the attacks, but also the informational one as well.

Terrorism is a rather ancient phenomenon. For some time, it had a predominantly individual nature. Terrorist activity was mostly limited to eliminating rivals in the struggle for power or achieving some other limited goals. Today in most cases terrorism has reached the state level in the form of direct or indirect support of certain organizations.

Ideologues and leaders of terror are perfectly aware of the PR component, as it is called nowadays. A terrorist attack, especially a successful one, that does not have an extensive informational component is devalued by at least 50%. This is exactly why the contemporary terrorist organizations carefully work through not only the technical, organizational and financial aspects of the attacks, but also the informational one as well. This is true for the time before the attack and even more so after.

So what do the propagandistic efforts of the terrorist organizations consist of?

Component 1. Establishment of specialized mass media, their financial, organizational and technical support. Various and often specific journalists' cadre are selected for these mass media taking into account their missions and national peculiarities.

The aforementioned circumstance is very common. Think about all of the TV spots and the terrorist organization sites that people come across. Even though there are many of them, they are not the only means used by the terror organizers and masterminds.

The reason for that is very simple. The information provided in these sources is not what it claims to be. It is a real and often very primitive propaganda littered with ideology, poor vocabulary, and simplified slogans that usually contain obscene language and explicit calls for violence.

The idea behind this is to strip the unstable, poorly educated people of the tiniest bits of analytical thinking, forcing them to fulfill the role of terrorist cannon fodder. This aim is partially achieved but not for long.

Component 2. The material factor is crucial in the recruitment process of terrorist organizations. Lessons learned from combating terrorism in Latin America show that as soon as the quality of life of the population increases the support for the insurgents plummets. In Chile, following the overthrow of the Allende's regime, the signs of economic recovery began to emerge and the activities of leftist terrorist organizations have ceased. The exact same thing has been observed in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.

On the aforementioned terrorist websites, the issue of remuneration is addressed indirectly even though those who are interested can always find the answers to their questions.

Component 3. Therefore, finding suitable forms of cooperation between mass media and journalists not directly involved in terrorist activity and the terror organizers and masterminds is of crucial importance for terrorist organizations.

Two factors are key for most mass media: promptness and exclusivity. Terrorist organizations often base their activities on these factors.

Exclusive interviews are often arranged for the leaders and masterminds of terrorist organizations with preferably well-known and reputable journalists. More often than not these interviews are conducted surreptitiously due to certain security concerns, but also as a PR move, in order to peddle the secrecy of location and activities. However, this is where the differences between various terrorist organizations come into play. For example, Yasser Arafat, the

*State terrorism – is it in the past
or in the future of humanity?*

leader of the PLO was a seemingly very public person, even though he only ever spoke to some selected press pool members. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden never met with journalists face-to-face and only rarely spoke to certain Arab/Muslim mass media via Skype.

Personal selection of journalists for an exclusive interview or other type of publication mostly depends on the preferences of the terrorist leaders and the agreement of the information outlet to publish or show the material in the future. It is worth noting that not all journalists agree to talk to terrorists for ethical reasons, since they perceive it as aiding and abetting mass murders.

However, the desire to talk to the terrorist leaders and visit the militant training camps often overpowers any ethical precautions. Such a newsworthy occurrence is a commodity that loses its value very quickly. If you do not interview the person, chances are your competitor will. The competition always sleeps with one eye open. Sometimes to come out on top you have to travel to the most remote areas of the world.

It is important to point out here that falling a prey to such exclusivity, the journalist may find themselves partially dependent on the terrorist. In the first interview or report there might be some liberties and in the next one and onward the limitations will grow. The information and opportu-

Communication-content security: nities to obtain it are given but only under certain conditions. There is a certain reputation that follows the journalist who has communicated with terrorists. The longer you cooperate with them the steeper is your professional fall. As Churchill once said: “He who sups with the devil should have a long spoon”.

The second aforementioned factor is promptness. Terrorist PR services select the media that are ready to publish their carefully crafted materials. These media outlets have the first-hand access to certain information often ahead of time without compromising the planning and implementation of the terrorist attack.

More often than not modern means of communication are used for information sharing. In some cases, the editors’ office receives the information in advance in a premediated manner or the editors are warned about the terrorist attack just mere moments before it happens when it is practically impossible to prevent it.

How compatible are the notions of “terror” and “happiness”?

Being aware that such messages can be intercepted by the special services and used to fight against terrorists, the latter resort to various deceptions. It should be noted that the relevant information can be conveyed secretly to selected journalists. For the most part this is very dangerous since there is no doubt that the special services will eventually discover the conspiracy. Therefore, this communication method is used extremely rarely, usually just once.

In the light of the foregoing the communication between terrorists and journalists is mostly unilateral.

One of the means of that communication is the distribution of propaganda materials recently being most commonly presented in a form of video clips. This is a relatively safe and simple method that allows to target as wide an audience as possible.

A terrorist attack, especially the one that has claimed many lives, is broadcasted on the TV and the Internet as soon as possible. This is one of the crucial objectives of the terrorists: to demonstrate their power and capabilities. At the same time this is done with the aim of convincing the society that all of the efforts made to fight against the organizations like Al-Qaeda will eventually prove futile. ISIS militants were persistently trying to instill a very similar idea by broadcasting public execution videos all over TV and social media.

Promptness is a very dangerous thing. Reports from the scene are usually filled with dramatic details and panoramic shots of devastations and other disastrous consequences. Hasty comments contain virtually no information but may breed ill-considered myths that could linger for a while.

In moments like these terrorists try to saturate the media space with messages in their favor under the guise of impartiality

In the worst case scenario there is a state behind the terrorist attack. The Malaysian plane crash is one of the prominent examples of a state using mass media in pursuit of its objectives, in particular, to cover up the involvement of the country that is to blame for the numerous deaths during an extensive media campaign.

It is worth highlighting that the media's strive to present unbiased information is often exploited by the terrorists with aim of publicizing false information with real facts masterfully embedded into it. Half-truth is the biggest lie. This is exactly what the Russian propaganda is using to conceal the involvement of Russian forces in the terrorist operation in Donbas.

In order to achieve that carefully crafted information is published in the media and pro-Russian organizations are funded to publish newspapers and shoot TV programs with suitable messages. A while ago Russian propaganda has launched an informational campaign stating that the government of the Netherlands had officially deemed Ukrainian servicemen responsible for the Malaysian plane crash. Federal channels reports contained statements of Dutch officials taken out of context. The aim of this campaign was not only to influence the domestic audience but also to spread the information beneficial for the terrorists in the global mass media.

*Why is half-truth
the most successful lie?*

We should not underestimate Russian propaganda, as it is based on the lessons learned by its Soviet predecessor. And even though every lie eventually gets refuted, frequent repetitions have lingering effects. A series of movies produced by Western television studios describing the events in Crimea, Donbas and the Malaysian plane crash can be given as an example.

It is also necessary to elaborate more on the occasional intense confrontations between mass media and the terrorists. Suffice it to recall how the case with the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten publishing a cartoon of Muhammad caused quite the scandal in 2005 – 2006. The 2015 attack on the office of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo ended tragically with the gunmen murdering 12 people.

In the cases described above terrorist pursued two objectives. The first one was to intimidate the journalists and in a broader sense the entire Western press. And the second objective was to visually demonstrate the helplessness of the French special services. Needless to say that after the more recent of the attacks the work of the respective French bodies was reorganized but those changes were insufficient to prevent the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels that followed soon after.

Terrorism has and will always be the enemy of the free press and independent journalists and yet it still manages to quite skillfully exploit them to its own advantage. The issue regarding the limits of cooperating with terrorists in general and the nations that support terrorism in particular remains open. However, certain progress has been made. Thus, American media outlets do not present close-up images of the terrorist attack aftermath, but instead resort to using panoramic pictures taken from a distance and comments provided by the representatives of the special or emergency services. Such a tactic forces the terrorist organizations to try and provide desired media coverage of the attacks using their own websites.

The war on terror is a rather specific example of hybrid war, as it involves a significant number of confrontations between relatively small units often stationed in big cities along with the classic types of warfare.

Informational and propaganda-related aspects of this warfare play a significant role as well. In Soviet times the latter term has gained a negative connotation but we cannot simply ignore the propagandistic activities of the adversary. We have to come up with new approaches to countering this propaganda.

First and foremost, this involves bringing to light the preparations for terrorist attacks as often as possible. The public awareness of a terrorist attack being planned is one of the most effective ways to disrupt its implementation. Israeli special services, being one of the most well-prepared for the war on terror, sometimes resort to this method almost always obtaining positive results.

It is counterproductive to withhold information on terrorist attacks. Preserving the veil of silence, which is often encouraged by the Russian politicians should not even be considered an option. Sharing information is key. The real question is how we present the burning, both literally and figuratively, topics. This is particularly true for television. In most cases it makes no sense to have the live broadcast from the scene and it is more rea-

sonable to simply have the narration of the events instead. The same goes for the images in newspapers. The aftermath can be presented later with appropriate commentary. By doing so the mass media will no longer follow the terrorists' lead and will cease to fulfill their propagandistic objectives.

There is another important aspect of this topic that, in our opinion, is being overlooked. The most sensitive information within a terrorist organization usually describes its funding sources. This is the information that has always been and will always be kept secret. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, made a last ditch effort to conceal this exact information, including the fact that the majority of funds were obtained illegally by the means of the so-called expropriations. A lot of this information has been made public by open but not very famous media outlets and this is something that may come in handy on day.

The third aspect. The exposure of internal, often conflictive, relations between the militants, robberies and appropriation of funds received from sponsors cast an unflattering light on the leaders of these terrorist organizations. This is also an open-source information which we need to learn to use wisely.

The fourth aspect. State terrorism and the support that the militants and their organizations receive from certain governmental bodies should receive media coverage as well. Notice how the Russian information agencies presented the data on the operation in Syria. By the way, the global media coverage of the Russian aviation operations targeting moderate opposition instead of ISIS militants has played a significant role in the phase-out of the Russian forces in 2017. Unsurprisingly from that point on the Syrian government forces were unable to fulfill many missions due to not having air support. However, despite Putin's statements, the main effort forces have not been brought back to Syria.

The mass media will remain the battlefield in the fight against terrorism in the foreseeable future. As of today this is one of the most actively exploited components of hybrid warfare.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. The origins of terrorism. Contemporary understanding of terrorism. Do you have an opinion on the essence of terrorism in the world of today?

2. *Human psychology against the backdrop of media reports on the latest manifestations of terrorism: how protected is the person from the impact of the terrorist propaganda?*

3. *State terrorism – is it in the past or in the future of humanity?*

4. *Terrorism as a way of acceding to power. Can the society become immune to terrorism as a form of governance?*

5. *Red (Bolshevist) terror as a part of the construction process of the imaginary happy society. Other examples of state terror and its acceptance by the society. How compatible are the notions of “terror” and “happiness”?*

6. *The opinions and associations you have with the terms “terrorism” and “totalitarianism”. Why are they still interpreted in the same manner, even though the governance and societal influence formats have radically changed? Indicate the specifics of interpreting terrorism in the framework of jurisprudence. Challenges, risks and threats that come from narrowing down and having a very limited understanding and interpretation of the term “terrorism”.*

7. *Which communication-content (propagandistic) components characterize the process of covering the contemporary global hybrid terrorism? Give examples of high-profile events from different scale standpoints of the key actors of the global hybrid terrorism practices.*

8. *Why is half-truth the most successful lie? Can a fake be unambiguously perceived as half-truth or does it have a completely different functional algorithm and existence timeframe? Give examples of the types of half-truth. Substantiate your opinion. How would you define the post-truth era?*

9. *Terrorism and publicity – can these two notions exist separately? Can terrorism exist without publicity?*

10. *Why are the nature and the functional mission of journalism as a phenomenon very similar to the functions and missions of global terrorism algorithms? What is the difference between the international terrorism actors and the global scale hybrid terror actors? Substantiate your opinion and provide reasons supporting your paradigm of choice in this field.*

11. *Why does the strive for exclusiveness for a journalists working with a terrorist organization always grow into a dependence and sometimes into a deliberate loyalty? Indicate the contributing factors or provide arguments opposing such an approach based on the examples of famous antiterrorist processes or terrorist practices. Why does this analogy of experiences and*

Hybrid messianic aggressions —————
cases make sense under the conditions of global hybrid terrorism? Substantiate your opinion.

12. Why does Putin's Russian Federation practice terrorist approaches on the global scale? Name the factors that unambiguously indicate that putinism is launching global hybrid processes instead of just separate attacks. Provide examples of such possibilities and realities from various areas of human life. Substantiate your opinion using the sources of non-hybrid/terrorist origin.

13. List the well-known examples of international and hybrid terrorist attacks on journalists. Why is it impossible for terrorism to exist without journalism and why does journalism possess the most efficient capabilities for its neutralization? What are the ethics of visually representing the victims of terrorist attacks? How can the journalism neutralize the reoccurring manifestations of terrorism? Give clear examples illustrating every segment of your answer.

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INFORMATION AGGRESSION IN THE GLOBAL WORLD

Development of the resistance strategies
as tactical content influence models

The success of any expansionist activity, which is developed as a geo-strategic dynamic model, depends on the appropriate communication-content strategies nature ...

Information aggression in the global online-mode reality does not mean providing the opponent with the new facts and arguments, but imposing own dominant interpretation of existing facts.

The success of any expansionist activity, which is developed as a geo-strategic dynamic model, depends on the appropriate communication-content strategies. In order to develop an appropriate strategy-tool, the clear concept on this issue needs to be defined.

During this stage, most of the systemic technological and creative mistakes are made. One of such mistakes is understanding the new aggressions (for example, Putin's Russia against Ukraine) only as a warfare with the aim to seize territory and neutralize communications. At the same time, the confrontation in the information space has a minor role. It is considered as something like disputes on information superiority (when the volume of information that one side sends towards the opposite one is the key factor). In other words, it means assail an opponent with arguments and facts, which should supposedly change the attitude of the main and allied enemies' forces to the surrounding world in the domains of contents, meanings and senses. In this way, the attempts to turn the information aggression in the global world into a form of academic-streaming scholastic discourse on the matter of considering or neglecting a number of facts and arguments, which usually deliver no results on the global scale of counteraction, are made.

Information aggression in the global online-mode reality does not mean providing the opponent with the new facts and arguments, but imposing own dominant interpretation of his facts, which creates the enemy's mindset ideological base.

The information aggression in the modern global world is usually came before (often goes hand in hand with) the physical aggression. However, it already substantially displaces the military component and becomes a methodologically implemented consequent effect of the real military model situation in various geopolitical stages. Therefore, stop believing the opponent aggregated split-level human segments will listen to the arguments, even if these arguments are flawless. The information aggression is irrational. It is designed to destroy both rational and irrational belief in any real or fabricated facts.

Each information aggression in the context of global world communication-content frameworks includes three vectors:

- **Attack vector** – actions aimed at erasure or imposing own interpretation of facts or myths which build the opponents mindset ideological base;
- **Defense vector** – actions aimed at securing own mindset ideological base against the opponent attacks;

– **Internal vector** – actions aimed at building up and modernizing own mindset ideological base.

Moreover, in the frames of modern trends, these vectors are also amplified by the global hyperactivity mode dominance with the keeping global scale public attention. It simultaneously accompanies all of these information aggression vectors.

The existence of vectors is the main difference between that information aggression in the global world and small-scale local information provocation. The last one usually has only one vector, which is the attack vector directed on imposing its own interpretation of mindset ideological base.

There are certain features that respectively determine the nature of modern information aggression in the current civilizational confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The main feature is that Russia has a powerful internal vector of imperial traditions, which have determined the existence of the so-called «Russian World» mindset ideological base. Due to historical circumstances, Ukraine was not able to create such ideological base. Then as today, it does not even attempt to develop this type of traditions, because in terms of modern global needs, which were formed up by the Maidan of Dignity in Ukraine, it probably would be a humiliation of the Ukrainian nation.

This means that Putin's Russia fights (concentrating state, business, public efforts) for the mobilization paradigm of the «Russian World,» and Ukrainians fight heroically against Russia and both states fight for their own image of a peaceful Ukraine. This is a combination of both Ukrainian society multi-level efforts and generally positive action, which is rather unprofitable comparing with the scale of the planet peaceful civilization.

What is the modern hybrid-messianic aggression unique feature, how it differs from the era of world wars?

Sociological researches show an unprecedented variety of motivation factors for dissatisfaction with Putin's (Russian) politics among Ukrainians. It starts with total imperceptions of Russia as a state and Russians (as a political nation) and continues with accusations of the Russian regime activity have led to the toppling of the Russian-oriented authorities in Ukraine and brought «nationalists» to power ...

The absence of common ideological doctrines in the age of well-established social and political interests as the basic state management driving

power for the whole Ukraine leads to the fact, that our state has never had an overall public consensus on any social and political issues during modern history. Consequently, the historical development vector was not shaped. Therefore, our state historically moved by the way of semi-revolutionary convulsions. However, this order of events also had a positive aspect. All Russia's attempts to deliver an informational attack on the Ukrainian ideological bases ended with no result, since these bases did not exist in the traditions of such stable state entities as Putin's Russian Federation. The absence of systematic doctrinism in Ukraine gave Putin's actions to certain features of schizophrenia. It is possible to say that such type of aggression is aimed at the thin air. This only annoyed Ukrainians, regardless of their mindset ideological bents. It should be mentioned that the Maidan of Dignity values are creatively and technologically ignored by the most of Putin supporters (which is effective neutralization strategy), while the current Ukrainian political elite represents value models in the state and society life in half-hearted manner.

However, this situation cannot continue forever, and it is vital for Ukraine during the third year of the actual physical warfare to establish a several levels strategy and to start real information aggression against Russia's political regime in all possible directions of the global online-mode reality.

Let's consider the subject matters of such campaign possible strategy:

Attack vector

The set of ideas that are referred to as «Russian World» should be the objective of the information attack against Russia. The main provisions of this Russian concept are following:

– Russia is a superpower, which according to its own status is equal to the United States and greater than all other countries, and in the aftermath of this, has the right to dictate its own terms to the half of the world.

– Russia won the Great Patriotic War, and it was the Russians who actually were the main force for gaining the victory.

– Russia is the country with the largest Slavic population in the world, which provides it the exclusive right to influence on the other Slavic countries anywhere.

– Russia is the largest Orthodox country in the world, which provides it the right on spiritual supremacy over other Orthodox countries.

– Russia is a glorious ancient empire, so it has the right to dictate its will

Communication-content security: to the states that used to be a part of it, and where the citizens who identify themselves as «Russkie» («Russians») live.

The following interpretation of the «Russian World» ideas by Ukraine in the context of information initiatives on public domination is suggested:

– Yes, Russia was a superpower until 2014, but after the capture of Crimea this status was annulled. The key point is that a superpower is the state, which is able to wage a successful war with any other state in the world using only its own means and assets as well as without allies. The conflict with Ukraine deprived Russia of such an ability, due to the strategic missiles manufactured by «Pivdenne» CB maintenance termination by Ukraine, which are the main Russian nuclear deterrence weapon. For the current period of time, the «Bulava»-type missile should be a pillar of the Russia's defense, but its technical characteristics are really insignificant. By the way, widely advertised Russian S-300 and S-400 missile complexes have also demonstrated in its helplessness in Syria. At this moment, Russia is unable to oppose neither the US nor China. Taking into account the other types of weapon systems, for example, the Russian Federation's fleet is 4 times weaker than Australia's fleet, and the ratio of Russian to the NATO forces is 1 to 14.

– Yes, the Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War, which was part of the Second World War. but all the republics won all together, in single effort, and not Russia by itself, and probably could never have done it alone. In this war, Russia is really a record holder, but the record holder by the number of traitors-collaborators. Thus, **according to official Russian data**, up to 600,000 Russians fought in the ranks of the Nazis, and according to expert's data it was up to 1.5 million. For comparison: the official Russia makes statements that the Ukrainian side fought in the ranks of Germany consisting of one Galicia SS division and two battalions which are «Roland» and «Nachtigall», with total personnel number up to 25 thousand soldiers Thus, there are incomparable rates. Moreover, according to their own logic, «Russkie» («Russians») «betrayed» the Bolshevik regime, while Ukrainians used the Nazi German as an opportunity to obtain the independence.

– The former Soviet Union can be considered as the largest Slavic country, but after its collapse Ukraine actually became such a state! Relying on official results of the Russian Academy of Sciences «Genetic makeup of the Russian» research, the Slavic component in modern Russia includes no more

than 30 million people. Most of those who consider themselves as Slavs in Russia, according to the Russian Academy of Sciences, are genetically closer to Finno-Tatars. When it comes to the acceptance and attitude towards other peoples, then Russians for some reason consider Bulgarians as the Slavs (who are actually not), and completely ignore the Poles and Czechs ...

– Yes, the former Soviet Union can be considered as the largest Orthodox Christian country, but after its collapse Ukraine actually became such a state. B There are approximately 15,500 parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, and in Ukraine the total number is up to 22,000 churches of the Byzantian Rite, which is even more than in the Russian Orthodox Church along with the Belarusian Exarchate. According to the established methodology, one parish usually includes approximately 1 thousand believers.

What is the difference between information provocation and communication and content aggression?

It appears that there are up to 15.5 million Byzantian Rite believers in Russia, and in Ukraine this number is about 22 million. Speaking of, according to official data, there are about 19 million of Muslims in Russia, so Russia is not the largest Christian Orthodox but moderate Muslim country.

– Yes, Russia used to be an empire de facto. However, it could never be a legitimate one, since the emperor should be ordained for the kingdom by the Pope or the Ecumenical Patriarch. But the Russian tsars were not even ordained by regional patriarchs, since Peter I abolished the patriarchate, and after that, the Russian church was headed by the Holy synod chief procurator, who actually was the tsar's minister. Having introduced the «Calvinistic heresy» in Russia, which means, that the church is a state institution, Tsar Peter I legally reduced the international status of Russian tsars to the status of «grand dukes». That's the reason why Romanovs was not an actual dynasty, but only «the House of Romanovs». Thus, Russia is a country which stole someone else history and an ambiguous authority legitimacy.

The massive and regular rejection of these interpretations in Russian society will probably lead to a kind of mind shock like that which arose after the really effective bombing of Syria by the United States on the complete helplessness of Russian Air Defense system.

Defense vector

Since Ukraine is actively transforming the basis of statehood during the new era of global geopolitical tendencies, the defense vector is actually

Communication-content security: reduced to a system multi-scale tactical actions and comments on the Russians reaction on our information attacks or any other activity.

Internal vector

There is a huge amount of intellectual work to be done. Public and state institutions must realize that without development of the statehood mindset ideological base as a global perspective motivational focus, we are doomed to a spontaneous drift between power houses and ideological theories of the world and quite often - on the fringes of civilization.

The global public dominance factor

Nowadays, Ukraine is a powerful partner of the world and a significant contributor to global security (including securing against putinism) not only in continental Europe. Ukraine, as a part of security and defense sector system, should cast a kind of mindset anchor and start a systematic progressive ideological movement in a certain direction ...

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *The international security system: the latest aggressions as a factor in the destruction of the mankind civilization. The pros and cons.*

2. *What does information aggression in the global online-mode reality mean? Your understanding and real examples.*

3. *Your understanding of up-to-date communication and content strategies. Strategies components.*

4. *What are the vectors of communication and content aggression in the communication and content frameworks. Give proves of the correctness of this statement using examples or your own technological and professional case studies.*

5. *Why the phenomenon of the victory acceptance in the geopolitical strategic expansion dynamic model developing process depends on the scale and level of communication and content design and its cases of holding social and political international and global attention variety? What is the modern hybrid-messianic aggression unique feature, how it differs from the era of world wars? Set arguments using the ATO history examples.*

6. *What is the version feature of the informational, in other words, communicative and content dominance in the global online-mode reality in the era of modern hybrid-messianic aggression and global hybrid terrorism? Explain how it is possible to impose its own dominant interpretation and*

views of the facts and behavioral patterns, imposed by the centers of global hybrid terrorism and hybrid-messianic aggression.

7. Why informational, in other words, communicative and content aggression is primarily focused on bringing discredit to state institutions and the official facts interpretation, that show real processes and course of action? Give proves using the examples of the phenomenon of fact as a dynamic process in the frames of the segment-day conditions toolkit and public information environment.

8. What is the difference between information provocation and communication and content aggression? Why does the INFO and PSYOPS methodology and implementation as well as strategic communications does not operate processes, that are defined as hyper dynamics of excessive content-creative discourse communicative and content aggression?

9. What are the civilization peculiarities of the ongoing confrontation between Putin's Russia and Post-Maidan Ukraine? Why a local-level small-scale resistance to putinism from the point of view of the single Ukrainian citizen and patriot's dignity is much more effective than the mobilized Putin's regime supporters solid mass.

10. Why state and society life value models are more promising and more victorious, comparing with the state interests? What are the frameworks of the Putinists for the «Russian World»?

11. What are the world's security challenges occurred as a result of Putinists activity?

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**GEOSTRATEGIC DYNAMICS
OF CONVENTIONAL
AND NON-CONVENTIONAL MILITARY
PROCESSES IN MODERN WORLD**

...at the time when we are the target of contemporary combined warfare aiming to destroy us, Ukraine simply cannot afford to treat this conflict as a non-zero-sum game. And any diplomatic agreements, reached in regards to this conflict, will not be able to have a more significant status than the truce. There is no other way for us to win in this conflict, but to defeat the Russian Federation

1. Since the time, when at the very “equator” of the 20th century, in 1949-1950 John Forbes Nash created first non-mathematical models for non-zero-sum cooperative games and discovered the so-called “Nash equilibrium”, the idea of using this theory to build a general strategy for resolving international conflicts has captured the Western world.

Ever since Henry Kissinger has displayed remarkable results of implementing this theory in 1974 during negotiations between Israel and his Arabic opponents, primarily Egypt, the ability to simulate and ultimately bring any conflicts to game situations with non-zero, mainly positive sum has become virtually a civilizational characteristic.

Taking this into consideration, it is quite natural that most of the Western experts and politicians, who are trying to at least somehow assist the third world countries, in particular Ukraine, keep saying that the main prerequisite for success is the ability to avoid negative or zero-sum games and settle on positive-sum games. Put simply, it is more important to have an ability to negotiate and benefit from conflicts, doing everything to evade the idea of victory or defeat, rather than to just have an ability to resist. Moreover, leading Western nations are spending tremendous amounts of money to stimulate this behavioral pattern.

2. This perspective on the essence of international policy was also reinforced by the realization that the confrontation between the main geopolitical actors of the 20th century, the USSR and the USA, under the conditions of a nuclear arms race could lead to a complete destruction of the human race if it ever turned into a classic conventional war.

3. In view of the foregoing, the military confrontation between the USA and the USSR had a lot of unconventional characteristics. This was primarily manifested in the fact that first of all, the military confrontation was very limited in nature, second of all third parties (from individual third world countries to insurgent religious and social movements and military juntas) ended up becoming the official subjects of military conflicts of the time, and third of all military units of the main parties to the conflict avoided direct engagement with each other by all means, reasonably believing that it could have unpredictable consequences.

4. Under these circumstances the support for the third world militaries grew significantly. Armed Forces of a large number of developing countries were granted resources exceeding their budgets. Servicemen were becoming a separate caste that seized power in a given country and waged

Communication-content security: wars with their own people and with each other. During the “cold war” years between 1947 and 1985 the world has witnessed more than 70 coup d’états. At the same time “civil and guerilla wars, separatist confrontations and ethnic or religious conflicts within society started dominating the overall massacre statistics... throughout the 20th century the numbers of civilian casualties became frightening: from 5% in World War I, 50% in World War II and up to 90% in the wars of 1990’s” – Democracy by Charles Tilly.

However, the parties that were predominantly involved in the majority of these conflicts, namely the military-political authorities of the USSR and the USA and their armed forces, did not perceive the military confrontations of the time as anything burdensome. Actual military casualties were rather limited and the financial and social support for the Armed Forces kept growing. Therefore, for the main opposing parties the conflict did turn into a 100% positive-sum game.

Why are game algorithms becoming increasingly more influential in international affairs?

Thus, for the key actors of the war it started to lose its traditional defining characteristics previously shaped by the situation in Europe in the period between 17th and 19th centuries, such as: official declaration, military defeats and victories, peace treaties and abidance by various international agreements. It has mostly turned into sequence of special operations aimed at causing as many situational casualties amongst enemy troops as possible in a way that would allow to avoid being held officially accountable and would not provoke the enemy to declare a war.

5. One of the side effects of this approach is a disproportionate increase in the power and role of special services to the extent that they began competing for the usurpation of power. Understandably for the US the threat of power being seized by special services has never been relevant, considering the extreme civilian control of their own institutions and relative weakness of the state in the face of civil society and business. For the USSR, on the other hand, this was a very realistic perspective that was fully implemented in the post-Soviet Russia.

6. At the time when the Soviet Union was going bankrupt and collapsing the special services of the state were concentrated on provoking national and separatist conflicts on the territories of national republics with a firm belief that this familiar method would allow them to maintain control over the situation. Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria – all these

“frozen conflicts” were inherited from those times. Apparently the goal behind these conflicts was not reached. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova declared their independence and the world acknowledged them. But the bleeding wounds on the bodies of these states are still there.

7. In early 2000’s, when the special services completely usurped the power in the Russian Federation and ensured proper political protection and funding for their organization, they adopted an already familiar approach aimed at increasing their importance and influence, in particular by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and destabilizing the situation there. This is particularly true for the post-Soviet countries.

8. This approach has led to the USA being declared the main enemy and geopolitical adversary of Russia, on one hand, and on the other, to Russia reviving the practice of waging non-conventional and proxy wars both on the former Soviet Union territories and beyond. Moreover, in its efforts Russia has gone even further than the Soviet Union in 1950’s – 1980’s, occupying and annexing Crimea, a part of the Ukrainian territory, the sovereignty of which is guaranteed by not only international agreements, but also bilateral agreements between Russia and Ukraine. The war, started by Russia in Donbas, is not just an attempt to destabilize the situation in the South and West of Ukraine, but also a geostrategic cover-up for the annexation of Crimea.

How can you explain the statement that victory over an aggressor equally depends on the armed forces and the society?

9. This brings up an appropriate question: what are we to do with all this? How to stop Russian military expansion under the existing conditions?

The international community is as usual encouraging Russia and Ukraine to treat the situation as a non-zero-sum game and settle this conflict around the negotiation table by signing something similar to a mutually beneficial commercial agreement.

Ukraine is hesitant to call this conflict “war”, despite having all of the grounds for doing so, since it may provoke a full-fledged escalation of aggression. This is a rational approach: if the war is declared Russia will be able to mobilize from 6 to 8 million soldiers and send them to Ukraine and no one can say for sure whether the West will provide efficient support to Ukraine in a scenario like this or not.

Besides, the more time passes since the onset of these events, the more uncertain Ukraine becomes, since the constant efforts aimed at restoring justice start to look as a typical neighborly or family feud.

Russia does not perceive Ukraine as a party to international negotiations and seeks to restrict, and in the best case scenario obliterate, Ukrainian state sovereignty. This is due to the fact that this very limitation is viewed by the Russian authorities as a situational victory over the USA.

12. At the time when we are the target of contemporary combined warfare aiming to destroy us, Ukraine simply cannot afford to treat this conflict as a non-zero-sum game. And any diplomatic agreements, reached in regards to this conflict, will not be able to have a more significant status than the truce. There is no other way for us to win in this conflict, but to defeat the Russian Federation. This is why our armed forces, security sector and society should be prepared to not only deter the enemy but also to inflict defeats forcing him to abandon any attempts to infringe the sovereignty of Ukraine, restoring the justice and punishing the hybrid messianic aggressor.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *Who is John Forbes Nash? What is the essence of his theory, known as the “Nash equilibrium”? What is the algorithm for using his approaches in a general strategy for resolving international conflicts, adopted in the second half of the 20th century?*

2. *Why are game algorithms becoming increasingly more influential in international affairs? How is this related to the proliferation of the global hybrid terrorism practices? Substantiate your response, indicate references, illustrate your opinion using geostrategic examples of conflicts in different areas of the world.*

3. *How and where did Henry Kissinger promote John Forbes Nash? What does it have to do with Egypt? Why was the international geopolitical tendency of bringing any conflicts to game situations with non-zero, mainly positive sum perceived as the basic foundation for peacemaking in the era of geopolitical statics?*

4. *Why are the diplomatic traditions of applying non-zero-sum games principles to regional conflicts losing their international significance in the era of escalation of global hybrid terrorism by the means of compo-*

sitional implementation of hybrid messianic aggressions in the communication-content security paradigm (innovative design and management stylistics of content flow-oriented dynamics)?

5. *Why are the capabilities of international diplomatic conflict settlement, that were based on the ability to negotiate and benefit from any altercation evading the idea of victory or defeat, stretched thin? Why are the global geopolitical leaders still spending enormous amounts of money to stimulate this very type of international-global behavior?*

6. *How can you explain the statement that victory over an aggressor equally depends on the armed forces and the society? Will the victory over the Putin's regime have national, continental or planetary? Substantiate your response through the prism of both the communication-content security and traditional military stylistics of the 20th century.*

7. *Why is the political regime of the Russian Federation not copying the geopolitical stylistics of the USSR in their multi-format manifestations of hybrid messianic aggressions and the global hybrid terrorism practices, but instead is moderating a new quality of expansion and brutal dominance in the geostrategic dynamics and on a planetary scale? Why does Kremlin not concentrate on the conflict, but instead disseminates the areas of influence so much that they become uncontrollable from the standpoint of geopolitical opposition stylistics of the past? Give examples proving your opinion, indicate references.*

8. *Explain (based on resources, scopes, scales and levels) why Ukraine cannot declare war with the Russian Federation (in a conventional war format)? Why do representatives of various Ukrainian political power often talk about declaring war with Russia? Why is Ukraine unable to accede to the international diplomatic non-zero-sum game offering only a hybrid terrorist truce? Indicate a solution to this problem from the standpoint of communication-content paradigm. Is it a viable solution? Pros and cons.*

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**TEMPORAL AND TERMLESS STRATEGIES
AS A POSSIBLE FOUNDATION
FOR THE COMMUNICATIVE DISCOURSE
OF COUNTERING HYBRID MESSIANIC
AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE
IN ITS MILITARY AND GEOPOLITICAL
COMPONENTS**

Long-term strategies that pose a direct threat to victory do not work, especially if you are more limited in resources than your adversary. In a case like this, only short-term strategies are effective, as they do not give the adversary any time to react and shape a counterstrategy.

We now face the challenge of developing adequate understanding of geopolitical, economic, social and military aspects of hybrid messianic aggression of the Putin's Russia against the Ukrainian state. Adequate and complete picture resulting from understanding the phenomenon of aggression has to shape the foundation for the development of informational policy, state communication bodies and public opinions on information. All this has to be done in order to develop and implement a strategy for eradicating aggression on the territory of Ukraine and all over the world.

LPR and DPR neutralization strategy, that was being implemented over the course of the three summer months of 2014, seemed completely feasible, as it was based on the undeniable military equipment and resources-related advantage of the Ukrainian party. Therefore, regardless of the actual combat advantages of each unit, the overall result of the combat operation looked very promising.

Heavy armament supply, as well as heavy shelling of the Ukrainian military units by Russia jeopardized the effectiveness of this strategy. Deployment of the regular forces of Putin's Army before and after August 24th, 2014 actually put paid to it. It is obvious that Russia has a lot more resource potential than Ukraine and it is fully capable of supporting the limited warfare in the East of Ukraine for however long. It is also clear that even if we do manage to deter Kremlin's aggression within certain limits, the currently available resources will not be sufficient to turn the situation in our favor and solve the issue of liberation certain regions of Donbas, occupied by Russian terrorist forces, by military means. This is the conclusion drawn based on the resources Ukraine can currently afford to use and the "game rules" that prevail today.

Beside everything else, the short history of the military-political confrontation between Putin's Russia and Ukraine, and before that the clashed on Maidan, showed that Russia and its satellites, not being able to win playing by the existing rules, changed the rules every time to engage previously forbidden resources. Which, naturally came as complete shock to the other party, leading to tactical success on one hand, and escalation of violence on the other, since in most cases the opposing forces were able to respond quickly and efficiently.

A short list of the escalation stages includes:

– dispersal and beating of peaceful protesters at Maidan (response – rapid increase in the number of protesters, Maidan take-over, creation of self-defense squads and construction of barricades);

Communication-content security:

– use of traumatic firearms and tear-gas grenades (response – use of “Molotov cocktails”, smoke screen laying on Hrushevskoho Street);

– employment of “Titushky” squads to terrorize citizens and protesters (response – creation of territorial self-defense squads and rapid response squads based on Automaidan);

– use of lethal firearms, abduction and murder of activists (response – roadblocks, regional government buildings takeover, armament of the protesters);

– sniper fire at the protesters, massacre of February 18-20 (response – law enforcement personnel desertion, reformatting of the parliamentary majority, amendments to the Constitution, Maidan of Dignity);

– protests in Crimea (response – counter protests);

– armed seizure of the government agencies in Crimea, proclamation of the so-called referendum on the accession to the Russian Federation, occupation of the military units (there was no response, which led to Ukraine losing Crimea);

– protests in Donbas and in a number of cities in the South East of Ukraine (response – counter protests);

– armed seizure of administrative buildings and certain military units (there was no response in Donbas, and in Kharkiv – armed building clearing);

– DPR, LPR proclamation, carrying out of the imitational referendum, murders of the discordant, attacks and murders of the servicemen (response – an attempt to use separate military units and the National Guard to restore order, clearing of Mariupol, defeat of the protest movements in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, etc.);

– use of artillery to shell military units and city quarters (response – use of artillery);

– employment of heavy armored vehicles against checkpoints (response – employment of heavy armored vehicles and artillery, as well as aviation);

– mass weapon supply, including heavy weapons, from Russia (response – mass employment of the Armed Forces, National Guard and volunteer formations, armament of the National Guard with heavy weapons);

In what areas is the hybrid messianic aggression of Putin’s Russia against the State of Ukraine manifested? How is it different from the aggressions targeting Ukrainian society?

Hybrid messianic aggressions

- mass shelling of Ukrainian military and border guard units by Russian heavy artillery (response – withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the border);
- sending in of the regular units of the Russian Army, comprised of professionals (serving on contract bases) and organic equipment. However, Russian government is in denial about their presence on the Ukrainian territory (response – ceasefire agreement).

Following the logic of further engagement of uncommitted resources in this confrontation, it is theoretically possible that Russia will resort to the following stake raising options, if faced with the possibility of defeat:

- acknowledging the war with Ukraine and employing direct aggression, increasing the numbers of troops deployed in Ukraine to 50–100–150 thousand servicemen. Deployment of conscripts to the war zone;
- carrying out mobilization measures and engaging an army of 2 million people in the war with Ukraine (theoretically Russia can mobilize even more people, but in reality it doesn't have neither C2 nor logistical/infrastructural reserves sufficient to feed, equip and command this large of an army);
- using nuclear weapons.

As for Ukraine, it still has the following reserves:

- assistance from the international community, predominantly the Western countries (includes both direct assistance and pressure on Russia. It is difficult to identify the actual scope of this assistance, since quite often it has ad hoc nature). In fact, this is the main reserve, but it has a disadvantage in that it cannot be used instrumentally and therefore in this sense it is practically impossible to manage this resource.

- postponed capability to conduct limited mobilization disguised as refresher/reserve training, exercises, etc. and to use that personnel to establish units and formations of a total 1 million people (for this to be possible, it is necessary to restructure relevant elements of the Armed Forces and provide additional armament and equipment, which would take, in the best case scenario, at least 6-8 months).

- postponed capability to openly conduct complete mobilization and to use that personnel to establish units and formations of a total 5 million people (the entire process from start to establishment of a capable force would take at least a year).

- ability to put pressure on and blackmail Russia by regulating transit corridors in Transnistria and Crimea. And also by supplying Crimea with a number of vital resources.

Another peculiarity of the aforementioned escalation is the fact that, while the use of the “forbidden” means was not only expected of the other party, but was also aimed at completing the operation within a limited amount of time, the party opposing them did not address the threat in an efficient manner and was being defeated. The case with Crimea is an evident example of this scenario. It took about a month for the Russian SOF to completely eject Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian government representatives from the peninsula. Over the course of that month Ukraine was not able to find a way to properly respond to the actions of the Russian Armed Forces. Later it turned that in order to bring the situation back to its initial state it was necessary for us to raise the stakes, meaning to start a full-scale war with Russia.

On the contrary, in cases when the “stake raising” provided a tactical advantage, but did not lead to final success in a given theater of war, sooner or later there would be a way to neutralize that tactical advantage.

In the same manner, the inability to win just one round within the existing conflict rules and the consequent feeling of being threatened by the possibility of defeat both lead to the stakes being raised. This is predominantly true in cases, when this type of threat is obvious over a long period of time. Thus, the victories that the Ukrainian Army demonstrated over the course of the 2,5 months (since the beginning of June till the end of August) were supposed to lead to an inevitable victory and conclusive clearing of Donbas from separatists and Putin’s terrorist spy network. After all, the long-standing awareness of this threat and the inability to prevent it using legitimized means led to the decision to employ regular Russian Armed Forces.

This is the real lesson. Long-term strategies that pose a direct threat to victory do not work, especially if you are more limited in resources than your adversary. In a case like this, only short-term strategies are effective, as they do not give the adversary any time to react and shape a counter-strategy. Although, this conclusion was drawn all the way back in the 70s.

Potential strategies for putting an end to the crisis in Donbas and the military conflict with Russia under the present circumstances

As the result of the crisis of August 24–28, 2014, when the Southern flank of the Ukrainian forces was practically defeated and the combat zone expanded southward – along the Russian border to the Azov Sea, the stabilization of the frontline with minimal casualties to the Ukrainian side has become vital. Theoretically this stabilization can be reached by establish-

ing a strong defense line, however under the conditions when the control over own troops is almost lost and the ATO authorities are perplexed, an attempt to obtain desirable result by military means only would lead to unjustified losses of people, equipment and territories. This result, in turn, led to demoralization of the Armed Forces and to rather unpleasant long-term consequences of this demoralization.

It is necessary to note, that under these conditions the Minsk agreements are the most adequate response to the situation. And even though they did not lead to a complete cessation of fire and hostilities, they did, in fact, allow to establish something that by analogy with “hybrid war” could be named “hybrid truce” and that could potentially develop into “hybrid peace”. This “hybrid truce” is highly beneficial for the Ukrainian side, as it provides necessary conditions for implementing any of the possible winning strategies in the existing conflict with Russia. These conditions can be boiled down to a few crucial points:

What is the essence of hybrid truce and hybrid peace? Why are these terms becoming categories and how can they turn (have turned) into the paradigm of the contemporary global hybrid terrorism practices?

1. Ability to hold the “front line” with minimal losses.

2. Maintaining the uncertainty of the situation, the nature of which enables the Ukrainian side to change the “rules of the game” at any time and to act legitimately in the eyes of international observers and in the eyes of its own people. Given that the opposing party does not have such an opportunity. Any obvious escalation by the opposing party will lead to the strengthening of sanctions and undesirable internal political consequences in the event that such escalation does not have a quick and definite result.

3. The circumstances are maintained in a way that forces the Russian government to continue lying to both its own people and the international community regarding the presence of their forces in Donbas and the weapon supply there. Persistent systematic lie will weaken the stance of the Putin’s regime both within the country and across borders.

Talking about strategy, it is worth highlighting, that the possible strategies for the existent confrontation in Donbas can be divided into two categories:

temporal – designed to be implemented and lead to a desirable outcome within a certain time frame;

and termless – designed to be constantly improved and to accumulate resources in anticipation for better times and a successful set of circumstances.

There are only three obvious temporal strategies in this situation:

- dead weight dumping strategy;
- fixed in time peaceful integration of Donbas strategy;
- armed solution strategy.

Dead weight dumping strategy, which consists of pushing the occupied territories controlled by Putin's cadre out of Ukraine and subsequently legitimizing that move, has many drawbacks:

- Russia will perceive this move as an explicit sign of weakness and a provocation to further extend the expansion zone;
- the world will perceive this move as a real weakness and will start treating Ukraine accordingly, which will be extremely difficult to fix in a long run.

After the annexation of Crimea, we have already given the world a reason to think that we are weak and current hardships are an immediate result of such an image, which has not been improved yet.

- a large percentage of the Ukrainian society will perceive this move as betrayal on the part of the government with all that it implies.

However, there are quite elegant implementation methods for this strategy, which will eliminate most of the aforementioned shortcomings and might also yield some image-related benefits.

For instance, we could announce a referendum in the specific regions of Donbas asking whether the locals agree to live in the State of Ukraine according to its laws and to abide by the will of the majority of Ukrainian people. There is a high chance that both Russia and local separatists will agree to conduct such a referendum under international control and oversight provided by both parties to the conflict. In case the results of the referendum are positive, which is very unlikely, it will be reasonable to launch a program to clear Donbas. The program should envisage for everyone willing to acquire Russian citizenship and emigrate to the Russian Federation to get 5 000 or 10 000\$ relocation allowance from the Ukrainian government. It should only be done under the condition that the person agreeing to this will not return to Ukraine over the next 15 years or otherwise would face a penalty of up to five years in prison.

In case the results of this referendum are negative (which is more likely), it will be reasonable to conduct an all-Ukrainian referendum right after to see how people feel about excluding respective territories from Ukraine and, if applicable, legitimize the “divorce proceedings”.

Fixed in time peaceful integration of Donbas strategy. Basically, this is the strategy declared by the President and his surroundings. Its essence lies in using the pressure on Russia, enforced by the Western world, diplomatic and financial levers, a number of legal and political concessions, as well as direct military pressure to gradually, step by step, integrate the occupied territories of Donbas into Ukraine over the course of three years.

This strategy seems morally justified, as it is based on the continuous demonstration of our own peaceful intentions in an attempt to portray Russia and the separatists, as bellicose aggressors and ourselves, as a victim. Moreover, this strategy is supposed to appease Russia and the world regarding the self-worth of the Ukrainian government, which appears so low to external observers that it will not allow to resume active offensive operations.

As for the efficiency of this strategy, it is very questionable. At least within the limits of the declared goal – to peacefully integrate entire Donbas into Ukraine within three years and to introduce local political and legal realities into the Ukrainian legal field. The thing is, that the main resource Ukraine uses to implement this strategy is the political, economic and moral pressure on Russia maintained by the West. And even though this pressure is a very effective resource, it is absolutely unclear how and when it will force Kremlin’s top officials to abandon the policy of supporting separatism and destabilizing situation in Ukraine, if at all. Furthermore, it is simply impossible to know this. The problem is that without this knowledge the strategy itself is imperfect.

Although, this is possible only if the declared goals of the strategy actually coincide with real goals.

It is possible that this strategy is just a preparatory segment of a wider strategic concept – either a gradual transition to one of the non-temporal strategies or a preparation for an armed solution of the situation in the East of Ukraine.

Possible armed solution. In order to solve the Donbas issue by military means, it is necessary for Ukraine to identify the most unsuitable moment for the adversary and then employ the reserves that would allow the

Communication-content security: Ukrainian government to regain complete control over the entire territory of Eastern Ukraine over a very short period of time. The timeframe here would be defined by how quickly Putin's Russia is able to find and implement adequate counter measures from the moment when the intentions of Ukrainian government become obvious. This timeframe may be estimated in advance at 3 to 6 weeks, depending on the exact circumstances that will come along with the "Liberation" operation. For example, it is obvious that if the operation starts in June 2018, at the time when the World Football Cup 2018 takes place in Moscow, Kremlin will need a lot more time to find efficient response mechanisms.

Therefore, a military solution of this issue is possible only if Ukraine unexpectedly employs military resources sufficient to defeat the militants and the Russian terrorist forces that support them over the course of 2-3 weeks. Potentially, such resources do exist. It is, first of all, the ability to relatively covertly mobilize around 1 million people (when only 600–800 thousand people are actually needed) to participate in a short-term operation, and second of all, the ability to ensure the readiness of and employ in the operation a large number of armored equipment (probably more than 1000 vehicles), which makes the fulfillment of the aforementioned task quite realistic.

Thus the force ration in the combat zone can be quickly changed to 30 to 1 in our favor, which will not only allow to quickly fulfil all of the military objectives, but also provide primary control over the affected territories.

If successful, these scenarios will not only improve the real international status and internal prestige of Ukraine, not only shape the preconditions for genuinely equitable dialogue with the Russian Federation, but also will create the conditions suitable to start putting in serious effort to solve the problem with Crimea. However, these strategies are not foolproof. There is a number of obstacles to their implementation. The following obstacles are the most significant:

- the possibility that in case of certain setbacks in the implementation of the said operation Russia will launch a full-scale war against Ukraine, mobilizing most of its resources, which can have unpredictable consequences. The likelihood of this scenario is very low, however it should not be completely overlooked;

- resources necessary for us to achieve military victory might be currently unavailable. It is possible to mobilize people and, most importantly,

the society will respond positively and be understanding. There are also huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, but there are no logistic, command or infrastructural capabilities to employ any of this, especially within a short period of time. Ukraine will need at least a year of hard work to create such capabilities. And this is in the face of an active opposition from Russia, on one hand, and the highest degree of corruption and governmental indecisiveness – on the other;

– with the current state of economy, state and private finances such an operation might turn out to be unaffordable. This is particularly true, considering the immense cost of Donbas restoration, which will be necessary in case the operation is successful. Therefore, the instant and efficient implementation of economic, infrastructural and other reforms that would have tangible effects before the beginning of the final operational phase becomes vital. (However, it is important to keep in mind that an attempt to implement this plan might become the main impetus for the reform of the state governmental system and internal economic relations);

– moreover, political and legal circumstances suitable for carrying out such operation have to satisfy certain contradictory conditions. First of all, the preparatory stage, which as has been said before might take a while, should not be accompanied by active military actions. It is expensive and may lead to unexpected threats and challenges at any time. Second of all, the co-existence conditions between Ukraine and the problematic regions of Russia in the preparatory stage of the given operation should exclude any doubts in the legitimacy and justifiability of the use of any force the Ukrainian party might deem necessary. It means that Ukraine must not allow for its use of force, if such is necessary, to be presented as aggression towards Russia, its citizens and servicemen or as an infringement of its international obligations.

It also means that it is impossible to establish peace in Donbas that would apply to DPR and LPR, as its subjects. Under no circumstances should we allow for the legitimate military units of the Russian Federation to be deployed on Ukrainian soil. (In this sense the legalization of Russian military units in Donbas is even more dangerous than the units themselves). It is also important to prevent Russia from making any formal commitments to the leadership of these pseudo formations.

Obviously, abidance by all of these requirements makes sustainable peace in the combat zone impossible and, as has been stated before,

Communication-content security: Ukraine is currently not interested in the aggravation of the situation and transition to the state of war. Therefore, we have to maintain the existent artificial truce by all means available (it is worth noting, that President Poroshenko has been pretty good at it so far, which will allow him to make fundamental decisions in the future).

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *In what areas is the hybrid messianic aggression of Putin's Russia against the State of Ukraine manifested? How is it different from the aggressions targeting Ukrainian society? Complete the answer with examples from your own professional cases or personal experience, rationalize your opinion in an evidence-based and substantive manner.*

2. *Why was the military strategy that Ukraine used in the first three months of ATO to counter Russian aggression in 2014 non-systematic, but phased and why did it require a fundamental change? Substantiate your response using systematic geo-positional examples and information on cases from the ATO zone taken from reliable sources.*

3. *Proactively brutal (unilateral) change or a complete disregard for international rules is a hybrid terrorist practice in international affairs, but in the contemporary paradigm of communication-content security it is just a variational game for global dominance in attracting systematic attention. In your opinion, what is the most promising approach in the contemporary era of the globalized world and why? It is reasonable to base the response on the analysis of the self-presentation of individual countries and military-political alliances. Which line of reasoning can hybrid messianic aggressions be used in?*

4. *Analyze the framework of the use of forces and resources in Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the period between 2013 and 2017. Indicate the levels where the opportunities to use means and forces were missed, considering existing reserve and capabilities of the contemporary world.*

5. *Why were the "Minsk-1" agreements appropriate for the geo-positional situation and why are these agreements ("Minsk-1" and "Minsk-2") often combined in a communication-content context, instead of being perceived separately? Substantiate your opinion. Demonstrate memes opposing Minsk agreements. Are they promising or limited?*

6. *What is the essence of hybrid truce and hybrid peace? Why are these terms becoming categories and how can they turn (have turned) into the paradigm of the contemporary global hybrid terrorism practices? Substantiate your response, referencing the sources and real cases.*

7. *The statement that the long-term systematic lies will definitely weaken Putin's regime both inside the country and beyond the borders was considered logical and reasonable in the past. Why is this statements no longer true in the paradigm of the contemporary hybrid messianic aggressions of the communication-content dimension? Provide situational examples arguing "for" and "against".*

8. *Why does the civilization confrontation in Ukraine involve both temporal and termless strategies? Provide examples.*

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**INTERPRETATIVE ATTITUDE
OF A TRANSLATOR AS A FACTOR
DISTORTING THE MEANING
OF THE MESSAGE**

Today we are witnessing the establishment of a new “Russian world” conceptual sphere which shapes its own system of terminal cognitive knots and relevant linguistic means of their verbalization. The most dangerous aspect of this process, in our opinion, is the effect of the “parallel worldview”, in which the elements of the reality are perceived by the Russian-speaking consumers through the cognitive paradigm previously selected and developed by the highest authorities of the Russian Federation

Linguistic theory of translation does not provide objective explanations for the variability of translation, since within its limits translation is perceived as a process of replacing one text with the other by substituting separate fragments in source language with corresponding fragments in the target language. Selection of exact translated equivalents of the original text was considered key to a successful translation. However, the linguistic theory of translation is unable to explain the diversity of the already existing translations and goes against the pragmatist ontology of translation, which identifies the translator predominantly as a doer. For the translator it is important to not resort to literal translation, but instead try to reproduce the mosaic of senses enclosed in the original text by the author as best as possible.

Viewing the process of translation as the transformation of original text into the translated text, I. Revzin and V. Rozentsveih consider it necessary to distinguish between two ways of implementing this transformation: “translation as such», when there is a direct transition from the units of one language to the units of the other, and “interpretation”, when the translator first recognizes which real life fact is behind the unit of the original language, and then describes this fact using the means of the translation language. In linguistic theory of translation interpretation is perceived as a type of translation, based on recursing to extralinguistic activity, as opposed to translation as such, performed in accordance to rules set for transition from the means of expression of one language system to those of a different one.

What is Russian linguistic aggression in Ukraine? How does the aggressor create a new conceptual online structure of the message by simply translating it?

Interpretation often turns out to be essentially just the process in which a writer or a translator is experiencing the meaning embedded in the text. K. Kohn, who studied the issues of translation from the point of understanding and interpreting the text, also stated that: “your understanding of the text will be reflected in your translation: “This very possibility defines the occurrence of a multitude of translation options for the same text, depending on how the translator understands the original text”. A culturally significant text that becomes the object of translation always contains a multitude of all existing and potential interpretations and cannot have only one correct interpretation: “perception of the entire text tends to be liberal: no two perspectives on the same piece of writing are ever the same”.

Translation and interpretation of a text are influenced by the individual specifics of the translator, the styles of the author and the translator, genre and typology-related peculiarities of the original and the translated text. In order to have an adequate understanding of the text and be able to comprehend and identify the meaning behind it, it is crucial to have certain knowledge (linguistic and encyclopedic) directly dependent on the background knowledge of the potential reader, his/her social, cultural or educational status.

The fact that the translator belongs to a different culture, the tools for understanding which may be drastically different from those for the source culture, leaves an impression on the interpretation of the text.

Factors that hinder the adequate understanding and perception of the original text include: differences between the communicative situations of the producent/addressant and the recipient/addressee, differences between the code systems they use, types of cultural time, norms, values, main elements of the social-cultural systems associated with the source and the target language, presence of a lingo-ethnic barrier, which includes not only purely linguistic impediments (differences in language systems, their linguistic norms and rules), but also extra-linguistic knowledge, meaning national-specific components of culture and lexical gaps resulting from the specification of the text itself (its content, form, poetics, author's personal style elements, genre and type of the target audience).

Why is literal translation ineffective in the dynamic communication processes?

Thus, different interpretations or “differences in the understanding” of the same original text by multiple translators may be considered one of the main reasons for the variability of translation and possible existence of multiple translations for the same original text. Variability of translation can be caused by two main factors:

- difference in the way translators understand and interpret the meanings of the original text;
- deliberate stance of the translator, meaning that he or she consciously changes, adds or omits certain meanings during the translation.

An original text is created with a certain aim and for a certain target audience. The same goes for translation, it is also created with a certain aim and for a certain audience, which may be different from the target audience of the original. Translation is a sort of a bridge between cultures, which

the translator is striving to build. Some researchers believe that a translator has to focus on the target audience in the process. Another widespread approach to comprehending the role of translation is the functional one, which assumes that translation has to fulfill the same role for the target audience as the source texts does for its specific audience.

Translational capabilities can be schematically generalized as a scale, the end points of which are equivalence, i.e. literal translation, and rewriting, i.e. loose translation. There are different interpretations, different ways translators may perceive the text and different translators' stances focusing on either source or target culture between these two end points.

Aforementioned factors eloquently describe the classic understanding of a source text message translation (interpretation). However, in our opinion, linguistic aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine has added another understanding of the translation process. Russian mass media have turned the process of translating a foreign text message, which has always been a process of interpreting the real facts, into a process of distorting reality by the means of language, the process of substituting concepts and manipulating objects and subjects of a given reality.

In this regard it is important to address the cognitive aspects of translation. Cog-

Why is the geostrategic paradigm of the “Russian world”, as a conceptualization of the parallel communication-content dimension of a human existence, a dangerous weapon against the peaceful modern civilization?

nitive linguistics opens up new perspectives for scientists related to the analysis of mental formations, which are a categorical foundation of all human activities, most notably – language. Cognitive linguistics defines its main task as studying the peculiarities of knowledge representation on all levels of a language system. Comprehension of new information aimed at concept creation takes place within the limits of communicants' cognitive. Concept creation process in the human consciousness can be explained by the term “conceptualization”. For the purpose of this research we will define conceptualization as “the process of a human cognitive activity, which lies in comprehending and compartmentalizing the results of the internal reflexive experience of a person and their view on object, phenomena and their indicators”. Establishment of a conceptual system of consciousness is the result of conceptualization.

Recent analysis of the original texts and the translations, done by the Russian-speaking mass media clearly demonstrates a new tendency in the so-called “translation” process. Authors of the secondary texts shape a new conceptual structure of the message based on certain “isolated elements of the original”. They do not even try to change the content of the initial message, but instead change the way the recipient perceives the initial message by imposing a new conceptual picture.

Over the past two years the tendency towards the establishment of a new “Russian” conceptual sphere based on the generally accepted system of meanings started to take form. New lexical units with a necessary information field, relevant conceptual structures and respective pragmatic influence on the recipient of such information are being created.

Today we are witnessing the establishment of a new “Russian world” conceptual sphere which shapes its own system of terminal cognitive knots and relevant linguistic means of their verbalization.

The most dangerous aspect of this process, in our opinion, is the effect of the “parallel worldview”, in which the elements of the reality are perceived by the Russian-speaking consumers through the cognitive paradigm previously selected and developed by the highest authorities of the Russian Federation.

Any cognitive system of perception of reality constantly needs to broaden the range of its consumers, that is why currently we are witnessing an expansion of such a system on the territory of Ukraine.

Obviously, the translator and his/her interpretative attitude are a key element of this process. Analyzing factual material, we came to the conclusion that the translator is applying ideological interpretative attitude, which envisages the initial meaning of the message being adapted to the established conceptual structures. Usually this process is characterized by the identification of key terminal cognitive knots, but with a completely different structure of linguistic verbalization and conceptualization of the meaning. Therefore, a similar attitude of the translator shapes a strong system of hierarchically connected meanings within the mind of the recipient and activating the key element of this system is associated with a system of meanings which is the exact opposite of the generally accepted one. Mental consolidation of this key concept system facilitates the creation of a specific “Russian” language reality in the future.

In our opinion, the identified aspect of a translator’s activity calls for applying additional efforts to the study of cognitive aspects of translation

Hybrid messianic aggressions _____
with the aim of creating an effective system of countering linguistic aggression and preserving our own Ukrainian conceptual sphere.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *From your point of view, can the use of capabilities of the automatic online translation services (like Google Translate) become the miracle solution under the conditions of an increase in the numbers of international communications-based relations? In your opinion, will the Artificial Intelligence replace the need to learn languages or study classic foreign literature? Express your opinion in the paradigm of the communication-content security.*

2. *Your attitude toward a professional translator: is it a manifestation of the atavism, temporary functions, visionary-level art in the dynamics of the global civilization or something else? Substantiate your opinion, provide proof for the importance or futility of professional translation.*

3. *Translator, as a communication-content actor. Complete the image based on competencies, specialties, specializations and other obligatory communication algorithms. Disprove this statement on the practical level of cases and lessons learned.*

4. *What is Russian linguistic aggression in Ukraine? How does the aggressor create a new conceptual online structure of the message by simply translating it? Why are Putin's propagandists trying to draw attention to the perception, rather than the content of the message? Why and how is the "Russian world" language conceptual sphere, as an essential base of mental codes of the hybrid messianic aggression, formed? Substantiate your opinion using practical cases and situational experience.*

5. *In your opinion, how important is the explication used by the translator in the process of translation and how is it different from the notion of "post truth" that the putinists are trying to force onto us and the entire world under the guise of "an explanation of what has actually happened"?*

6. *Why is literal translation ineffective in the dynamic communication processes? What competencies should the translator possess in order to efficiently work with the communication-content design or the terminological composition of the definitions of the content flow processes in the era of hybrid messianic aggressions? Substantiate your opinion using translation cases or personal experience.*

7. *Why is every event, situation and fact always interpreted from the standpoint of the “Russian world” conceptual sphere in the flow dynamics of the hybrid messianic, but also in the paradigm of creative industries? In your opinion, is interpretation just a technological component of a translator’s activity or a modern technology of linguistic aggression, which allows to destroy the essence of information in the process of public interpretation of a translated text? Can this phenomenon be addressed as the new level of the communication-content dimension of the global hybrid terrorism?*

8. *How is it possible to focus the flow publicity on creating the linguistic composition and communication-content design in a way that would allow authors to understand the importance of this format on the synergistic level?*

9. *Why should the communication-content design operate on the levels of explication and interpretation in the field of linguistic conceptual sphere positioning? Will this decrease the capabilities of the opponents or aggressors from the global hybrid terrorism centers? Try to base your answer on the examples of the information resonances of the stream era. Is it possible to use interpretations and explications via online systematic infrastructural solutions targeting a certain linguistic conceptual sphere? It is preferable for the provided examples to be based on antagonistic linguistic conceptual spheres in accordance with the interpretation formats.*

10. *What are the specifics of flow (stream) translation in the realities of hybrid messianic aggressions in the formats of communication-content design? Why should the value-based guiding landmarks of a civilization become the arbitral expertise for the effectiveness of online translation and the scale of challenges, created by the party practicing neo-barbarism in the paradigm of hybrid messianic aggressions of the communication-content design?*

11. *What factors cause the variability of translation in statics and what issues arise during simultaneous or stream translation of information related to a public resonance situation? Substantiate your response using personal translation practice cases, both direct and indirect.*

12. *What is the essence of cognitive linguistics and what does it mean to conceptualize human consciousness? Why is conceptualization fundamentally different from the algorithms of the propagandistic dogmas? How can the use of terminology attributed to propagandistic technological algorithms in the communication-content process facilitate contemporary hybrid messianic aggressions? Provide examples that help improve the understanding of the communication-content security processes.*

13. *Why is the geostrategic paradigm of the “Russian world”, as a conceptualization of the parallel communication-content dimension of a human existence, a dangerous weapon against the peaceful modern civilization? What are the signs of its effectiveness? Analyze this topic using the examples of banners in urban centers, the use of humor and sarcasm in TV and video formats (popular TV shows), the use of rituals in sports, trolling based on language conceptual spheres, international law, democracy, distribution of power, etc. Add other fields if necessary and substantiate the need to fight against the linguistic expansion of the “Russian world”.*

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**PARAMETERIZATION
OF THE INCITEMENT
IN LINGUISTIC EXPERTISE**

...The notion of “incitement”, just like the notions of “propaganda” and “incitement to hatred”, which are conceptual for legal linguistics, has not gained sufficient theoretic coverage yet for the linguistic expertise to rely upon it

Verbal extremism is becoming an increasingly apparent component of the informational content in Ukraine

The spectrum of capabilities to directly or indirectly influence views, actions and decisions of other people by the means of a word is limitless: from improving relationships within a family to settling international conflicts, from glorifying one party to discrediting the other, from encouraging certain actions (purchases, political moves, abidance by the rules of Christian morality) to igniting various emotions. We will focus on those situations when the manipulation of the word led to actions, classified by the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as criminal offences. Amongst these actions particularly dangerous are the ones committed not against a person or a group of people¹, but against human society as a whole, actions that go against the established rules of human coexistence. These linguistic crimes can be legally defined as “crimes against humanity”.² These include, in particular, incitements to violently overthrow the constitutional order or to change the borders of the state, to commit terrorist attacks, to facilitate terrorism, to violence and cruelty, as well as propaganda of war and racial intolerance, incitement of interethnic and religious hatred, etc.

How do you define the notion of “verbal extremism”?

Manipulative influence on the consciousness via the information flows is a covert impact on the consciousness and subconscious of a person that determine their behavior. Language, imagination and cogitation are interdependent, interconnected, dynamic and open to external influence. These are the systems that can be targeted in an unnoticeable manner (in the speech-act theory – illocutionary aim of the speaker) and allow to deliberately shape the thought and behavior of a person.

One of the conditions for efficiently influencing the consciousness by the means of language is for it to be covert. Communication theory stud-

1 Linguistic criminal offences committed against a person or a group of people according to the Criminal Code of Ukraine include, for example, offences committed using blackmailing (cr. 120, 149, 258-1, 303), intimidation (27, 129, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162, 174, 186, 187, 189, 195, 206, 258, 266, 280, 289, 303, 308, 312, 342, 345, 346, 350, 354, 355, 368, 369, 377, 386, 393, 398, 405, 444) and extortion (159, 189, 262, 308, 312, 313, 320, 354, 355, 357, 368, 369, 410). Oxford Dictionary of Linguistic Pragmatics Terminology defines a linguistic crime (or a language crime) as an offence “committed partially or completely by the means of language, in particular by committing certain language acts. Perjury, extortion and intimidation are a few of the salient examples” [Yan Huang, 2012: 240].

2 English expression “crimes against humanity” was used for the first time in 1915 in the declaration of governments of England, Russian and France to designate the Armenian genocide in Turkey. As an element of the international law this notion started circulating after WWII and the Nuremberg trials, when the world was confronted with a question “what to accuse the Nazi leaders of?”. In the contemporary Ukrainian law there are two terminological alternatives to the English “crimes against humanity”: crimes against humanity (as in mankind) and crimes against humanity (as in humanism), which tend to be terminologically delineated.

Communication-content security: ies state that the division of information between the surface and in-depth structures of the conceptual iceberg influences the efficiency of the content uptake: compared to the information contained in the surface structure of the statement, implications have a much higher uptake efficiency. Therefore, covert information, which is either partially or completely contained in the subtext and requires certain mental effort, is a lot more impactful. H. Pocheptsov remarks that successful influence is always related to shifting the believes as if onto the person at the time when the independent decision-making model is being shaped [Pocheptsov, 2001: 138]. Subjectively, the knowledge that was obtained with a lot of effort becomes more valuable for the person and is more firmly rooted in the consciousness [Baranov, 2009: 175-176]. Therefore, placing the most significant information in the subtext (“knowledge privatization” principle) is a method that is widely used for influencing consciousness by the means of speech [Baranov, 1999].

Mind manipulation, aimed at influencing large societal group via information flows, has become an integral part of the public life. Manipulative influence techniques that are based on contemporary scientific methodologies are to be thoroughly researched and their paraphernalia is still to be parameterized. Information manipulation technologies are already for the most part described in the categories of pragmalinguistics – linguistic sub-discipline that studies language as a tool intentionally used by a person in their activity. However, in spite of all of the achievements of pragmalinguistics, psycholinguistics, communication theory and other related sciences, lack of sufficient societal mechanism for countering the increasingly more successful attempts to direct thoughts and decisions of large groups of people by the means of covert linguistic impact via information flows is becoming apparent nowadays. In a civil society freedom of speech, the highest democratic value protected by law, paves the way for the manipulative use of a word, as an instrument for dominating and controlling human behavior and for carrying out covert infringements of long-established human values, rights and freedoms, democratic institutions as such and security of the state and its citizens. These infringements, like, for example, incitements to inter-ethnic or inter-denominational hatred hidden in the information flow, are just starting to become conceptualized within the framework of contemporary law and often remain unpunished due to the lack of reliable legal mechanisms.

Legal evaluation of information flow-based mind manipulations is further complicated by a few factors, including the non-obviousness of the harm inflicted and the absence of a victim willing to defend their rights. From a legal standpoint, elements of a linguistic offense are also unevident, which means that it is very difficult to identify the mens rea of the manipulative influence, since legal evaluation of such actions has to be based on specific substantiation mechanisms.

In the framework of pragmalinguistics, covert informational influence is defined as task-oriented linguistic acts, subject to linguistic parametrization. From the standpoint of linguistic qualification, the elements of a linguistic crime have to be identified using the previously developed methods of discourse analysis. Thus the legal-linguistic nature of conflicts that occur as a part of case proceedings associated with the identification of similar linguistic delicts, requires the lawyers to use special linguistic knowledge, which they almost always lack.

Let us illustrate, how one can carry out linguistic evaluation of the elements of a linguistic crime when conducting a linguistic examination of a media text in verbal extremism cases.

Incitement is a category of linguistic pragmatics and, at the same time, a juridified speech genre. Under certain communication-related conditions incitement is perceived as an action that imposes criminal liability. Juridification of this linguistic notion and a dramatic growth in the number of criminal cases associated with this category establish an urgent need to fill the notion of “incitement”, commonly used by lawyers, with linguistic content to meet the requirements of expert linguistic analysis.

There are many court cases associated with the “incitement” category, which are supposed to provide legal assessment for respective speech acts. According to current legislation, incitements to overthrow the constitutional order; to change the territorial borders of a state; to commit a terrorist attack; to facilitate terrorism; to commit violent and brutal acts; to infringe upon rights and freedoms of a human being, etc. are illegal. Along with other cases related to the manifestations of verbal aggression (propaganda of war, racism, incitements to inter-ethnic or inter-denominational hatred, etc.), they can be classified by a general title “verbal extremism cases”. Certain articles of Ukrainian Criminal Code classify respective speech acts as criminal offences. However, the notion of “incitement”, just like the notions of “propaganda” and “incitement to hatred”, which are conceptual

Communication-content security: for legal linguistics, lacks comprehensive theoretical bases, that linguistic expertise could confidently rely on.

Dynamics of the respective applications filed to the Ukrainian linguistic expertise bureau demonstrates a dramatic increase: while in the period from 2006 to 2013 the organization carried out only one linguistic expertise, related to incitement to separatism, in the period from 2014 to the first half of 2017 there were dozens of applications filed requesting this type of expertise. Verbal extremism is becoming an increasingly more ap-

What are the differences between the understanding of the terms “verbal extremism” and “public terrorism”?

parent component of the information content in Ukraine. Without claiming to provide comprehensive statistic generalization, but solely relying

on the expert practice of the Linguistic expertise bureau, it is necessary to highlight, that in all of the verbal extremism cases reviewed by the bureau the objects of the analysis were texts, representing Russian information content.

So what are the signs of verbal extremism? Linguistic expertise practice allows to outline the range of objectives for such analysis and to offer basic methodological approaches for addressing occurring issues.

The linguo-pragmatic core of incitement lies in a certain communicative intention of the speaker. That is why the theory of speech acts serves as the theoretical grounds for the linguistic expertise in verbal extremism cases. Authors of this theory, John Searle and John Austin, systematized the understanding of how various acts can be committed by the means of a word¹. In this theory, language is perceived as a totality of task-oriented speech acts that enable a person to influence the behavior of other people, direct their thoughts and emotions.

In spite of the fact, that various types of linguistic expertise are seemingly different, the objective of each of them can be boiled down to, first of all, establishing pragmatic content of any given speech act and second of all, correlating this pragmatic content to a disposition of a legal norm. In order to distinguish the social context factors relevant for identifying

1 J.L. Austin How to Do Things with Words // New in foreign linguistics. - Issue 17. Theory of speech acts. - Moscow, 1986. - P. 22-130; J.R. Searle What is a speech act? // New in foreign linguistics. - Issue 17. Theory of speech acts. - Moscow, 1986. - P. 151-169; J.R. Searle A Classification of Illocutionary Acts // New in foreign linguistics. - Issue 17. Theory of speech acts. - Moscow, 1986. - P. 170-194; J.R. Searle Indirect speech acts // New in foreign linguistics. - Issue 17. Theory of speech acts. - Moscow, 1986. - P. 195-222.

pragmatic content of a speech act in verbal extremism cases, linguistic expertise traditionally resorts to the methods of discursive analysis.

Pragmalinguistics perceives incitement, as a speech act directed at an addressee with the aim of motivating them to carry out certain actions, that are conceptualized as an important part of socially significant activities and facilitate the attainment of certain ideals. In this case both the speaker and the addressee are perceived as political actors and the speech act itself, as a part of social-political communication¹.

From a linguistic stand-point the diagnostic assessment of incitement requires the researcher to answer key questions, including whether the expression is a part of social-political communication, whether it belongs to an imperative speech genre, what the suggestive content of the imperative is, how this suggestive content correlates with the disposition of legal provisions, whether the actions, the author is motivating people to carry out, are perceived as socially significant, as those that embody certain value systems and moral principles and whether the addressee of the message is the potential performer of these actions, etc. Important characteristics of classic incitement include public release of respective information: informing the addressee via media means, by distributing leaflets or publicly expressing the idea at meetings or gatherings. In verbal extremism cases linguistic analysis unfolds in multiple directions that is why it is rational to emphasize respective components in the linguistic expertise conclusion.

I. The situation of use and general discursive context are the most indicative linguo-pragmatic characteristics of incitement if compared to other types of imperative expressions. The main field of incitement is political communication. That is why the linguistic assessment of incitement starts with the discursive analysis of text material in question: linguistic substantiation requires it to be affiliated or not affiliated with a political discourse.

II. Grammatical expression of incitement. Incitement is classified as an imperative speech act. The degree of categoricity of an incitement, degree of intensity of modal component expression, nature of the relationships between the author and the addressee, specific means of verbal embodiment and other differential characteristics used to distinguish between multiple types of imperative expressions all can fundamentally vary from incitement to incitement. It is not always possible to use formal characteristics to draw a probable conclusion regarding the existence of an in-

¹ A. Baranov. Linguistic Expertise of a Text. Theoretical bases and practice. – Moscow, 2009. – P. 42

Communication-content security: incitement speech act. It is only possible when the case involves explicit forms of incitement represented on a level of surface content structure of the text. However, incitements, just like other speech acts, may have both direct and indirect expression forms. The indirect techniques of presenting certain information, in particular indirect incitements, most often become the subject for the linguistic expertise analysis. In order to shine the light on the implicit content layers and pragmatic content of the message as a whole it is also necessary to use the entire spectrum of means and methods of discursive analysis.

III. Semantic analysis of the speech act – determining the content of incitement. Linguistic expertise defines the content of incitement, as a description of actions the author intends for the addressee to perform. The speech act of incitement stipulates that the addressee of the message will be the performer of a respective action. Quite often these actions are not a part of the suggestive component of the expression, they are not explicitly stated, but rather implied in the subtext content layers of the message, that is why determining the content of incitement requires the employment of a wide spectrum of linguistic pragmatics methods. In verbal extremism cases establishing the correlation between the contents of incitements identified in the text and relevant legal provisions is an important objective of the linguistic expertise. This correlation can be established, for example, with a certain article of the Criminal Code:

(art. 109, p. 2): Public incitements to violently change or overthrow the constitutional order, or to seize the state power, as well as the distribution of materials containing incitements to such actions; (art. 110, p. 1): Willful acts, committed with the aim of changing the limits of the territory or the state border of Ukraine... as well as public incitements or the distribution of materials containing incitements to such actions; (art. 258-2, p. 1): Public incitements to commit a terrorist attack; (art. 295): Public incitements to mayhems, arsons, destruction of property, seizure of buildings or facilities, forced eviction of citizens, threatening public order; (art. 436): public incitements to aggressive war or to a military conflict; (art.442) public incitements to genocide, etc.

IV. Content implications and pragmatic content of the message. Semantic structure of the message is complex and multi-layered. Explicit component of the content is the expression of the suggestion (its separate content segments are also distinguished by the degree of explicitness)

and there are also multiple implicit layers. The implicit layers include background knowledge, semantic implications, content implications, implicatures, etc. Explicit component of the content of the message is often compared to the tip of the content iceberg, large part of which is hidden underwater. If during the linguistic examination of the elements of a speech misdemeanor the researcher only operates the segments represented on the surface content structure of the text, disregarding the implicit component of the content, then the larger part of the semantic message might end up being completely left out of the analysis. Therefore, linguistic unveiling of the communicative components of incitement represented not on the level of the surface structure of the text, but rather in the deep subtext layers is an important objective of linguistic expertise, in particular in verbal extremism cases. The indirect forms of presenting information are the defining characteristic of the manipulative speech impact on consciousness and are quite often related to the desire to avoid being held accountable for committing criminal acts.

Linguistic assessment of the incitement to commit illegal acts embedded in a text envisages confirming or denying the presence of the following communicative components in the text:

1) affiliation with a political discourse: content and communicative context indicate that the analyzed speech act is a part of social-political communication;

2) speaker and their addressee are political subjects of this communication;

3) description of a certain achievable ideal goal;

4) reference to certain actions that are the content of incitement and are perceived as a part of socially significant activity aimed at reaching the ideal;

5) message addressee is the potential performer of these actions;

6) motivation for the addressee to carry out these actions and/or statement of the necessity to shape one's behavior with the aim of reaching these ideals;

7) content of incitement is pragma-semantically correlated to respective legal provisions.

Some of these communicative components of the speech act of "incitement" can be implied under certain conditions. However, if the speech act is carried out successfully these components are easily restored by the

Communication-content security: addressee taking into account the general communicative context of the message when the contextual reconstruction of these components is a necessary precondition for cognitive reception of a message. For example, the Soviet motto “Five-year plan in four years” is an incitement, even though not all of the aforementioned communicative components are represented on the surface level of this message. Content elements transferred in the subtext (for example, the achievable noble goal – to build communism and establish respective social roles of the communication participants) are easily restored by the addressee from the wider communicative context of the message. In this case, only the communicative components of the incitement (4), reference to certain actions, perceived as a part of socially significant activity (5) and motivation for the addressee to carry out these actions are represented on the surface level. On the other hand, the incitement “Forward toward the victory of communism!” brings to the fore the meta-ideal that seems achievable to the collective addressee and motivates the addressee to direct their behavior toward achieving it. The motto that was used as a part of the pre-election campaign before the Crimean “referendum” of 2014, “March 16th – back home to Russia”, had a similar communicative background. This incitement contains a criminal component, since in the communicative context (social-political communication field, distribution of agitation leaflets before the referendum that had a question printed on them: “*Are you for the reunion of Crimea with Russia, so it can become a part of the Russian Federation?*”, the target audience of this incitement were the citizens of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea that were going to participate in the referendum) its pragmatic content corresponds to the “legal matrix” — pragmatic invariant that sets the regulatory direction: *willful acts, committed with the with the aim of changing the limits of the territory or the state border of Ukraine* (art. 110, p. 1) [19].

In regards to each of the seven aforementioned communicative components of the speech act of the “incitement to illegal act” a separate linguistic argumentation model has to be selected — depending on how it is represented in the text (explicitly or implicitly) and what methods of discourse analysis need to be used for the examination of the surface level communicative situation components, implicit components of the pragmatic content of the message, extralinguistic factors and intertextual relations.

Absence of at least one of the communicative components (1-7) in the evaluated text material is enough to disprove the initial assumption regard-

Hybrid messianic aggressions _____
ing the implementation of the speech act of “incitement to illegal act” in the text in the context of a respective legal provision.

Linguistic assessment of the implementation of the “incitement to hatred” speech act envisages the use of a certain sequence of formalized discourse analysis procedures aimed at confirming or denying the presence of certain critical communicative components in this text:

1) 1) affiliation with a political discourse: content and communicative context indicate that the analyzed speech act is a part of social-political communication;

2) speaker and their addressee are political subjects of this communication;

3) the text contains reference to certain national/ethnic/religious groups or representatives of these groups;

4) information that is contextually related to the aforementioned groups or the members of these groups is profiled axiologically (i.e. certain groups have consistently positive or consistently negative information associated with them);

5) this information shapes the “friend or foe” opposition and is aimed at polarizing this opposition;

6) text contains pragma-semantic correlates with respective legal provisions (for example, “willful acts, aimed at inciting national, racial or religious hatred, at offending ethnic honor and dignity” – Article 161 Criminal Code of Ukraine).

Some of these communicative components can be completely or partially implied. Success of the speech act of “incitement to hatred” is related to the potential possibility to reconstruct these content implications taking into account communicative context. In linguistic expertise practice covert communicative components are defined as an integral part of the pragmatic content of the message, provided that the reconstruction of these components is a vital precondition for the addressee to comprehend it. Absence of at least one of the communicative components (1 – 6) in the evaluated text material is enough to disprove the initial assumption regarding the implementation of the speech act of “incitement to illegal act” in the text in the context of a respective legal provision.

Linguistic evaluation of incitement to illegal actions, hatred and propaganda of illegal acts is a complex multi-faceted objective, which rests on almost all branches of linguistic theory in one way or another, but primarily

Communication-content security: this is the case with linguistic semantics, linguistic pragmatics (in particular, the theory of speech acts) and the theory of covert speech impact on the consciousness. In cases, where the crime was committed via any given speech act, the objective of the linguistic expertise is to confirm or deny the initial assumption regarding the presence of the elements of the offense in the text, i.e. the text contains aim-oriented speech acts involving the use of direct and indirect mechanisms for influencing human consciousness and controlling their actions in a certain way.

Linguistic parametrization of relevant complex speech genres and the methodology of their linguistic assessment in public texts have the potential to become significant theoretic foundations not only for linguistic expertise, but also for the development of content research programs, aimed at documenting manifestations of verbal extremism in the field of public communication, identifying social prerequisites of such speech acts and predicting their potential implications.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

- 1. What is incitement? Can incitement be criminally prosecuted?*
- 2. Provide examples from your personal experience when, in your opinion, incitement could create criminal liability.*
- 3. In your opinion, it is necessary to interpret a successful incitement, as an action that created criminal liability? Will this limit the rights and freedoms of a human being?*
- 4. How do you define the notion of “verbal extremism”? Create a list of characteristics. Illustrate them using examples from professional experience.*
- 5. Which areas of linguistic analysis of verbal extremism do you know? How do they depend on real legislation? Why do the highest-value characteristics of the “spirit of the law” remain silent in this situation? Your interpretation and impressions. Associations from your professional experience.*
- 6. Incitement is a legal speech genre and at the same time a finalized complex of communication-content motivations that contain the public energy of the communication-content flow dynamics. In terms of its destructive effectiveness it can be placed into one technologically creative category, but in terms of its legal documentation and control – into a different*

one. These are two opposites, where on one hand, there is direct liability, and on the other – criminal neglect. In the first case the term “incitement” is an almost perfect legal example of the use of a term in accordance with existing standards and requirements and in the second case (incitement, as a complex of motivations) it does not have a suitable contemporary legal definition, despite being just as significant for the legal documentation of the use of these communication-content design techniques in the global hybrid terrorism practices. Why is it so? Substantiate your opinion using examples.

7. What are the differences between the understanding of the terms “verbal extremism” and “public terrorism”? Identify adequate examples. Substantiate your opinion using practical public cases from the defense and security sector.

8. Give linguistic (communication-content) meaning to the words “incitement”, “propaganda”, “incitement to hatred” with the aim of creating an accurate gradation in the conceptual diagnostic model for determining criminal liability based on the results of a linguistic expertise under the influence of flow dynamics and the use of communication-content design algorithms. Your suggestions, best practices, opinion expressed using facts and cases.

9. Why is the methodology of the communication-content security the answer to the contemporary riddle of an ever-extending paradigm that is phrased in the text in the following manner: “Verbal extremism is becoming an increasingly more apparent component of the information content in Ukraine”. Point out these characteristics and give examples of their public manifestations.

10. Which areas of the linguistic parametrization of language acts classified as “propaganda” and “incitement to hatred” do you know? Which methodology can you suggest for their linguistic diagnosis? What are the challenges?

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THE PRACTICE OF CREATING AWARENESS AMONGST THE POPULATION IN THE ATO ZONE

...It is crucial to provide objective and accurate information primarily to those people, who still do not have a firm stance regarding the events in Ukraine. Although the local population of the region and the regional mass media have to fulfil the role of the information carriers in this case.

The most important factor is the existence of a large number of machine-building, metallurgical, chemical and coal-mining enterprises, which traditionally have ties with Russia. At the same time, the opinion of the management remains the main source of the agitational content. And the main source of motivation is usually the fear of losing one’s job and putting the family on the poverty line

The peculiarity of the Donetsk region lies in the fact that the patriots of Ukraine are still in the minority there and the population is very conservative when it comes to obtaining, sharing and analyzing information. Spoken word stories, agitation materials, as well as TV and radio shows, remain the main sources of information to influence the consciousness of the citizens. Traditionally, the level of distrust of the central Ukrainian channels remains very high. A part of the population will rather believe in a situ-

Is it appropriate to use the term “Donbas” in the public-administrative space?

ation described by the Russian than in a real one. It is enough to recall the cases of mass shelling of Kramatorsk by MLRS “Uragan” and the mass shelling of Mariupol by MLRS “Grad” that occurred in 2015. Even today, being under the influence of Russian propaganda, some locals still blame the UAF units for those incidents. That is why it is crucial to provide objective and accurate information primarily to those people, who still do not have a firm stance regarding the events in Ukraine. Although the local population of the region and the regional mass media have to fulfil the role of the information carriers in this case. In the best case scenario, it should increase the amount of patriotic dwellers of Donbas simultaneously depriving the separatists’ ideas of the grassroots support.

Particular attention should be paid to the population of the towns and villages of Donbas that are closest to the line of deterrence or have just recently been liberated from occupation. The residents of these regions have to understand the difference between the life they had in DPR and LNR and the life they have now. Creating positive media content covering the solutions to relevant daily living issues and the efficient work of the local government bodies is a further step towards eradicating separatism in Donbas.

The typical social composition of the population of Donbas is very diversified. There are significant segments of the population consisting of white-collar workers, the clerisy, the blue-collar workers and the unemployed.

So what influences the minds of the people of Donetsk today (June 2017)? Let’s arrange the influence factors in order of importance.

1. The most important factor is the existence of a large number of machine-building, metallurgical, chemical and coal-mining enterprises, which traditionally have ties with Russia. At the same time, the opinion of the management remains the main source of the agitational content. And the

Communication-content security: main source of motivation is usually the fear of losing one's job and putting the family on the poverty line. There have been instances of the anti-Ukrainian agitational banners being hanged up above the entrances of certain factories and similar materials being published in the newspapers and on the websites of the enterprises.

2. Cross agitation, self-agitation (self-zombifying), rumors. The main source of this type of influence are specially-trained people, as well as random, authoritative thought leaders of certain neighborhoods, members of the workforce and other citizens. Between February and April of 2014 there are have been cases of agitation in the public transportation means of Kramatorsk. Usually these agitation tasks were performed by elder women that have mastered the art of persuading the opponent. They would often speak very loudly with their opponent, so that everyone in the public transport could hear them. In that scenario every single person that was on that bus unintentionally ended up being influenced by the agitator and subsequently influencing another 20 – 300 people. Dissemination of certain messages via rumors was intentional and the intention was to spread panic. And if wreaking havoc and spreading panic was unfeasible, then those rumors would at least achieve the objective of creating fear, doubts and uncertainty. Immediately prior to the military operation in Donbas the population of the region witnessed protests on city squares, buses filled people blocking the access to the Oblast administration and the emergence of the illegal armed formations.

How does Kremlin implement the policy of communication-content disintegration of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk regions?

3. The media segment, which includes both Ukrainian and Russian channels, local radio stations, websites and print media. Russian TV channels were the main source of the provocative content, which was later disseminated by the means of the spoken word. Currently the Russian channels are assisted by the newly-established TV channels of the fake DPR and LPR. However, recently there has been a slight decrease in the role of television, as the Internet has been gaining more and more popularity. This change is attributed to two factors. First, the area of Donbas region covered by the Ukrainian TV has significantly decreased. In several “gray zone” districts the reception of Ukrainian TV channels is simply non-existent. Second factor is the emergence of new regional TV channels on the

occupied territories. The reception of such TV channels, as “Novorosiya TV”, “First Republican Channel of DPR”, “Oplot TV” and the like is very strong in the “gray zone”. They still affect the minds of a certain segment of Donbas population.

4. Moreover, the role of pro-Russian NGO’s in the dissemination of hostile content should not be overlooked.

Which means and methods are used to tackle the hostile content? It is commonly known that the opinion of the population of the region cannot be permanent, but instead it is shaped by mass media. This is why the majority of mass media on the occupied territory of Donbas have focused their attention on the fulfilment of the following objectives:

- supporting the patriotic segments of society;
- providing platform for expressing personal opinions;
- convincing the unaffiliated fellow citizens of the unreasonableness of supporting the separatists;
- improving the reputation of the UAF servicemen;
- disseminating the content on the occupied territories;
- supporting and improving the morale of the population of the occupied region of Donbas.

In our opinion, local mass media play the crucial role in fulfilling these tasks. The fulfillment of these tasks has already allowed to reach a qualitatively new level of patriotic upbringing of young people of the region, to provide young journalists with many self-fulfillment opportunities and to improve the quality of the content covered by the local mass media, let alone the informational support for the civic initiatives, volunteers and NGO’s. For example, the situation in Kramatorsk is positively influenced by the work of the traditional Internet media Kramatorsk.info and “Novyny”. The TV Internet channel “Studio Nash dim”, created by the “Academia” media group in cooperation with the ATO staff, is becoming increasingly influential. It is also important to highlight the commendable work of the media outlets that were transferred out of Donetsk, such as the Donetsk Oblast TV and the “Hromadske TV” channel. After the de-occupation the staff of the “Hurtozhytok” newspaper has returned back to work. However, nowadays the newspaper is published on the Internet.

Where, in your opinion, is the line in the interpretation of notions: local, regional and national patriotism?

Analyzing the changes in the content covered by mass media, it is important to mention that two years ago due to increased numbers of IDP's the information space was dominated by materials that allowed those people to speak out and share their experience. At the same time there was also an increase in the number of publications covering the stories of heroism of Ukrainian servicemen and volunteers. After that the civic events, as well as the efforts of NGO's and political parties have become the prominent coverage topics. This has allowed us to compile analytical materials based on recent history.

Currently we can objectively identify positive changes in the minds of the majority of the population of Donetsk region. The situation is definitely far from perfect, however in the past two years the number of pro-separatists locals has decreased, people no longer fear the UAF servicemen and young people are becoming increasingly patriotic.

However, the internal situation dynamic of Donbas still requires new efforts to improve the consistency and the content. First and foremost, actions should be taken to support local independent mass media, since at this point some of them have started to work on a voluntary basis. The radio station established by the servicemen, specializing in electronics, is a case in point. It broadcasts directly from the frontline and covers a large segment of the temporarily occupied territories. Local enthusiasts usually are behind the creation and maintenance of similar small radio station in Donbas oblast.

It is also necessary to improve the cooperation between mass media and law enforcement bodies. The main objective of this cooperation is to detect and address internal and external information threats. Local law enforcement bodies and "Studio Nash dim" have gained some useful experience in this regard.

We believe that Donbas is not only a theater of conventional war, but also a battlefield for the information warfare aimed at conquering the minds of the people. The information war in Donbas is not lost yet and the victory in this war will allow to bring Ukraine even closer to peace.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. What are the specifics and the uniqueness of the Donetsk region? What shaped these peculiarities? Why is urbanism one of the dominant trends in Donetsk and Luhansk regions?

2. *How would you define the notion of “Donbas” and does this interpretation correspond the one shaped by the Russian propaganda? Is it appropriate to use the term “Donbas” in the public-administrative space?*

3. *Why did the toponym “Donbas” become an international communication-content meme strategy with a creatively geo-strategic nature and why is it imposed by the aggressor using the hybrid messianic stylistics? What is the objective that Putin’s agitators are pursuing?*

4. *How does Kremlin implement the policy of communication-content disintegration of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk regions? Demonstrate the communication-content security processes using the examples of settlements liberated by the UAF.*

5. *Where, in your opinion, is the line in the interpretation of notions: local, regional and national patriotism? Illustrate the communication-content fault lines and the capabilities of the geostrategic synergy of the patriotism phenomenon under the conditions of ATO/JFO.*

6. *Which factors indicate that the Ukrainian information space has to be dominated by the communal surroundings, instead of the communication-content monopolism of the central corporate media systems?*

7. *How should we maintain the paradigm of the motivational trends aimed at improving the confidence in the life of the communities and in the institutions of social and governmental representation in Ukraine? Suggest approaches, models, action formats. In your opinion, is it possible to implement the situational strategy of focusing the attention on civilizational positivity despite the efforts of the hybrid messianic aggressor aimed at imposing multi-format version models of destruction of trust and faith under the living conditions of ATO/JFO? Use personal experience and well-known cases to substantiate your response.*

8. *Why does the corporate industrial managerial elite still have a big impact on the communities in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts? Which hybrid messianic aggression instruments does the enemy use in the urbanized settlements? Why is the enemy engaging elderly women in the informational and mental special operations and why are they basing their manipulations on the topics of pension and local building-utilities administrator offices, known as ZhEK? Is your opinion does the corporate patriotism prevail over the settlement-related one? Exemplify your answer. Have the current situation awareness sources changed for the communities in the ATO (JFO) zone and in the areas of responsibility of civil-military administrations as*

Communication-content security: compared to 2014-2015? Substantiate your opinion using facts and figures taken from the verifies national and international sources.

9. How can we explain the dramatic increase in the number of media and communication media projects created by the DPR and LPR terrorist organizations? Rationalize your opinion using the example of an individual settlements in different periods of the history of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Why does the enemy focus on the regional communication-content background in the process of hybrid messianic aggressions, while Ukrainian government continuous to conduct informational operations at the levels of central mass and communication media? Substantiate your opinion in the paradigm of propaganda and communication-content security.

10. Why does communication-content security-related volunteering hold a special place in the process of increasing the effectiveness of such a phenomenon, as public presence under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions as the global hybrid terrorism practices? Substantiate your opinion using the 2014-2018 cases separately for each term.

Hlib Korol

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**INFORMATION ON THE FRONTLINE:
BACKGROUND DATA
AND EFFECTIVE CONTENT**
(lessons learned between 2014 and 2016)

Arriving at the combat zone, we were faced with a complete lack of any awareness raising activities which by default were not only supposed to be equated to the levels of perception and understanding amongst personnel, but were also supposed to serve as a strong morale booster under the ATO conditions. We weren't aware of anything besides what was happening right next to us. The rumors coming from those serving in the rear (who turned to be the most aware category) paint a rather grim picture. Information is a weapon of constant dynamic influence, and at that time we didn't have access to it. There were two solutions

How long does the information live for? How and which information influences morale and psychological well-being of a person in combat? Can we differentiate between reliable information and a fake under the conditions of a constant information flow and a lack of content, when every message seems indisputable?

To be completely honest, I have never thought about this before August of 2014. I just have never been faced with similar issues. Constant exposure to the dynamics of the information space, existence of various sources and the ability to compare not only the sources but also the formats of the news coverage and the emphasis placed on the events gave the opportunity to freely manipulate the arguments generated during the media stream analysis.

I have been faced with a total content vacuum for the very first time in August of 2014. Personnel of the third mobilization wave has just arrived to the military unit and the process of the re-adaptation of the mobilized, who had grown unaccustomed to military life (the age of my comrades in the division ranged from 21 to 57)

How long does public information exist for under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions as practices of global hybrid terrorism?

has begun. The TV completely disappeared from our lives (the barracks simply did not have one), none of the newspapers ever reached us and only the lucky few had brought their phones with consistent Internet access.

Naturally, like any servicemen we were relying on our “morale officer” and, besides, Ivanovich, the soldier of the “1978 model” from our unit, demanded for him to start doing his job better.

In a couple of days, we (around 300 people) were gathered in the brigade’s club. We were presented with the aim of the gathering – becoming acquainted with the characteristics and capabilities of the enemy’s equipment. The idea was absolutely on the right track. The implementation, however, left me feeling confused, to put it mildly, and my colleagues - shocked.

We have fallen under the impression that the morale officers do not possess neither the knowledge nor the methodological approaches sufficient to fulfill their duties addressing existing threats. The video we saw on the screen was downloaded from the Internet. Although, this was only part of the problem. As it turned out, the video was filmed (quite creatively) by

the masterminds of Russian propaganda machine to inform the viewers that the armament and equipment of the terrorist formations in Donbas was unstoppable and invincible.

The outcome was catastrophic – brigade’s youngest recruits (third day of service) were already “defeated” by the communication-content aggression of the Putinists. What were the morale officers thinking when they showed us this video? They, probably, hoped the newcomers would have a high content immunity. However, it wasn’t the case, the morale did not only plummet, it got so bad that it could only be characterized by the phrase one of the older soldiers shouted exiting the room: “So are we just walking corpses now?”

Seeing this situation as a journalist who used to work for military mass media, I first spoke with the chief morale officer for the battery and then was forced to take matters into my own hands explaining this video to almost each and every soldier in person. It took a lot of talking and honestly I didn’t always have enough facts to substantiate my opinion, but at the end I was able to impart momentum to the situation – no more spooky stories were spread amongst the personnel of the battery.

Why does orientation become key to a powerful contemporary awareness raising complex?

A week after this event we were gathered in the club once again. This time a colonel from the General Staff read us a lecture on moral and psychological support. He told us what we were supposed to do under enemy fire. Namely, he said to use armored equipment to take cover. After around 15 minutes one of our servicemen was no longer able to stand it and informed the speaker that we were towed artillery and thus had no armored vehicles at our disposal. The speaker responded with an obscene expression, which concluded that lecture on moral and psychological support. I think there is no need to describe the reaction and mood of our third wave troops. To be honest, even I was left completely speechless by the situation.

However, this was just the beginning of my informational “race”. Now I can call this a movement from inadequate information data to professional content-related success.

Arriving at the combat zone, we were faced with a complete lack of any awareness raising activities which by default were not only supposed to be equated to the levels of perception and understanding amongst personnel,

Communication-content security: but were also supposed to serve as a strong morale booster under the ATO conditions. We weren't aware of anything besides what was happening right next to us. The rumors coming from those serving in the rear (who turned to be the most aware category) paint a rather grim picture. Information is a weapon of constant dynamic influence, and at that time we didn't have access to it. There were two solutions, namely:

- friends amongst the volunteers, who sent us filings of “Narodna armiya” newspaper with every package. This newspaper was actually supposed to reach us in a different, officially established manner;

- risking to become a sniper target, I climbed on the roof of a partially destroyed shed, where I could get at least some signal and download daily “Informden” from the website armyua.com.ua. As a participant of this project I trusted the information source.

That is how I (a private) unofficially assumed the duties of the officer responsible for communication-content orientation, who we still call “morale officer” (the respective position in the battery was filled with a mobilized serviceman, whose professional efficiency was close to none).

Due to the lack of sufficient awareness raising measures, unprofessionalism of the morale officers and the fact that the personnel of the combat unit was from different regions of Ukraine there were difficulties related to finding suitable individual approaches for proper presentation of information. By the way, analyzing this period in hindsight, I came to a conclusion that in real combat conditions information demonstrated its flow-related peculiarity – from data to content formats of various complexity.

What does it mean to be in the dynamics of the information space?

The initially negative attitude of the local population toward the servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was one of the most negative factors and a serious obstacle in the awareness raising work. It is worth noting, that the local population was quite professionally disoriented (zombified) by the adversarial propaganda information and at the very beginning it was almost impossible to convince them of anything that went against it. Apparently, this zombification was a continuous process with a flow nature.

Another serious issue was a complete lack of a professional chaplain service. Seeing the emerging picture and having neither the professional knowledge nor the experience, being physically and mentally exhausted I still decided not to give up. The solution for me was a combination of

spreading awareness amongst my brothers in arms regarding the events in the East and in Ukraine in general and... sport. My volunteer friends helped me with purchasing various sport equipment. As for evidentiary coverage of certain events, there were times when I was forced to look for an opportunity to call someone in Kyiv and resort to “call-a-friend” option.

...At the beginning of 2015, a day after arriving to combat positions in Debaltsevo, one of our soldiers got message from home that contained a link. Information presented there shocked the entire battery, but it was absolutely unclear what to do or who

How should we use the potential of military chaplains?

to talk to in a situation like that. The link led us to a terrorist website, where under the title “More Donbas castigators arrived to kill civilians” someone posted a scanned copy of the ATO HQ order on the movement of our entire battalion with ATO HQ and SSU stamps. This document contained complete information on every serviceman (first, last and middle name, rank, position, year of birth). The thought that we were being betrayed and concerns for our loved one worried us more and more. Morale kept plummeting. Pinnacle of this situation was the link posted on the same website a week after. Under the same title someone posted a similar document, but time contained information of our KIA and WIA servicemen.

After a few months of intense hostilities near Debaltsevo we were hit with yet another psychological attack. While everyone on TV and Internet kept talking about monetary rewards for destroyed enemy equipment and vehicles, we were notified that our combat register (where we document every move of artillery) was lost somewhere in a higher HQ. This meant that over the course of a few month of fierce battles our unit did not do anything but enjoy the military accommodations provided by the state. At least, that was what the newly written official registers stated. This case remains a “historical embarrassment” until this very day.

...In spring of 2015, when the troops were being withdrawn from Debaltsevo, we were stopped right near Artemivsk (now – Bahmut) to be inspected by the OSCE mission. The personnel were significantly disturbed by the fact that most mission members where Russian, who first pretended to be foreigners. They inspected the equipment in great detail, wrote down the numbers of howitzers and towing vehicles and counted the troops. They obviously acted within their areas of competence, but everyone also understood that they were overtly collecting intelligence. From that moment

Communication-content security: forward they would often visit the deployment sites of the unit. One could tell from their behavior that under the guise of an official mission, representatives of the Russian Federation were simply collecting complete and comprehensive data on the positions and armament of the UAF units. We can only assume what happened next to the data they gathered.

Conclusions. Regardless of specialization, it would be reasonable to introduce the cadets to basics of contemporary military psychology and chaplain function as fields of individual dynamic communication practices. This knowledge will come in handy no matter what. It is also a good idea to have certain practical skills related to working with personnel.

Future military journalists should also possess the skillset necessary to take awareness raising measures, as an orientation under the conditions of segmented information space and be able to hold discussions on various topics related to military life. It is important to understand and be able to identify communication-content immunity of the unit or any given audience under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions. And I know that these training elements are already being implemented in practice by the professors of the Military Journalism Department of the Military Institute.

I personally believe that in order to objectively document violations of Minsk agreements it is necessary to completely reform the membership of the OSCE mission barring representatives of the aggressor country from participating in it. As for me, this is something we need to do to at least help stabilize the moral and psychological state of our soldiers, who are currently witnessing the representatives of Putin's Russia at work. In order to document all of the events as quickly as possible it would be a good idea to finally set up real time video recorders at the UAF positions on the line of deterrence and in the adjacent settlements. Also, we should set up fire recording systems (24h) the reports provided by which would prove to the international legal institutions who and where from launched which caliber projectile.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. In your opinion what is public information? Does the definition of public information presented in the Law of Ukraine “On the access to public information” meet the requirements of today?

2. *How long does public information exist for under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions as practices of global hybrid terrorism?*

3. *Which type of flow information has the strongest influence on the human being in combat (active hostilities in the ATO/JFO zone) and how?*

4. *Are we capable of telling the real information from the fake, structured in a way that every message seems unquestionable, under the conditions of a constant information flow from the aggressor aimed at the geo-positional level of the tactical-operational acts (ATO/JFO zone) and a complete lack of targeted content flows from the State of Ukraine? Substantiate your opinion using personal experience and cases from ATO/JFO.*

5. *In your opinion what is the immersion in the constant information flow? How do you understand the expression “lack of content flow”? Substantiate your opinion from the viewpoint of the communication-content security. Use personal experience and lessons learned by colleagues.*

6. *What categories of specialists of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine should have the skills to conduct qualitative creation of awareness amongst the personnel and the civilian population on public flow dynamics at a certain methodological level (professional analysis of the course of daily events) in a segmented information space of the country, combined with public dynamics of the international community?*

7. *Why does orientation become key to a powerful contemporary awareness raising complex?*

8. *In your opinion, how (using knowledge, practical actions, specific approaches) can we determine the status of the communication-content immunity of a unit or an audience under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions, as the practices of the global hybrid terrorism? Why is the continuous strengthening of the communication-content immunity becoming an important potential for the entire defense and security sector? Substantiate your response using your own cases of professional fulfillment. On a scale from 1 to 10 how dependent is the professional efficiency on the communication content immunity?*

9. *What does it mean to be in the dynamics of the information space? Which factors, tools and services are needed to do so? Substantiate your opinion using the experience of countering hybrid messianic aggression in the ATO/JFO zone.*

10. *How can any public presentation of the aggressor's potential done without a comparison to own weapons or the potential of the geostrategic*

Communication-content security: *partners have negative psychological and communication-content implications in the ATO/JFO zone? Substantiate your response using personal experience.*

11. *What are the functions of a morale and psychological support of officer and do they meet the requirements of the modern world under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions? Why is this category of officers still unofficially referred to as “zampolit” by the troops?*

12. *How should we use the potential of military chaplains? Substantiate your opinion and your attitude toward denominational chaplains in the Armed Forces and other state security agencies. What is the difference and why is it important?*

14. *What is the public conjuncture of the era and what is the informational public resonance of the era? How are these technologically creative notions related to each other and to the information space of Ukraine and the global notions of “post-truth” and “fake”? Substantiate your opinion taking into consideration the principles of the communication-content security.*

15. *Demonstrate the types of the flow information used by the aggressor to demoralize and demotivate UAF servicemen based on cases from ATO and JFO. How can we combat the mechanism of professional disorientation (so-called zombification) launched by the aggressor? How can we solve this problem through the prism of communication-content security of the country? How to increase the motivation and mobilizational potential of the military and civilian space of the country against the authors of hybrid messianic aggressions, as the contemporary global hybrid terrorism practices? Provide your solutions of various levels of managerial difficulty based on cases from the ATO/JFO.*

Taras Khibovych

Head of the “Dubeltivka” photo agency, former commander of the press service of the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

**PHOTOGRAPHY
AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
OF THE CONTEMPORARY
MULTI-FUNCTIONAL SECURITY SECTOR**

...Well-thought-out strategy for using high quality photographs yields quick and significant results. For example, a series of photographs capturing tactical field exercises at different times of the day and with different units, after being published on the brigade’s Facebook page, played a great role in motivating people to join the UAF in the regions where this publication received the most coverage by the civilian media.

Photographs are an integral part of our life, as they fulfill the crucial function of transferring the visual representation of the essence of the event to the recipient. People say a picture is worth a thousand words. Photography has not changed its format since the day it was invented – it is mostly a printed image, which today can be digitalized while still remaining unchanged. This is due to the digital format that photography has become accessible for everyone: you can just pull your phone out of your pocket and share the pictures you’ve just taken with an entire world on the Internet. For this very reason photography became an integral part of the complex battles for the minds and souls of people in information wars.

Due to its inherent versatility, a photograph can depict anything – from stars in the sky to the enemy transferring convoys of heavy armament. A photograph can be application-oriented or artistic and can also have a strong impact on the consciousness of the beholder. It can do both: discourage and encourage the audience. A photograph can become an important element of scolding, but at the same time can be used to stimulate and praise someone. It is practically impossible to find a field of human activity where a photograph would not come in handy.

Given the foregoing, one may conclude that photography is of the utmost importance for the Armed Forces amid this intense information war. From my personal experience, I can argue that a well-thought-out strategy for using high-quality photographs yields quick and tangible results. For example, a series of photographs capturing tactical field exercises at different times of the day and with different units, after being published on the brigade’s Facebook page, played a great role in motivating people to join the UAF in the regions where this publication received the most coverage by the civilian media. There were many messages sent to the brigade’s Facebook page asking to join our unit. This means that the photos had a real impact on the communication space.

Why do the photo strategies of the communication-content design provide extraordinary branding opportunities for the unit in the?

Photos that were printed for the brigade’s bulletin-board newspaper revealed another interesting fact – the servicemen wanted to save them. The photos depicting soldiers and NCO’s were simply stolen from the posters! This insignificant loss allowed us to understand just how much the service-

men appreciate a good photograph. So in order to prevent the destruction of the bulletin-board newspapers, the filtered and censored digital photographs were simply distributed amongst servicemen, even though it did take a while. But it was worth it!

Photographs published by the press service of the 10th mountain assault brigade are usually obtained by the means of candid photography with the maximized presence effect, which can be achieved only using the wide-angle optics. Only this equipment can almost literally convey every breath of the soldier that is crawling with a weapon during an exercise because the photographer is crawling alongside him. Such photographic evidence has an additional positive effect – the soldiers start respecting the officer behind the camera as he is with the unit everywhere. Thus a photograph is also an important component of the educational process.

Servicemen are the backbone of the Armed Forces. This is also true for the photography, the military photography in particular.

Beside influencing the human consciousness, photographs can fulfill the function of documenting certain events and be used as evidence of war crimes and violations. Sometimes such photos can have a significant impact. The publication of such photographic evidence in the open sources that are not subject to enemy control can change the course of warfare. Needless to say, this type of photographic evidence with all of the EXIF

Which factors and conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions prove the desperate need for having a professional photographer on the staff of the unit and for providing them with necessary digital equipment, including a UAV?

data, that identifies the authenticity of the image, must be carefully protected and preserved on all available devices and cloud services to ensure that these images will not disappear. In case you cannot trust different devices and data carriers due to certain technical and design features, then the cloud services, despite being a pricier option, are the way to go. The storage of important photographic evidence, that can potentially cause a global public uproar or be used in court, is the issue of the utmost importance as it currently requires additional research and funding.

Every unit should have their own photo and video archives not only to illustrate its own history, but also to preserve a segment of the national history. Despite the fact that some may say that pictures and videos are not

Communication-content security: that important it is simply not true. Those pictures and videos create the body of evidence. That is why every unit must create and protect these archives to the best of their abilities, which is not always easy. For example, even though it sounds absolutely counter-intuitive, the events of the World War II had a much better coverage than the ATO events. The current situation with photo and video records from the ATO zone can be mainly characterized by fragmentarity, sporadicity and sometimes even incompetence. The One Voice Principle, that envisages all mass media, bloggers and other public figures adhering to a general nationwide vision, is not working either. None of this works in our favor. No matter how the situation develops, lawyers and historians will have to deal with it, but they will also have to base their investigations and researches on photo and video archives.

Today almost every soldier in the ATO zone is not just the direct participant of the combat but also a potential photo and video taker. Nearly everyone has a smartphone or another modern gadget. The fact that most servicemen have their own social media profiles has its risks and benefits. Not all smartphone owners realize that the gadgets record not only the specific photo parameters, but also the geographic location of troops and equipment. If publishing a picture like that on Facebook is relatively harmless, since this media does not record EXIF data, publishing it on Instagram or VKontakte could entail serious problems. Therefore, it is crucial to articulate this to the soldiers on the daily bases, explaining to them how to avoid having the

What are the technological taboos (dangers) of the Instagram infrastructural service under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions?

unit's movement tracked by the enemy and how they might be held accountable for certain social media posts. It is equally important to have the same type of conversation with servicemen bloggers. It should be conducted in a form of a genuine conversation, rather than reprimand. Experience shows that a well-planned conversation and properly selected persuasion techniques may turn a pessimistic blogger into an ally, who will not only enhance the efforts of the press service on a completely different level, but also may even reach a much bigger audience than the official social media pages of the unit. Currently it is very difficult to monitor and track publications on a military unit due to a catastrophic lack in the capabilities of the service and the special software. The press

service, as well as the commanders of the unit, have to be aware of the needs and attitudes within the unit and publish the respective posts on social media right away. One of the main tasks of the press service is to scan through the social media posts of the servicemen on the daily basis in order to be able to respond to emerging challenges in a timely manner and to prevent a security leakage. In my opinion, the ability to scan any piece of information for key words can sometimes be more advantageous than engaging the enemy with ten tanks.

Photo and video services fulfill an important function by rapidly sharing information with large audiences at no cost at all. In addition, it is virtually impossible to stop some of these materials from spreading, as many bloggers repost them to different information platforms. The ability to maintain a simple and continuous communication with the target audience allows experienced social media users to create publications that could be extremely influential under certain conditions.

As was stated above, photo and video records of professional activities of the unit have a significant impact on the society, the troops and the enemy. But who is to execute this important mission in the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Press service seems to be the obvious answer according to the manning chart. The problem is that none of the press service logistic requirements (such as: a powerful laptop with a quick graphics card, external drive for archiving currently processed data, suitable photo and video equipment with a set of high-quality lenses of various focal distances that allow to take pictures without the flash, a modem for quick and unlimited Internet access, a printer and a light four-wheeler type vehicle) are formalized. Also, the importance of having official software for processing photo and video files must be taken into consideration as well. These are just the minimal requirements for a military journalist team. Some people may suggest to request this equipment from the volunteers. This road leads nowhere. The reality is, either we establish and maintain full-fledged press services or we lose the information war due to misunderstanding the importance and the basic needs of the press service.

We also need experienced and professional personnel that would be able to use the contemporary and creative language of photography and video to deliver the truth about war and operational record of military units to the general public and to document the adversary's crimes against humanity. Establishing a military press service network is similar to establishing new

Communication-content security: units – it is complicated, hard and expensive. However, the first steps in the right direction have already been made yielding positive results.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *Have you ever thought about how can public demonstration of an image influence someone's life? Characterize the state this person would be in and the possible implications depending on the artistic/emotional aspects and the general nature of the photo.*

2. *Why does a well-thought-through strategy of using high-quality photographs yield quick and tangible results in particular in the military? What category of communication-content security specialists of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should deal with this type of activities? In your opinion, how can this be implemented in practice?*

3. *How can we saturate the photo content with the high-quality dynamics? How did the public presence cease to be only an informal attribute of personal desires and turn into a component of professionalism and a prerequisite for long-term development? Support your opinion with examples from well-known cases/personal opinion.*

4. *What is a high quality photograph according to the author (Taras Khlivoych)? Why is a good photo considered valuable on both personal and civilizational geostrategic level under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions against Ukraine?*

5. *Identify technological and creative characteristics of the photo projects by Taras Khlivoych. Examine the design of the photos from the communication and content point of view. Define the style specifics and idiosyncrasies of the author in the ATO zone.*

6. *Why do the photo strategies of the communication-content design provide extraordinary branding opportunities for the unit in the? How can these photo strategies improve the motivation for professionalization of the defense and security sector and speed up the qualitative transformations of the philosophy of interpersonal communication and establishment of a community? Support your opinion with examples from well-known cases/personal opinion.*

7. *What is a photo/video archive of a unit, how should it be established, stored and used? Do you think there is a need to establish a regulatory framework for this issue?*

8. *Why should the cloud technologies for storing corporate content arrays become an infrastructural mundanity for the defense and security sector of the state? What is the educational purpose of these arrays?*

9. *Which factors and conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions prove the desperate need for having a professional photographer on the staff of the unit and for providing them with necessary digital equipment, including a UAV?*

10. *What technical resources are required for the photo and video design team of the unit's press service? Why is the special equipment of a professional photographer just as important as the basic equipment/armament of the troops? Support your opinion with examples of military photographers fulfilling their missions under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions.*

11. *How can the systematic, dynamic photographic personalization created in formats of public presence in segmented elements of the information space benefit the security sector philosophies of NATO member-states? Why does the lack of quality photos reduce authenticity and effectiveness of the multi-functional sector of national security? Why will a good picture from the ATO/JFO zone taken in the style of Taras Khlibovych always be relevant? Support your opinion with examples of real high-quality photographs and stories of professional photographers.*

12. *What is the story behind the D. Muravskii precedent why has this approach been effectively used against Ukraine by the Kremlin's centers of the global hybrid terrorism?*

13. *Why isn't the One Voice Principle, that envisages all mass media, bloggers and other public figures adhering to a general nationwide vision working under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions as practices of the global hybrid terrorism? To substantiate your opinion, use the peculiarities of the contemporary public dynamic, specifics of civil-military aggressions in the formats of terrorist practices, power and design sophistication of the communication-content aggressions and immersive communication environments produced by the aggressor on the global scale. Focus your attention on the plurality of authors and the helplessness of the iconic communication instruments from the past, that nowadays only strengthen the aggressor by rebroadcasting the attacks as a form of reporting.*

14. *What are the technological taboos (dangers) of the Instagram infrastructural service under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions?*

Iryna Marushkina

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**DRONE JOURNALISM IN UKRAINE:
CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES**

There have been no judicial precedents in Ukraine yet, but it must be acknowledged that taking footage with a drone can be partially compared to taking footage with a hidden camera, with the latter being defines by the current standards of journalism practices as the last resort, permissible only in cases when there is no other way to obtain information.

“Varianty” media outlet in cooperation with the Lviv Polytechnic National University are about to complete the creation of a robot that will write daily news on currency exchange rates. After the end of the testing phase we will try to create robots that will write news articles based on the informational data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine

The use of drones by Ukrainian journalists is a new, but rapidly growing trend. Today most editorial offices have a drone at their disposal, many others simply rent a UAV to carry out various projects.

In 2015-2017 within the framework of the projects “Drone-view on the natural disaster zones in Lviv region” and “School of innovative ecological reporting” “Varianty” media outlet was given the opportunity to actively use quadcopters DJI Phantom, which are a popular tool for journalists and many others. Today we continue to use these UAV’s to carry out other projects as well and, therefore, we would like to share certain observations and findings, which we hope will help our colleagues master this innovative tool.

Challenges

Use of drones in journalism is an element of a more global topic – the use of robots in journalism. In our opinion, as of today this topic has not received sufficient attention in Ukraine and most importantly – nobody is discussing the possibility of robots completely changing journalism and mass media communication as a whole in the near future.

Some journalists believe that robots are going to steal their jobs. The reality is that robots are already widely used in different editorial offices as a mean of organizing and structuring their work and also in the process of informational product creation, in particular for gathering (monitoring) and disseminating information. In the near future robots also will write (create) around 90% of the news. Information bases and big data journalism are the introduction to robotic journalism.

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Where does this bring us? Journalists are freed from routine tasks and irrational time allocation and can focus on analysis and creative processes. This is particularly relevant for the short-staffed editorial offices of the regional media outlets.

Let’s get back to drones. It is likely that in the near future drones, not reporters will be dispatched to cover the events. Therefore, a drone will become a universal instrument for gathering information.

However, the use of drones is currently limited by a list of technical characteristics:

- battery (15-20 minutes of flight time);
- plastic exterior (which has to be replaced after a few dozen flights);
- weather conditions (not lower than -5°, no wind and no precipitation);
- occurrence of external obstacles: electromagnetic field, jamming in the radio network, etc.

It is difficult to determine when and how these problems will be solved, but one tendency is obvious: the first drones were only able to travel 1,5 km, and today they travel 4-5 km and have cameras capable of 3D filming. All of this shows that technical characteristics of the UAV's are constantly improving.

Despite the fact that the number of drones continues to increase, their use in journalism and other civilian fields in Ukraine is not regulated. The State Aviation Administration of Ukraine has developed a draft of the "Guidelines and procedures for ensuring flight safety of general purpose aircraft, sport and amateur aircraft, as well as UAV's"¹ but it has not been passed yet. The order of the Ministry of Defense "On approving the Rules for performing flights by unmanned aviation complexes of the state aviation of Ukraine" has only been in place since 2016.

Positive implication of this uncertainty lies in the fact that the journalists are currently not limited in the flights they can perform by any bureaucratic procedures and also do not incur any additional expenses related to the commercial usage of drones.

On the other hand, the disadvantage of this uncertainty is that in case of accidents only the journalists would be held accountable, as it is currently impossible to insure drones.

This brings up another challenge related to the flight safety. Drone pilots currently operate under a set of unwritten rules, beside the general provisions of the Air Code: the team of pilots should have at least two people, no flights are to be performed over people, near airports and high-security facilities, etc. They also do not use drone to fulfill military objectives.

The truth is that 80% of the flight safety ensuring measures are taken during the preparatory stage.

Another challenge is in the lack of experience on the practical implementation of journalism standards when using drones. Is it permissible to

1 The Concept "Guidelines and procedures on ensuring the flight safety of general purpose aircrafts and sport, amateur and unmanned aerial vehicles" <http://www.avia.gov.ua/documents/Bezpeka-aviatsii/Bezpeka-polotiv/25434.html>
Ukraine set the limits for the use of drones <https://varianty.lviv.ua/37059-v-ukraini-vstanovyly-zaborony-u-vykorystanni-droniv>

fly over houses and private property land? What to do if quadcopter filmed people close-up? Do these situations violate the private interests, human rights and personal data security?

There have been no judicial precedents in Ukraine yet, but it must be acknowledged that taking footage with a drone can be partially compared to taking footage with a hidden camera, with the latter being defines by the current standards of journalism practices as the last resort, permissible only in cases when there is no other way to obtain information.

Last challenge lies in the fact that Ukraine does not have a fully-functioning drone services market in the field of journalism. Neither the service providers, nor the clients (journalists) have a full understanding of the potential of the drones, currently they are only

Can you name any powerful Ukrainian search engines that would answer most questions regarding the current and the past life of Ukraine?

attracted by the possibility of getting a pretty picture with the UAV. That is why as of today this market is running in test mode.

Development perspectives of the drone journalism

Everyone knows that drone videos and drone photos are primarily the sources of high-quality exclusive visuals. On the World Wide Web the demand for such content is very high. Consequently, the use of drones by the editorial offices when preparing reports and other materials is already a significant advantage.

At the same time journalism is a field of mass communication that deals with providing coverage to socially significant topics and issues, it does not simply produce a pretty exclusive picture. And the very realization of this mission has prompted a search for other possibilities of using data obtained with the help of drones.

Drone does not only record videos and take pictures, it also records an on-board log of GPS coordinates, altitudes, filming time, inclination angles, etc. This information can be used to determine when and where certain incidents took place.

Thus, in addition to processing pictures, we also learned to process geospatial data obtained with the help of drones, particularly: to create orthophotomaps and implement them with Google maps.

Another interesting capability, which we have not tested yet, is the creation of 3D models and panoramic pictures.

Why is it important and what is in it for the journalists?

1. We obtain additional information about the object, which helps the reader to get a better understanding of the issue.

For example, in Lviv almost everyone is aware of the unsatisfactory functioning of the Lviv utility company water and wastewater treatment facilities and of the existence of the so-called sludge beds, but only by using the drone were we able to document this for the first time and show what it looks like¹.

The same goes for the Novyi Rozdil sludges: everyone has heard about them, but a few people have seen them².

2. Information, obtained with the help of drones, facilitates journalistic investigations, as it provides accurate coordinates, allows us to calculate area, altitude, distance and other parameters of the object.

For example, our drone had recorded the exact coordinates of the barbaric deforestation near the Ukraine-Poland border in Starosambir region, which were later used to file a report to the State Forest Resources Agency of Ukraine and other agencies³.

With the help of the drone data we managed to calculate the area covered by Sosnowsky's hogweed in Zhovkiv region⁴.

We were able to document gravel theft from the Stryi river⁵.

We also identified and documented a few uncontrolled dump sites in Peremyshliany region⁶, the precise coordinates of which, in combination with the pictures and the orthophotomaps, allowed us to draft reports to the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine and have these reports registered as № 653 and 652 on the environmental map of the ministry⁷.

3. Drones allow us to conduct journalistic monitoring of the problematic objects.

Over the course of a few consecutive days, our journalists together with emergency service workers were observing the crack that occurred at the

1 Sewerage to Europe <https://varianty.lviv.ua/33448-kanalizatsiia-do-yevropy>

2 Novyi Rozdil: ecological disaster zone <https://varianty.lviv.ua/32614-novyi-rozdil-zona-ekolohichnoho-lykha>

3 Carpathian meteorite <https://varianty.lviv.ua/34293-karpatskyi-meteoryt>

4 Using a UAV "Varianty" calculated the area covered by Sosnowsky's hogweed in Zhovkiv region <https://varianty.lviv.ua/37156-varianty-za-dopomohoiu-drona-pidrakhuvaly-ploshchu-borshchivnyka-sosnovskoho-na-zhovkivshchyni>

5 Rivers with gravel banks <https://varianty.lviv.ua/35071-riky-z-hraviinymy-berehamy>

6 Quiet element <https://varianty.lviv.ua/38286-tykha-stykhiia>

7 Interactive map of the Ministry of Environment <https://ecomapa.gov.ua/feedback/check/?CallCode=653>

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Grybovysk landfill in summer of 2016, in order to avoid the secondary collapse of the trash¹.

After the publication of the “Lviv region badlands” report² the emergency service workers reached out to us and asked to assist them in observing the burning slagheaps.

4. Drones allow us to create new informational products.

The use of geospatial data, geographic Google services and aerial photography and video recording organically supplements the textual context of our informational messages and reports, as it has become the norm for the visualization of information³. At the same time we started to create special informational products based on drone information and Google services and even introduced a number of new concepts, like: drone geography of Lviv⁴, drone video map of Lviv⁵ and drone monitoring of the environmental objects of Lviv region⁶.

Overall, working with drones has stimulated our interest in the geographic Google services. For example, we currently keep up to date the Lviv garbage migration map⁷.

The use of drones in journalism is a promising development path. This is particularly true for the land-related conflicts, environmental issues, illegal construction, as well as travel, salutary and military journalism. Those, who plan to use the drones in their work please refer to the materials of the School of innovative environmental reporting “How to write about ecology for new media”⁸.

1 Grybovychi covered with spores <https://varianty.lviv.ua/35158-hrybovychi-sporamy>
Grybovychi are smoldering <https://varianty.lviv.ua/35193-hrybovychi-tliiut>
Grybovychi are moving <https://varianty.lviv.ua/35238-hrybovychi-rukhaiutsia>.

2 Lviv region badlands <https://varianty.lviv.ua/35253-bedlenty-lvivshchyny>

3 The area occupied by the Lviv “Santa Barbara” market has been curtailed <https://varianty.lviv.ua/32280-rynku-santa-barbara-u-lvovi-urizaly-zemliu>

4 Drone geography of Lviv: Exclusion Zone in the Jewish Quarter <https://varianty.lviv.ua/31704-drono-heohrafiia-lvova-zona-vidchuzhennia-u-yevreiskomu-kvartali>

5 Map of Lviv drone videos <https://varianty.lviv.ua/32158-karta-lvivskykh-dron-video>

6 Environmental objects of Lviv region. The map <https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?hl=uk&authuser=0&mid=1JOIXETmm5P4WtzrMz4kf8bK6CZE&ll=50.79241840431691%2C22.3147210796875&z=88296117911991&z=12>

7 Migration of Lviv garbage. The map <https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?hl=uk&authuser=0&mid=1dTozOewcGp9y47NUGW9IGLR4dQc&ll=50.603320712374504%2C26.281659931182844&z=15>

8 How to write on ecology for the new media. Manual <https://varianty.lviv.ua/files/dron/Posibnyk-Eco-story-web-ed.pdf>

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *What is your attitude to drone journalism? To what extent does drone journalism meet the requirements of the modern age? Should we train professionals in this field?*

2. *Drone in the editorial office of a mass media – is it a tool for an efficient journalistic development or just a mean to get ahead of the competition? What is, in your opinion, the capitalization perspective for the drone communication services, as a capability to create content flows? What is your attitude to the prohibition of drone services in the settlements? What fields of drone service use can you envision? Why are the drone complex communication channels particularly important along the line of deterrence in the JFO zone?*

3. *Think back to your first encounter with the content created using drones. How can we turn the data collected by UAV's into the nomenclature of the content representation formats that could shape a separate type of communication-content flows? Why does the creative designer stylistic of "seeing from above" has the potential and perspective for capitalization and is leaning toward the ecumenical worldviews of a human in nature, society and hyperlocal phenomena, as the living environments? How can drone journalism produce exclusives and additional potentials for the augmented public realities of the settlement/region/city? Add your own communication-content scenarios and approaches to the task matrix for the UAV's (make sure they are focused on the communication content aspect, instead of the tactical narrowly specialized aspects, such as ecology, geositional control, search operations). Take into account the following parameters: speed scales, space ranges, controversial angular combinations, seeing height as an opportunity to discover and supplement a person's awareness of the dynamics of life and rhythms of these dynamics, encouraging the state of dynamic presence, horizons of equal visions, which ultimately destroy the states of static monopoly status. Object to or complete these semantic sets.*

4. *Do such robotized systems threaten the art of authorship of the communication-content design? To what extent does drone support of the work of a collective artist (a journalistic pool of synergistic partnerships) facilitate the totality of public life, in other words how does it help to be included in the understanding of the dynamics of processes, which in recent*

past were off limits for the journalism or functioned only in emergency situations?

5. Do you think the journalism has moved on from being the threat warning service to being the service of positive models and motivations for shaping a promising future? What role do the speed of information distribution and the scaling of the dynamics (as the omnipresent energies) play in this situation? Is it safe to say that due to the use of UAV's the journalism is becoming the vehicle bringing democracy into the digital era of the societal synergies of happiness? Substantiate your opinion relying on studies on the use of UAV's and drones in communication-content security. Use Ukrainian, EU and US legislation on the use of drones.

6. Name other robotized systems (beside UAV's) that are used in contemporary journalism.

7. Can you name any powerful Ukrainian search engines that would answer most questions regarding the current and the past life of Ukraine? What search engines do you use in your work and why?

8. How is the situational data monitoring (based on time and geoposition) different from seeing segmented contents of the information field bases of the contextual analysis of the information resonances (CAIR)? Why does the monitoring of the information field, "polluted" with the enemy's communication-content influences, disorient the journalistic community and works for the aggressor in the stylistics of the hybrid messianic expansions? In your opinion, how do these monitoring systems spread fear, doubts and mistrust, which in turn can produce hate and zealotry? Indicate which monitoring formats you are familiar with and which you would like to learn more about and why.

9. Why are the monitoring bot infrastructures addressing mostly the news and topics dominated by data and why do they disregard the materials with content, sense, motivations, visions and emotional compositions of the communication-content design?

10. Do you agree with the opinion that the prospect for journalism exists on the scale of certain specializations and specialists of the synergetic style of communication-content:

- management,*
- logistics,*
- design,*
- production,*

- *support,*
- *assistance*
- *logistic infrastructural solutions, etc.*

Can you substantiate your opinion with the examples from the reality of the modern day and the reforms implemented in the society and the state?

11. How should industrial informational bases become the technological hubs for the extension of communication content abilities for the legalization and motivation of public positives as the system and a lifestyle? Do you agree with an idea that Big Data journalism is a step toward shaping robotic journalism? Or is it possible that the combination of Big Data aggregation tools will become just one of the communication-content flows, without dominating the societal publicity? Substantiate your opinion using lessons learned from working with various types of content arrays.

12. Why do UAV's have an onboard lot file beside photo and video ones? What does it add to the basic data and why does this additional file increase the evidence value of the data and can be used as evidence in court? Why is data documentation always unique and cannot be duplicated? Why is it important to simultaneously record the weather patterns that accompanied the process of drone documentation? Why is drone vision called "the world for the first time"? How does drone vision motivate people to create? Substantiate your opinion using examples from personal experience of working with UAV's. If you do not have such experience look for reasonable examples from reliable sources.

13. Which professional competencies are required to work with drone documented data, to create orthophotomaps and integrate them with Google maps? Why is drone journalism an example of direct synergistic cooperation between a team of communication-content security artists? Substantiate your opinion using examples of drone data processing.

14. Have a look at the content arrays presented by the "Varianty" media outlet, which in cooperation with the Lviv Polytechnic National University have created a content robot that will write daily news on currency exchange rates. What are the functional specifics of a communication-content robot responsible for transferring data into content flow arrays?

15. What is the difference between a reporter on the scene and a drone journalist in the same situation? In your opinion is there a technical need (and capability) for such replacements? Is the fusion of these two authors a better option? Why does the drone reporter have more functional poten-

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tial and why is the traditional reporter more effective in the communication-content design?

16. What are the perspectives of drone journalism in the paradigm of the communication-content security and design under the conditions of the hybrid messianic aggressions, as global hybrid terrorism practices? Substantiate your opinion, using lessons learned from UAV-based content production (if applicable).

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**SPECIFICS OF ESTABLISHING
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
IN THE COMBAT ZONE**

Hybrid aggression against Ukraine has its specifics, one of them being the mentality of the region. Therefore, imposing something that is not typical for this region would be a mistake. It is also important to take the language issue into consideration, the fact that most of the population there speaks Russian, does not necessarily mean they adhere to anti-Ukrainian views. The issues in the East of Ukraine have to be addressed taking into account the particularities of the local population. The specially established institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine take into consideration these aspects while working with the local population

Experience of conducting combat operations in the East of Ukraine indicates that in order to restore the proper functioning of the state managerial institutions in the territories liberated from the Putin's terrorists it is necessary to engage not only units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also the specialists from civil-military cooperation teams.

Under the conditions of hybrid aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the hostilities in Donbas, the process of the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine becomes a long-term commitment.

Therefore, the implementation of new cooperation approaches and principles between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and international and domestic GO's and NGO's, volunteers, local self-government bodies

In your opinion, how can we quickly eliminate the effects of Kremlin's communication-content aggressions in the occupied territories of Ukraine (Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions)?

and individual citizens of Ukraine and other countries is extremely important. Warfare experience in the context of ATO has shown that under the contemporary conditions it is crucial to take into account social, cultural, political, economic, religious and humanitarian factors when conducting operations with the use of forces. That is where the need to establish an institution aimed at detecting and addressing cooperation issues between these parties comes from. The CIMIC Department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and CIMIC teams in the sectors are the institution that facilitates the civil-military cooperation.

The main objective of the CIMIC bodies lies in organizing the cooperation between the military command and the executive bodies, volunteers, international organizations for the purpose of facilitating the fulfilment of military missions and ensuring timely response to the occurrence of certain destabilization factors.

Topicality of civil-military cooperation significantly increases during critical stages. The volunteer movement that was established in Ukraine on a large scale right after the outbreak of hostilities can be taken as an example. It consisted of assisting the UAF units and formations by providing them with logistical assets; participating in the negotiation process with the representatives of puppet "people's republics" regarding the POW exchange and recovering the bodies of the KIA servicemen from the territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities.

The principal cooperation activities of the CIMIC teams are carried out in three fields:

1. Organizing cooperation with other military formations, law enforcement bodies, local government bodies, mass media and the private sector.

2. Assisting civil population:

– providing humanitarian assistance: evacuating civil population from the most severely affected regions and settlements, supplying the population that is unwilling to move with essentials and food items;

– restoring infrastructure: electricity supply network, water supply system and sewerage system.

3. Assistance provided to the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by charity funds, volunteers and mass media that includes searching and recovering the bodies of the KIA servicemen from the territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities and negotiating the POW exchange.

As of today, the composition of the civil-military cooperation teams working in the combat zone can be very diverse. The teams are usually led by staff officers and each of them includes specialists in multiple areas to make the teams multi-functional. These teams consist of lawyers, communication and logistics specialists, human resources officers, psychologists and journalists with each of them benefiting the group in their own way.

Representatives of all law enforcement and local government bodies work in the aforementioned centers. Their work is organized in cooperation without the large number of reports and approvals. This practice was also adopted by the ATO staff, where the on-duty officers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard, Border Guard and Fiscal Services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Emergency Service and Security Service of Ukraine coordinated and harmonized their efforts to deal with certain contingencies on the checkpoints in the demarcation area.

Establishing cooperation between civilians and the military lays the groundwork for the implementation of CIMIC objectives and functions on all stages of planning and conducting operations. Timely organization of strategic, tactical and operational-level cooperation ensures the increased support of civilian population, as well religious and other organizations and creates prerequisites for the success of the operations as a whole.

Hybrid aggression against Ukraine has its specifics, one of them being the mentality of the region. Therefore, imposing something that is not typical for this region would be a mistake. It is also important to take the

language issue into consideration, the fact that most of the population there speaks Russian, does not necessarily mean they adhere to anti-Ukrainian views. The issues in the East of Ukraine have to be addressed taking into account the particularities of the local population. The specially established institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine take into consideration these aspects while working with the local population.

An important element of Kremlin's aggression displayed against Ukraine is the use of informational special operations and propaganda by the putinists. Under the conditions of hybrid aggression, the enemy is not the main influence target, it is instead the population that is being "liberated". It is necessary to gain the loyalty of the population prior to occupying the city. The information operation forces are also building up their capabilities in the occupied regions of Donbas.

Putin's Russia has begun establishing PSYOPS bodies in the occupied territories. Aggressive anti-Ukrainian propaganda and the shortcomings of the system providing media coverage of the UAF activities have shaped the mistrust that parts of the population of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have in both the servicemen and the State of Ukraine, as a whole. In order to confidently tackle all of these absurd, but at the same impactful challenges of terrorist mind attacks, it is necessary to establish active cooperation with civilian population. Civil-military cooperation teams are amongst those working with the population in the combat zone and adjacent areas. Communication between the military and civilian population requires extensive bilateral exchange of information, which can be simplified by the use of technical means, but occurs mostly during personal encounters.

Working with children is another issue that needs to be addressed. It is carried out by the means of polls, lectures, concerts and meetings. One of the main issues faced by the children from the territories affected by hostilities is the number of concealed weapons and explosives. A large percentage of munition detonation-related injuries are caused by negligent mishandling.

At the same, the hostilities in some settlements have also led to disruption in the functioning of certain critical infrastructure facilities, thus causing the population to struggle to fulfil their basic needs and necessities. The government of Ukraine has deemed the establishment of the civil-military cooperation system within the Armed Forces of Ukraine necessary in order to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe in the areas

Communication-content security: adjacent to the frontline, as well as the social tension in other regions of Ukraine and to shape a positive public opinion about the military framework of the state.

Existent issues define the main areas of focus for the CIMIC teams, including the coordination of humanitarian assistance for educational and medical institutions located near the line of deterrence, large families, elderly, people with disabilities and other people with special needs. This assistance usually implicates providing the aforementioned categories of the population with food items, clothing and medication and facilitating the restoration of schools, kindergartens and residential buildings adversely affected during the hostilities.

Civil-military cooperation teams pay particular attention to increasing awareness of the UAF activities amongst the citizens and other civil society actors. For example, there is a website created in Luhansk oblast that allows you to not only learn some information regarding the work of the CIMIC team, but also to use an interactive feedback form and notify the authorities of the issues which the Armed Forces of Ukraine may help address. Nowadays, the civil-military cooperation framework is a way for citizens, NGO's and all other stakeholders to access those fields of the UAF activities that are directly related to their needs and interests. The existence of the civil-military cooperation teams allows to ensure the effective communication and to collaboratively tackle the issues that arise in the process of restoring peace in our country.

What can become the grounds for discrimination of civilian population in the course of the work of CIMIC teams in the ATO/JFO zone under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions?

When performing assigned missions, the civil-military cooperation teams systematically monitor the morale of the combat zone population with the aim of improving it by assigning mental health specialists to provide counseling, informing the population on the procedure for the temporary resettlement from the combat zone and on the procedures for receiving humanitarian and other assistance.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of civil-military cooperation units in modern warfare and the increasingly more common hybrid aggressions. Currently, the dwellers of many Donbas settlements liberated from Russian terrorists ask Ukrainian servicemen not to change their locations. A great

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deal of credit for the mentality shift of the local population should go to the CIMIC units.

Facilitating cooperating with local executive bodies, national and international non-governmental and volunteer organizations and civil population is one of the key objectives of the civil-military cooperation at the initial stage of operation planning and execution. In other words, the work of these units is aimed at establishing rapport and gaining support of the civilian population.

Owing to the well-functioning system of cooperation with volunteers and international organizations the CIMIC units were able to hand over to people, living near the frontline around 2 thousand tonnes of humanitarian aid, including: food items, personal hygiene items and medication. The aid is sent to almost every settlement located along the line of deterrence. Besides, a lot of the infrastructure restoration projects are being implemented in the settlements affected by hostilities, including the restoration of power supply and gas supply systems in certain frontline areas.

Moreover, active communication and awareness-raising work with both the representatives of the local government and various age groups of local population are currently underway. In schools, boarding schools and other educational institutions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast CIMIC representatives teach classes on mine safety and raise awareness of the specifics of the peace-making operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the affected regions of Donbas.

Putin's aggression against Ukraine has shown that under the contemporary combat conditions it is crucial to take into consideration social, religious, cultural, political, humanitarian and economic factors when planning and executing military operations. New methodologies and legal framework for the improvement of CIMIC humanitarian assistance system in the future activities of the Armed Forces are being developed taking into account the specifics of this region.

In order to establish an effective cooperation with the public, the representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have to be properly trained, in particular they have to be able to develop an optimal behavior model when working with the population. The servicemen have to be aware that it is impermissible to advocate the leading role of a certain religious denomination and also to express discriminatory opinions based on a person's sex, race, nationality, language, etc.

Existing threats require a constant monitoring of the civilian environment, as well as a comprehensive consideration and prediction of the impact the civil society may have on the multinational forces operations. Specially-trained personnel of the CIMIC units communicates with the population in their native language and can promptly identify issues and needs of the peaceful population, which affects the rate at which this issues are addressed. Even in the complicated circumstances of conventional and informational warfare between Ukrainians and Russian terrorist aggressors, the restoration of peaceful life in the region can have a huge impact on politics and morale. The public has to have confidence in the Armed Forces capability to not only protect the independence and territorial integrity of the state, but also to become an efficient instrument in the active restoration of all aspects of life.

As of today (2016) there are 14 teams and two joint CIMIC centers in Mariupol and Severodonetsk working in the conflict zone, assisting the most affected civilian population. In the future these numbers are to be increased. Nowadays, every operational command has a CIMIC team and it is planned to embed CIMIC specialists into every brigade command. Utilizing the CIMIC tools, brigade commanders can effectively coordinate daily activities of their unit with local government and civilian population. First and foremost, this coordination involves informational and awareness-raising work, as well as other measures required to establish cooperation between the civilian sector and the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. *What do you know about civil-military cooperation as a system of relationships between servicemen and governmental institutions, organizations and citizens? When and why was this type of relationship first established?*

2. *How does NATO CIMIC system function? How appropriate is their experience for Ukraine?*

3. *Present your understanding of the notions “war target”, “target of the hybrid messianic aggressions of the global hybrid terrorism”, “information war target”. What do these notions have in common and how are they different?*

4. *What is “international humanitarian law”? Which organizations ensure the abidance by the international humanitarian law, in particular during armed conflicts or aggressions? Do you know anything about the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in particular done in Ukraine since 2014? What are your suggestions regarding the improvement of the abidance by the international humanitarian law in the occupied territories of Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions?*

5. *Why should the State, affected by genocide and lawlessness, deal with the violations of the international humanitarian law? Why did the term “liberation”, being actively produced by the hybrid messianic aggression centers in the international information space, became a weapon of communication-content dominance for the aggressor?*

6. *In your opinion, how can we quickly eliminate the effects of Kremlin’s communication-content aggressions in the occupied territories of Ukraine (Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions)? Do you agree with an idea that making the objective of these efforts a long-term prospect is a technique aimed at strengthening and spreading global hybrid terrorism practices? Respond considering all of the characteristics attributed to the quantitative/qualitative changes in the civilian population of these territories. Why are these characteristics more important than all of the other ones?*

7. *Why should linguistic peculiarities and the issues of the occupied territories become the paramount condition ensuring the effectiveness of the communication-content arrays (of the state information policy), aimed at changing the outlook and the envisioned perspectives of certain settlements? Substantiate your opinion using the experience of people (preferably of different age groups), who lived through occupation, as an example.*

8. *Analyze the functions of the Civil-military cooperation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the format of ATO and JFO. Identify the factors that indicate the prospects of developing (or curtailing) these forces in the nearest future. Substantiate your opinion based on current legislation and public stance of the commanders of UAF CIMIC and UAF JFO.*

9. *What are the functional specifics of the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and defense and security sector as a whole under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions from the perspective of Civil-military cooperation and the volunteer movement? How should this cooperation*

Communication-content security: evolve? *Substantiate your opinion using lessons learned from CIMIC, volunteer and international organizations.*

10. What are the focus areas for the activities of CIMIC teams in the ATO/JFO zone? Briefly describe each of these areas.

11. What can become the grounds for discrimination of civilian population in the course of the work of CIMIC teams in the ATO/JFO zone under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions?

12. Substantiate your opinion regarding the need for and the numbers of CIMIC teams in the ATO/JFO zone.

Hryhorii Liubovets

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**TRANSFORMING THE CRISIS NATURE
OF THE GLOBAL
COMMUNICATION PROCESSES
INTO COMMUNICATION-CONTENT
HORIZONS OF THE SYNERGISTIC
PARTNERSHIP**

Putin's Russia is actually maintaining the state of hybrid peace (unstable, questionable) on the planet, characterized by permanent anxious anticipation of a new total world war and, respectively, a reflectory, in other words unconscious refusal to facilitate the development of the global powerful communities (which are separate for now) via cultural, tourism-related, spiritual and other aspects of life...

Defense and security corporation of Ukraine and the world is currently at the cutting edge of the global life dynamics. The extent of the destruction of life in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the ATO/JFO zone (just like in Syria, in the areas affected by ISIS) boils down to seconds of targeted and non-targeted threats and risks.

We have to faithfully recognize and accept all of the real events that have been taking place in Ukraine and all over the world since 2014. We have to be aware of the perspectives and potentials the cessation of the aggression of Putin's Russia and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity can have. We have to develop and implement every possible action format for transferring to peace-building and peace-promoting processes, as a steady course for the development of the planet under the current international security situation in the world.

Today, you and I are living through the boom of global technologies that intellectualize life and provide a multitude of educational and creative opportunities for almost every human being, not to mention governmental institutions or NGO's, in particular, international.

Globalization of the world by the means of global technologies and global challenges accelerated all of the socially-technological processes around us without creating any field-specific division in the formats of industrial revolution 4.0. This is due to the fact that now these dynamics and technologies are not just the possibilities and potentials of life, but also global technologies of non-military weaponry that at the hands of global hybrid terrorists have given rise to multiple challenges and direct threats to the existence of people and even the planet. Global terrorists are no longer destroying just people with traditional military practices, but rather aim at destroying sovereign states, they do not only produce fear of the losing physical life, but also the fear of losing perspectives for the peaceful future of people, nations, states, continents and planet, as a whole.

How do you personally define a public crisis: is it a challenge or a catastrophe?

We are living in an age that before our eyes is being transformed from traditionally stable into a dynamically digital one, in which the possibilities for communication, reactions, decision-making and responses emerge in a matter of minutes or seconds. The reality is measured based on its information flow characteristics, where the key role is played not by the scale of the event or the significance of the person, but rather by the ability to

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capture attention for the longest period of time (using creatively innovative solutions and technologies).

In other words, the general public usually finds out about “something” online, if this “something” is adequately represented in the communication-content flows containing data that can and will become public content environment. However, under such conditions the cognitive process no longer occurs as a result of the public eye phenomenon, which in this case is characterized by accents, stylistics, visions and vibes, instead of topics and argumentation systems.

In our opinion, the transformation of the primary stage of hybrid messianic aggressions into the process of Putin’s Russia initiating various formats of global hybrid terrorism on the training field

Why does the world security system recognize conflicts and regional wars but does not recognize global terrorist practices especially on global hybrid terrorism scale?

“Ukraine” and other training fields around the world has become the dividing line between the adequacy and non-adequacy of definitive diagnostics of communicative crisisness in the analysis of armed conflict zoned in the official ATO format. This transformation has been carried out via special technological, resource, methodological and creative complexes, incorporating the use of massive dynamic communication-content terror means, subversive flow activities and brutal dominant influences. These negative influences have permeated all restricted defense systems due to people being the carriers of civilian communication-content publicity.

The world has been experiencing the effects of the scale of influence of this complex since 2007 (V. Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference) and is still experiencing them today (the International Court of Justice in Hague examining the case of Ukraine vs. Russia), without being completely aware of it. However, it can already be stated, that the Kremlin’s global hybrid style of the new combined terrorism led to the establishment of a new public diplomatic state of the global life, which we can hypothetically title “planetary unrest” or “hybrid peace”, which is used as a tool to create civilizational uncertainty in the peace, stability and prospects of future life. Henceforward, this will be the form of the artificially modeled ongoing crisis of global communications.

In other words, creative and technological centers of Moscow’s Kremlin have accomplished their aim and even mission of establishing globally

Communication-content security: mobilizational and destructive communicative disastrousness of the communication-content flows. The thing is that this mission is accomplished in the formats of hybrid terrorist orientation of the communicative militarism. Putin's Russia is actually maintaining the state of hybrid peace (unstable, questionable) on the planet, characterized by permanent anxious anticipation of a new total world war and, respectively, a reflectory, in other words unconscious refusal to facilitate the development of the global powerful communities (which are separate for now) via cultural, tourism-related, spiritual and other aspects of life. Therefore, global hybrid terrorists are attempting to bring the planetary world back into the state of constant survival, as a standard of the new historical era, the state of total distrust, of the distribution of various hybridized aggressions with aim of destroying the perspective and effectiveness of peace, as the technological and methodological state of the development of the planet of equal people in the environment of the noospheric partnership.

Why is the societal attention often used as a weapon against the public attention?

Ukraine has recently been granted the long-awaited visa-free regime with Europe, which establishes this very regime with 35 countries of the world. There was a three-year-long period, during which the Ukrainian government kept setting a new date for the implementation of the visa free regime, postponing it every time – was it a permanent public crisis or the communication-content catastrophe for the government as such?

In order to answer this one, as well as many other questions, let's go back to our recent past. In USSR, where the party was planning and approving not only the issues of national economy but also any other events including those related to the private life of citizens, even the smallest deviation from the "general line" or just an unusual public situation caused unrest, anxiety and foreboding of inevitable global catastrophe.

Public crisis, as seen by traditional societies that were established in the Soviet paradise of "real socialism", can be compared to a geostrategic catastrophe. The catastrophe itself was classified as an unusual event that brought the society into the state of shock. Quite often the perception of this catastrophe was associated with the feeling of an upcoming apocalypse, that is, the elimination or destruction of everything that existed before that.

According to a Soviet approach a public crisis is synonymous with a state-level catastrophe. On the other hand, Chinese philosophical discourse

perceives this phenomenon, as a dynamic process of indicative warning that has two development vectors: establishment of a new order based on the rituals of the past (real logic of a real catastrophe of public discourse) and a good opportunity for positive changes that would pave the way for the future perspectives.

It is not that the Soviet past lacked the notions of communication, it is just that those notions could not possibly have existed, since the interactions between social groups or separate individuals were completely controlled by the state. In that case, the freedom of speech (as the result of freedom (independence) of an individual) could not develop naturally. We have not yet learned to understand communications as means to reach consensus (look at how in English language communications also stand for elements of the infrastructural systems), as connecting points that create or extend opportunities for interaction and contact through presence, experience exchange, impressions reflected in the compositions and design of the content, etc.

At a certain stage of the independent development of our country (in the 1990's) crisis communications were regarded as the responsibility of highly specialized professionals with foreign training and background.

Quite often, crisis communications were seen as public reactions to processes, phenomena and events that had gotten out of control of the corporate organization or had crossed the limits of the coexistence norms and principles in all fields – from ethical to environmental.

At times, when the global technologies had not yet reached the functional capabilities aimed at affecting personal and private human abilities, crisis communications were simply a component of anti-crisis services, as very often they dealt with local unusual events, which in most cases were interpreted as negatives – from the standpoint of corporate production, logistic delivery processes, security functions, etc.

Conclusions:

1. Today, amidst the permanent crisis of communications caused by the globalization of unique opportunities, it is crucial to realize that the communication-content reality is an open global (purely dynamic) environment of public (subjective and institutionally subjective) variables, which first and foremost include the security sector institutions, such as the Ministry of defense on levels of its functionality. The effectiveness of these variables requires combined complex diagnostics not as much on the managerial or

Communication-content security: infrastructural level, as on the level of a specific doer and the smallest military unit (as an essential creator of content format or subgenre, especially being the first responder in the field or an active online commenter) under the exclusive conditions of combat.

2. It is also vital to understand that in order to ensure the effective coordination of public tasks under the crisis conditions even the most adequate diagnostic complexes should not interfere with the formulation of these tasks in their completed form and not provide the same performer for different tasks despite being limited in personnel and resources. It will limit the potentials and the communication-content capabilities for adequate reaction to a crisis and turn the communication process into a primitive but imitating exchange. Understandably, there will be certain influences under such conditions as well, but they will be mostly quantitatively primitive and will follow the stylistic guidelines of the hybrid terrorist/aggressor (facts manipulation, distorting the nature/source of the facts, humiliation, pettiness, fear, brutality, etc.)...

3. Regardless of whether we like it or not, we are currently in the midst of the background data dynamics, which are measured by compositional and designer practices and models of content presentation formats for experiences, knowledge and understanding. In this case, the content flows of life are no longer characterized by professional authorship, now this dimension is shaped by an average citizen that has one or a few gadgets in his/her pocket capable of documenting, producing, transferring and controlling the legalization of life events on a verbal level. These vortices of dynamic content dimensions and authorship

What is the essence of the notion "hybrid peace"?

manifested in the public areas of the social life completely destroyed the static scale of positivity and negativity. Moreover, it is worth noting that this scale is no longer shaped by the corporative professional approaches and totally monopolistic statuses, because now it is created in real societal configurations of real-life environments. They are what defines the understanding of the positive and the negative now.

These and many other aspects of the transformation of life in the contemporary society prove to us that the communication processes are no longer divided into crisis and crisis-free. In the contemporary dynamics with the simultaneous participation of hundreds of millions of people the crisis is constantly present – as a process of a dynamic content effort, which

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radically changed our understanding of the standards and technological manifestations of public positive and negative. The latter grew into the dynamic models/indicators of the flow content.

Today we have to realize that the crisis nature of the communication processes in the military field can be neutralized by the effective and harmonious exposure of people that can no longer stand simple linear advertising technological decisions on a mass scale or the system of brutal coercion (since the motivations, moods and the perception aesthetics of the target audiences are not taken into account) to communication-content environments.

The world of crisis-free communications produces horizontal partnership and leans toward the systems of indirect specialized diagnostic indication of all public processes within the highest hyper dynamics (peaceful and combat environment).

Practice of producing fake staged content that Putin's hybrid terrorism technologists use to spread fear or humiliation and to produce traditional linear formal PSYOPs and INFOOPs only proves that the horizontal communication-content environments are replacing the monopolistic hierarchies aiming to accumulate fear and formalism regarding the possibilities for professional self-growth within the partnership systems of all segments of the defense and security sector of Ukraine, in particular, under the conditions of the ATO in the East of Ukraine and the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Questions – food for thought and motivation to understand the topic more in-depth:

1. Characterize the era you live in. Do you see any differences compared to the previous eras? If yes than what are they?

2. Understanding the public crisis: between the future and the past. How do you personally define a public crisis: is it a challenge or a catastrophe?

3. Why did the communication-content crisis become permanent? How did it manage to destroy the corporate hierarchies of opposition and engage communication-content horizons of the synergistic partnership in the communication-content design paradigm? Which industries are involved and why is all of this vital under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions, such as the global hybrid terrorism practices?

4. *Why did 2014 become the turning point of the geostrategic creative duel with the aggressor in the communication-content paradigm of the globalization of security as the condition for the existence of the world?*

5. *How is the article by V. Surkov “Loneliness of the half-blood” related to this duel? Why does the article present war as a form of communication? Is this approach cynical or does it establish both technological and methodological bases for the use of the militarized world in the global hybrid terrorism practices?*

6. *Why does the world security system recognize conflicts and regional wars but does not recognize global terrorist practices especially on global hybrid terrorism scale?*

7. *What are the goals of the global hybrid terrorists? What is scarier than losing a life? Why did the loss of the hope for the future become the aim of the global hybrid terrorism? How can the communication-content security prevent this, especially under the conditions of the hybrid messianic aggressions of Putin’s Russian Federation?*

8. *How is reality related to public attention? Why is the societal attention often used as a weapon against the public attention?*

9. *What is the essence of the notion “hybrid peace”? Why does using hybridity to categorize a war means underestimating the processes and distorting the reality of the horizon of the geostrategic processes on the planet?*

10. *Do you agree with the statement that hybrid peace is the pinnacle and the main aim of the total cynicism era, achieved by the means of global hybrid terrorism practices? Substantiate your opinion using personal/professional experience or examples of well-known persons/institutions.*

11. *Does the notion of “communication crisis” complement the notion of “crisis communication” or are they two completely different things? Why is the permanent crisis of the communication-content process most prominently manifested under the conditions of hybrid messianic aggressions, such as the global hybrid terrorism practices?*

12. *Can you substantiate the statement that crisis as a permanent characteristic of the flow content discourse is a perspective of the globalized world? How do the technologically creative centers of the hybrid messianic aggressions use this realization? Can we use this approach for the benefit of the peaceful civilization, as opposed to neo-barbarism?*

Hybrid messianic aggressions – military, paramilitary, creatively artistic, communication-content, sports-related, environmental and other aggressions against a peaceful country, that are disguised by hybrid (pseudo-hybrid, mixed) means, regulations, norms, as well as by being presented in the public (information) space through the stylistics of pseudo-far-reaching redemption, protection and salvation.

In certain cases this can be the protection/salvation carried out, in particular, via hybrid messianic self-presentation, by a high-status geopolitical state (regime), which is usually represented on the geostrategic map of the world by an authoritarian, totalitarian, autocratic politically corporatized thuggish regime that has either directly or indirectly usurped the power in the state and that raises concerns in the international community to an extent where a deployment of an international (UN, NATO) peacekeeping/security mission in that state becomes a very realistic prospect.

Hybrid messianic myths of Putin's Russia – collective memory of the USSR and the Russian Empire imposed upon the former Kremlin's satellites by the components of the communication-content security and through various fields of communication-content influences as an ideal long-term development paradigm for sovereign countries based on imperial geostrategic pseudo-messiahship.

Global hybrid terrorism (GHT) – instantaneous arrays and individualized, multidirectional, multifunctional models, formats, standards, regulations, and even managerial-geostrategic styles that can be manifested as:

- contemporary innovation-technological complex for creating the environments of total cynicism and neo-barbarism, using modern technological capabilities of the planetary-globalized distribution of the most powerful (fundamental) characteristics of rituals, traditions and instruments of the barbaric era;

- innovatively creative and technologically resource-based combined format of transforming practices, stylistics and instruments of the traditional clandestine international terrorism into the state-level geostrategy, which in turn shapes an extremely effective standard for managing the international diplomatic and social-geostrategic space, which does not have formal institutional features, but achieves effective geo-efficiency through the domination in the categories of communication-content attention and

geostrategic-social fear;

– multi-dynamic combined situational totality of the occasional use of the military, paramilitary forces and the means of public communication-content influence (mass media, political forces, civic movements, NGO's or initiatives, etc.) in global societal horizons. It is supported by the hybrid methods and technologically creative means in the framework of the globalized infrastructure services created for the domination of the terrorist stylistics of discursive and physical denial of peace as a universal way of planetary coexistence.

– flow-based excessive and dynamically hyper active process of holding the instantaneous public attention on all levels of the social and civilizational structure, which fills the life with the internal and external dynamics of creative-version moderation, destroys the traditional democracy of the industrial and postindustrial era and becomes an endless in time and scale process of capturing public attention;

– technologically creative transformation of the institutional corruption into the efficient models of the multi-format official and unofficial “mafiazation” of the state government, which is later used by the moderators of the GHT to create international geostrategic corporations that unite the state, society, diaspora, native speakers and members of the cultural-mental and spiritual-psychological stylistics into a globalized virtual organic integral unit, within which the real functions of the branches of the governments and the mission behind those functions are completely disregarded (destroyed);

– the combined multi-sphere geostrategy of communication-content use of the capabilities of the military, special force, judicial, legislative, paramilitary, cultural-spiritual, sports-civil, private-state forces and means which, due to the situational dynamics of public dominance – through mass media, political and social movements and organizations, etc. – achieve the global societal horizons of absolute acceptance of the desired content flows;

– technologically creative, hybrid-terrorist, artificial version-based acceleration of the global trend of statehood devaluation through controlled digital violence in algorithms of total cynicism (fear of humiliation) of the monopolized-hierarchical empire;

– technologically creative development of the traditional state practices of special use of terrorism (the key factor is the endless process of terrorist

practices that always have a beginning and never the end) in situational-dynamic serpentine of the realization of criminal intentions in all areas of life of a civilized world;

– transformation of corruption in a state into the multi-level formats of the “mafiazation” of the state government (creation of megacorporation), which neutralizes society, public life, civil liberties and legal foundations for the existence of a modern international community;

– cynical ignorance, communication-content extrusion, or legislative and managerial erosion of democratic norms, regulations, standards, procedures that are constitutionally declared, but in the practice of state administration destroyed by usurpers-neotyrants through simulated democratic institutions (elections, referendums, distribution of branches of power, protection of human rights, presumption of innocence, etc.);

– main condition for the “mafiazation” of the state government is an impetus, motivational moderation of the total dominance of capillary corruption in all areas of life of a society, based on inadequate knowledge of the environment and potentials that are destroyed in this way;

– communication-content production of a fanatical confidence in the prospects of the ungoverned existence of mega-countries, in other words, the formation of a public opinion on the abandonment of statehood based on the results of modern development of promising technologies and systems of global cultural and creative influences with the aim of “hopping” to non-statehood based on the old formats of brutal violence – physical, spiritual, mental – in the practices of direct barbarism and disregard for everything produced by the horizons of partnership and synergy of the eras of the noosphere world based on the humanistic and ecumenist principles of life, such as good and happiness.

– segmented situational practices of the terrorist stylistics of the multi-format implementation of the multifunctional dynamically-selective destruction of statehood, algorithms of democratic principles of international law, social trust in the partner horizons of the capacity for peaceful lifestyle, mental health, spiritual religious principles of ecumenism and long-standing practices of peaceful life in the paradigm of dreams and happiness of a person, a citizen, society, country, continent and the civilized world.

Global hybrid terrorism is an antipode of the conventional war.

Humanitarian convoy of Putin’s Russia – vehicular invasion of the sovereign territory of Ukraine (unauthorized border crossing) which is sta-

Communication-content security: tistically usually documented by the general public instead of being inspected and verified in accordance with domestic and international legislation and is a form of paramilitary terrorist practices.

The current political regime of the Russian Federation creates a positive connotation for such humanitarian convoys amongst the international community by using the dynamic capabilities of the accentuated and creative design of the linguistic support of their communication-content aggression in the translations of the information about the humanitarian convoys into foreign languages and forces the foreign citizens to believe in the narrative of the civil war in Ukraine.

In cases, when the globalized instruments of the communication-content aggressions are used in this manner, particular attention is paid to the headlines on Putin's humanitarian convoys, since the content of the headlines is what remains in the memory of an average person.

It is advisable to perceive this as an international emergency event/process.

Spiritual-psychological confrontation (opposition) – state, security, spiritual and psychological support of an individual under the conditions of direct threats to life and health, sudden psychophysiological overloads and extreme states in uniquely radical situations associated with fulfilling professional duties in the era of the accelerated development of total cynicism (systematic cycles of violent confrontations under the conditions of permanent aggressions and global hybrid terrorism practices) communication-content, planetary and geostrategic dominance of neo-barbarism.

Informational-psychological confrontation – dominant regulatory abstraction of the methodological and functional scale of the era of security geopolitical statuses (statics) and real special practices of the Cold War period geopolitical confrontations, which in its real status monopoly and traditional perception and understanding denies, disorients and neutralizes instantaneous dynamic environments of the existence of an individual, psycho-mental (age-related), geositional and social anthropological affiliations, linguistic conceptual sphere-based existence compositions in the processes of self-expression and self-realization, flow-excessive information globality in the technologically industrial, situationally creative dimensions of the communication-content component of the information security of the state and civilization.

Information space – interconnected segmented framework-model of

real values and states of information fields of certain territories and socio-territorial communicational-content environments of settlements, which according to the standard operating procedures are clearly marked by state borders, but in terms of functions go beyond the borders both inertially and stylistically.

Information object – public reflection of real objects and phenomena (person, territories, organization, social systems and institutions, public executions, etc.) and information objects that have no physical embodiment (myths, accents, facts, beliefs, etc.) in the structure of the information space of the state.

Information challenge – a resonance event topic, a problem, a process characterizing security issues in the broadest sense for the continent, groups of states, states, nations, communities, individuals and is often not directly linked to the security sector (the Armed Forces of Ukraine), although the development of an information wave may grow into both an informational risk and an information threat directly to the Armed Forces, the security sector and the state as a whole.

Information risk – a result of the development of information processes, when the prospect of public coverage of a topic does not completely discredit the security activity of the state, but indirectly comes very close to the implementation of discrediting information acts by both public adversaries and partners, who in the competitive activities to protect their direct functions or interests constantly “enter the territory” of the functions of the state security structures.

Information threats – direct discrediting processes, which often lack continuity both in temporal and territorial sense, as well as in the areas of responsibility, since they target different parts of the state security sector. Development of these processes in the information space often leads to systematic crisis phenomena in a certain functional field of the security sector and to public catastrophic collapses of the managerial procedures in a given situation.

Communication-content aggressions – dynamic formats of content flows that redirect the attention of society in the direction defined by the aggressor with the aim of establishing the dominance of imposed understandings, processes, facts and events.

Kremlin’s communication-content aggressions in the world – a complex of special state corporate and religious-denominational measures,

Communication-content security: aimed at creating another, virtual reality in the minds of average citizens of various countries of the world, as well as at shaping the public opinion in a way that would help to forcefully reform administrative structure of a state or a group of states in a manner defined by Kremlin.

Kremlin's communication-content aggressions against Ukraine – complex multi-level technologically creative advancement of multi-format issues, topics, ideas, the fundamental basis of which is the ideological concept of the “Russian world”, with the aim of achieving communicative infiltration into various social groups of information product consumers in order to render the Ukrainian national resistance impossible and to return the Ukrainian society under the paternalistic influence of the orbit of the Russian Empire stylistics with the subsequent total destruction of environments bearing the humanistic values of a peaceful civilization.

Communication-content security – creation of legal conditions on the national and international levels, professional technological motivations, infrastructural solutions for the adequate simultaneous development of the communication-content processes that would accelerate the crystallization of modern communication dimensions in communities of different scales and provide the ability to use the present and future range of flow content information formats. Advanced comprehensive development of the communication-content security of Ukraine can protect from the contemporary flow-oriented public negatives (challenges, risks and threats) and geostrategic flow-oriented public aggressions manifested by thirds countries or planetary actors.

Communication-content fake – transfer of the original fact (context flow reality of a discourse) into a different geopositional reality of geostrategic scale by the means of information excessiveness (public dynamics) of the communication-content flows and under the condition of creation of a situationally torn publicity development state.

Maidan – national mental geostrategic phenomenon of the civil ecumenist realization of the national responsibility for the state and perspectives of communities, territory, state and country that is implemented through the catharsis of the public dialogue between society and current government.

Maidan of Freedom (2004) – social and national self-identification of the Ukrainian citizenship, as an institution of freedom of a united political nation established to freely create an environment suitable for the equal-

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ly promising personalities bearing this citizenship (as opposed to it being based on status hierarchies of the managerial scale of historical and mental priorities of the post-colonial past).

Maidan of Dignity (2014) – highest state of the legalization of personal integrity and civic partnership values in the horizons of the living environments that provide for the peaceful implementation of humanist (ecumenical) values into the social and state processes, as well as into the daily realities of the Maidan society and their transformed peacefully civilized country.

Maidan Ukraine – innovative, promising and motivational image/brand describing the mission of a country in the global world of responsible partnership; a societal community of decent, independent, capable citizens and their social groups with real and functional distribution of power, that operate based on the humanistic and ecumenist values of the era of noospheric synergy of people living a peaceful life and the prospects of a peaceful planetary civilizational society.

Post truth – false interpretation of the situational context of events, phenomena and processes aimed at replacing the obvious understanding of any given case with an understanding beneficial for the communication-content aggressor. This forms an indicative state of a respective (defined by the aggressor) mass (public) situational comprehension of the meaning behind the real events and is reflected in a certain (selected by the aggressor) segment of the information space of a country.

Public threat – direct public situational dynamic discreditation of a field (a person) with direct managerial responsibilities, when the public attention leads to definite reputational losses of not only the target of the threat, but also the entire social corporate system.

Public presence – situational and/or contextual ratings of the presence of all objects, persons, sectors of public attention within the positioning system with an obligatory background.

Content dominance strategy – a complex of technological and technical resource-based measures, aimed at dynamic distribution of a certain content within an information space in order to popularize or implement (impose) a certain state policy paradigm.

Publicity statics and dynamics – stages (eras) of a qualitative change of the information space, that envisage the development of digital modules of journalistic technological and communicational instrumentarium, the

Communication-content security: initial parameters of which are knowledge, understanding, vision, argumentative compositions of emphasis, energy, stylistics, situational communication-content content design, etc.

The statics are defined as the period in the development of the information space of a country, in which the authorship was based on professional status, always documented and dependent on law and managerial standards.

The dynamics are defined as the period in the development of the information space of a country, when the journalistic technological instruments become self-generating and less restricted by law, as now they function on the level of a human reflex, rather than a conscious act, competency or a technological (nano-neurological) algorithm.

Ukrainian testing field of the GHT – limited military activities of an aggressor accompanied by a simultaneous use of an array of comprehensive manifestations of the terrorist communication-content practices in all segments of life in Ukraine and on the territories where the global Ukrainian community is present. These activities are aimed at destroying the institutions of democracy, traditions, mental potentials, history of the statehood and state-building practices, peaceful way of life, trust, horizontal cooperative partnership of extending national opportunities and global capabilities. Ukrainian training field is particular because here the aggressor uses the widest arsenal of the GHT practices, which are subsequently improved to be used in other countries of the world, as well as on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Chechen testing field of the GHT – testing of military and ethnic mafia-style instruments aimed at allowing the federal and regional government of Putin's Russian Federation to enslave the people (trap them in the monopolistic dependencies of corporate totalitarianism) by using terrorist practices targeting religious beliefs of the local population.

Polish testing field of the GHT – geostrategic technogenic practice of a non-recurrent destruction of a governmental establishment by the means of law enforcement structures and legislative systems of Putin's Russia; establishment of a public dominance of defined topics (the catastrophe of the presidential plane, the history of relations with Ukraine, Israel, etc.) by the means of stylistics-based monopolistic dominance of the communication-content resources of Putin's Russia in the information spaces of the global world; legislative and organizational unpreparedness of the interna-

tional security organization to counter Kremlin's global hybrid terrorism.

Georgian testing field of the GHT – geostrategic practices of occupying and forcefully maintaining control over occupied territories against international law and the provisions of international institutions (UN, OSCE, etc.) with simultaneous moderation of communication-content geopolitical discourses and discreditation of the creators of Georgian modernization reforms with the aim of humiliating global democracy, as a way of establishing civilization justice.

Syrian testing field of the GHT (since 2015) – geositional version-game-based arena, which is the doppelganger of the Ukrainian GHT testing field with the simultaneous creatively technological use of communication-content aggressions against the global democracy (battlefields: world and civil war, world and ISIS, world and ATO).

Syrian testing field is a platform for the development of the global planetary dominance technologies in the diplomatic, geostrategic and communication-content dimensions of public attention by the means of the artificially moderated dynamic influences targeting all of the socially situational configurations of elites and societal groups of the contemporary planet. This approach also envisages an active use of the effective complexes of dynamic public energies to motivate the youth of developed democratic states, that is facing a personal fulfilment crisis caused by the lack of massive online services and public societal horizons for broadening the range of self-realization opportunities in the realities of the contemporary democracy (industrial era), to actively join the practices of direct and indirect global hybrid terrorism (ISIS strategies).

A defining feature of the GHT communication-content aggression in Syria is the full-fledged and multi-format employment of such practices against all parties of the civil conflict with the aim of achieving absolute public dominance and subsequently creating a unified and multi-version evaluation of the situation on the international level. This Kremlin's GHT technology is predominantly aimed at ensuring Russia's return into the ranks of the most influential global political actors.

Korean division of the GHT – narrowly focused nuclear mental-ethical challenge/threat as a unique resource opportunity of holding global public attention on the scale of the planetary geostrategic blackmailing.

ISIS: combined division of the GHT – narrowly focused, highly dynamic, motivational destruction model of the contemporary democratic

Communication-content security: world by the hands of young people in the hybrid missionary pseudo-paradigm of the salvation of a single religion (Islam) in the horizon of the existing and potential geostrategic platforms of the planet; development and testing of the effective motivation complexes of the GHT targeting young people from the developed democracies (industrial era) that are unable to fulfil or express themselves in the contemporary public-social horizons of the extending capabilities of generation 4.0 mass online services.

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Communication-Content Security: Hybrid Messianic Aggressions.
Ukraine: 2014-2017: Training manual for communication-content
(informational) resistance specialists.

Desktop publishing: Hlib Korol
English translation: Anastasiia Shpartak

Passed for printing Digital print. Offset paper.
Page size 60x84/16. Conventional printing sheets
Order number

Publisher and manufacturer: Sole proprietorship Lopatina O.O.
www.publishpro.com.ua
phone number: +38 044 501 36 70
Publishing business subject certificate
DK № 5317 of 03.04.2017